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ABSTRACT
TRADITIONALISM AND PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
PROCESSING AS QUALITATIVELY DISTINCT
MODELS OF THE MIND
FEBRUARY 1996
MARY M. LITCH, B.S., OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lynne Rudder Baker
My main concern in this work is answering the question: does
parallel distributed processing (PDP) as a model of the mind offer a
genuine alternative to traditionalism? There has been vigorous
debate within the last eight years on the subject of the relative
merits of the one model over the other; however, a detailed
examination of the nature of their respective differences has not
been attempted.
The mental realm is that realm in which causal interaction is
governed by laws quantifying over representational states.
Traditionalism is the thesis that the law-governed transitions
between mental states are transitions between computational states.
PDP is the thesis that the transitions between mental states are
transitions between distributed representational states in a PDP-
type system. The representational content of a distributed state is
determined by the causal history of the system as a whole, and
results from the changing of system parameters via learning so as to
insert this state in the causal chain between the perception of some
external state-of-affairs and behavior.
v
Traditionalism and PDP are best considered not as providing a
detailed picture of the causal processes involved in mental activity,
but rather as providing a general framework that sets broad
constraints on how such law-governed transitions proceed. I
describe two aspects of qualitative distinctness that can be used
even when comparing such non-specific models. The first involves
examining the ontological commitment of each: assuming a realist
interpretation, what must exist if traditionalism (or PDP) is a true
model of the mind? If the two models make the same commitments,
one may ask the further question: do the constraints imposed on the
form that mental causal transitions take allow the possibility of an
isomorphism between causal sequences permitted by the one model
with those permitted by the other? An examination of the manner
in which representational content is determined within PDP systems
shows that there is no possible isomorphism. Therefore, the two
models are qualitatively distinct.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of the Issue
My main concern in this work is to argue that two widely held
views of how the mind works present genuine alternatives to one
another: the model of the mind associated with the one view is
qualitatively distinct from the model associated with the other. The
two models being compared are traditionalism and parallel
distributed processing (PDP). “Traditionalism” is the name I have
chosen to designate that model of the mind commonly held within
post-behaviorist psychology and mainstream artificial intelligence.
It is also known as “classicism”, “symbolism”, and
“computationalism”. Among philosophers, its most oft-cited
proponent is Jerry Fodor. According to traditionalism, the causally
efficacious mental states are structured, and the manipulation of
these states is governed by formalizable rules. Parallel distributed
processing (also known as “connectionism” and “the neural networks
approach”) is a newer model of the mind gaining in popularity
within the cognitive science community. According to PDP, cognitive
processes are implemented in networks of many interconnected,
simple processing units.
The title of this dissertation, “Traditionalism and Parallel
Distributed Processing as Qualitatively Distinct Models of the Mind”,
provides a key into the structure of the remaining four chapters.
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Obviously, my argument that the two models are indeed
qualitatively distinct is premised on a particular interpretation of
the four key phrases found within the title. Each of Chapters 2-5
includes an explication of one of the four phrases. Thus, Chapter 2
poses and then answers the question: what is a model of the mind?
Chapters 3 and 4 provide an analysis of traditionalism and PDP as
models of the mind, respectively. Chapter 5 begins with a discussion
of what it means for two models to be qualitatively distinct. Once
the task of explication is complete, my actual argument for the
qualitative distinctness of the two models follows rather easily.
In the rest of this section, I provide an overview of the line of
argument found in the body of the dissertation. This overview
should aid the reader in obtaining a feel for the philosophical
landscape of the work, so that my motivation for including the
particular topics and the particular arguments in subsequent pages
becomes transparent. Stated in more poetic terms, the remainder of
this section describes the layout of the forest and the examination of
individual trees begins in Chapter 2.
The first topic to consider involves the meaning of “model of
the mind” when applied to either traditionalism or PDP. A clear
understanding of causation is integral to the interpretation of one
system as a model of another, so I begin my examination of the
concept of modelhood with an analysis of causation. 1 I assume a
lMy greatest complaint against those who write in the field of cognitive
science is that they so often employ words understandable only in the context
of a particular interpretation of causation, yet fail to make their assumed \ie\\
of causation explicit. A case in point is provided by Smolensky s "On the
Proper Treatment of Connectionism", which is the most widely read work by a
PDP researcher within the philosophical literature on PDP. Although he
repeatedlv refers to representational states within PDP systems, and to a
2
modified Lewisian view of causation: the causal laws are
determined by simplicity and strength criteria. These laws are
analogous to axioms, which, in combination with the initial
conditions, yield the set of facts. I must make several amendations
to Lewis
' original proposal in order to produce a theory that allows
for the existence of psychological laws. 2 I prefer Lewis approach to
causation, because, with the accompanying possible worlds
interpretation of counterfactuals, I am able to explain how
representational content can be causally efficacious within the
framework of a physicalist metaphysics. This is an important
feature, given that this whole work presupposes that there are
mental causal laws, and that these laws pick out the states based on
their representational content.
I must here differentiate between two senses of “model”, as
that word appears within the phrase “model of the mind”. According
to one sense, a model is the supplier of a general, abstract
framework: it is not a concrete instantiation, hence, it cannot be said
relationship between the dynamics of PDP systems and cognitive processes, he
describes neither how representational states could possibly arise within such
systems nor how the relationship between PDP system states and cognitive
states is to be understood. As I shall argue in later chapters, the resolution of
both of these questions involves an explication of causation and its role in
determining meaning. The result of this failure to make the underlying
theory of causation explicit is sometimes arguments with ambiguous premises,
and a tendency for the potentially philosophically interesting exchanges
between proponents of traditionalism and proponents of PDP to degrade into
the two camps “talking past” one another, because they bring to the
discussion differing understandings of what causation (and, in particular,
causation as applied to the mental realm) is.
^One of several key assumptions to be found in this work is that there are
mental causal laws. I nowhere attempt to justify this claim against either of
the two groups opposed to the existence of mental causal laws. As a result,
convinced eliminativists and non-eliminativist philosophers and
psychologists who maintain that mental causal laws as such do not exist will
right from the start want to reject my analysis of mental modelhood.
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to itself instantiate causal laws. Rather, a model in this sense
supplies a set of guidelines according to which a concrete
instantiation of the model would be constructed. “Model” in the
other sense refers to the concrete instantiation itself. Thus, when
one refers to a model as a concrete physical object, subject to causal
laws, one is using “model” in this second sense. Strictly speaking,
traditionalism and PDP each are the supplier of a model of the mind
in the first sense. However, I sometimes refer to, for example, a PDP
system (i.e., a physical implementation of a network along PDP lines)
as a model of the mind. This ambiguity in the word “model” allows
me to avoid use of the more cumbersome, but technically more
correct descriptor “concrete implementation of a system subject to
the constraints supplied by the PDP model of the mind”, when
refering to such a PDP system. I hope that in each case the context
in which “model of the mind” appears makes its clear which sense of
“model” is meant.
When we use one system to model another, we imply that the
modelling system reproduces certain relevant features of the
modelled system. Clearly, relevancy is relative to our purposes. If
our purpose in using the model is to explain the behavior of the
modelled system, one relevant feature of the modelled system is the
set of causal laws operative in producing the behavior (or, more
precisely, the set of causal laws operative in producing the subset of
behavior of the modelled system of interest to us). Thus, an
explanatory model’s behavior will not only mirror the behavior of
the modelled system, but will do so by virtue of instantiating the
same causal laws responsible for the behavior in the modelled
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system. If our purpose in using one system as a model of another is
merely prediction, all that is required is that the modelling system
reproduce the sequence of states of the modelled system, without
regard to whether or not that sequence is reproduced by
instantiating the same causal processes. When proponents of
traditionalism and PDP put their respective models forward, they do
so with the understanding that the models can be used not merely to
predict, but also to explain mental phenomena -- that the mental
causal laws operative in (biologically-based) entities are likewise
operative in bringing about the state transitions associated with
their respective models. (A related thesis endorsed by both camps
is that mentation is nothing above and beyond the instantiation of
mental causal laws. In particular, issues relating to consciousness
and its role in mentation are not a concern.)
One sees then, why, within the domain of cognitive science, it
is so important to make explicit the interpretation of causation being
presupposed. In order for a system to be an explanatory model of
the mind, it must at a minimum be the sort of system that can
possibly instantiate mental causal laws. Since these laws quantify
over representational states, the system must likewise be capable of
supporting representational states. To say (for example) that
traditionalism is a model of the mind is then to say that a system
structured according to the traditionalist guidelines can support
tokens of the very same state types mentioned by the mental causal
laws, and that the transitions between these states are governed by
the mental causal laws.
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What, then, distinguishes a traditionalist model: what
constraints does traditionalism place on the hypothesized structure
of the mind? (This is the second of the four key phrases in the
dissertation title.) According to this view, the mind is a computer,
not in the concrete sense in which "computer" is most often used
(namely, as a particular piece of hardware), but in the abstract sense
in which the term appears in the theory of computation. A
computer is defined as something that engages in computation,
which is in turn defined as something with readily identifiable states
whose transition function is described by a formal, explicit
algorithm. How these states (usually called "computational states")
are realized is irrelevant: they could equally well be "realized" in
the total states of an abstract Turing machine (the system state +
tape contents + position of the read/write head) or in the states of a
garden-variety silicon-based computer or in the states of a human
nervous system. 3
The theory of computation has advanced to the point where
the border of the class of computable functions is well-known.
Traditionalism assumes not only that mental state transitions
constitute a computable function, but also that mental processing is
computational processing, whereby the formalizable rules that force
the mental state transitions are the mental causal laws. This
hypothesis places clear constraints on the nature of mental
processing. Two that bear directly to my main argument in this
work are that: (1) any possible transition sequence of mental states
3This of course glosses over the fact that all real computers are resource-
bounded, whereas the standard Turing machine is not.
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consistent with traditionalism must be computable, and (2) the
representational content of a particular mental state is inherited
from the representational content of the computational state of
which it is an instance.
A view that goes hand-in-hand with traditionalism is the
language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. Within the theory of
computation, it is the total computational state that, strictly
speaking, must be rule-governed. According to the LOT hypothesis,
those monolithic computational states that are also mental states
have structure to which the mental causal laws are sensitive: in
particular, they have a combinatorial semantic structure that
mirrors a combinatorial syntactic structure. This structure explains
certain attributes of mental phenomena (e.g., its systematicity ) . An
implicit assumption of the argument for the LOT is that the semantic
structural parts of these mental states are the same as (or, at least,
very similar to) the semantic structural parts of our natural
language. Thus, a further feature of traditionalism (via its
association with the LOT argument) is that the level of reality
represented by the mental states is that of word-concepts and
propositions (i.e., entities easily representable in natural language).
A final point to note on traditionalism is its (sometimes
love/hate) relationship with folk psychology (i.e., the "folk" theory
explaining the behavior of mind-possessing beings by reference to
beliefs, desires, etc. held by the entity and a set of generalizations
Unking the having of certain beliefs and desires with certain types of
behavior). I explicitly distinguish the two: traditionalism is
coherent on the view that mental states are something other than
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beliefs, desires, and all the rest. However, what traditionalism
would be in that case is unclear. As a result, within this text,
whenever I want to illustrate a traditionalist principle with a
concrete example, I pull one from the domain of folk psychology.
This does not, however, demonstrate an equation of the two.
Indeed, folk psychology is best viewed as a specification of
traditionalism: traditionalism provides the broad framework and
folk psychology provides the particular details (i.e., the set of
efficacious mental states and mental causal laws).
Parallel distributed processing, on the other hand, is not so
widely familiar (and, may I dare to say, not so intuitive) as a model
of the mind. It has gained in popularity over the last decade or so to
the point where many within the cognitive science community view
it as a rival to the continued hegemony of traditionalism. Its earliest
roots are in neuroscience -- initially PDP networks were constructed
as models of neural processing within the brain. Because of its
relative youth, there is not even a consensus within the field of PDP
researchers about what their current systems are modelling. In this
work, I explicitly assume that PDP is interpreted as a model of the
mind. This means that I identify states within PDP networks that
are capable of supporting representational content, and construe the
PDP model of the mind as the view that the way that these
meaningful states follow upon one another is the very same way in
which the mentally causally efficacious states in biologically-based
agents follow upon one another. One consequence of my siding with
the mind-modelling (as opposed to the brain-modelling) contingent
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among PDP researchers is that I downplay the physiological
plausibility angle that one often meets in the PDP literature.
The most striking feature of PDP networks is that they consist
of many simple processing units that pass signals to one another.
The connections along which these signals are passed have a
(perhaps alterable) number encoding the strength of connection
between the unit sending the signal and the unit receiving it. This
number is called the "weight". Each unit instantiates a simple
function of the sum of the weight x output value (one product per
unit to which this unit is connected); this output will in turn serve as
input for the other units with which this unit connects. The pattern
of connections for a network is one of the features determining its
architecture. Some networks have bidirectional connections (i.e., if
unit-a is connected to unit-b, then unit-b is connected to unit-a).
Other networks are segmentable into layers, such that information
passes (via the connections) in only one direction. (This net-type is
called "feed forward".) Still other networks are predominately feed
forward, but allow some connections to go "in the other direction".
The network architecture determines the class of functions
that a PDP system can instantiate, and, hence, the types of tasks that
it can perform; some network architectures are extremely limited in
their task-solving capabilities, whereas others are powerful enough
to instantiate any Turing-computable function. It is important for
the reader to keep in mind that instantiating a function is not the
same as computing it. In particular, PDP systems do not engage in
computation. (Many contributors to the PDP literature, both PDP
researchers and philosophers, fail to note this point. However, as
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even a cursory examination of PDP system dynamics shows, PDP
networks fail to satisfy the conditions for a computational process, as
understood within the theory of computation.)
This said, how then does a PDP state possess representational
content, if it is in theory disbarred from inheriting it from the
corresponding computational state? This question leads naturally
into a discussion of how representation is in general explained. I
adopt Dretske' s approach to the naturalization of content: a state (in
this case, a state in a PDP system) comes to mean x when the state
comes to play a causal role mediating the presence-of-x and
behavior appropriate to the presence-of-x (for example, avoidance
behavior when x s are dangerous to the continued survival of the
system as a whole). Dretske's theory constitutes, I think, the best
hope for the naturalization of content, and it applies just as well to
artificial mental agents as to biological ones.
His theory does, however, make learning a necessary feature
for any such agent, as the causal role that a particular state takes on
is a result of learning. I mentioned above that, within PDP systems,
each unit's connections has associated with it a weight. Learning
within PDP is accomplished by the changes of these weights over
time, as the system adapts itself to its environment: as learning
progresses, the system becomes more and more likely to produce
the "correct" behavior, given its immediate environmental
conditions. Various methods for achieving this directed changing of
weights have been developed for use with PDP networks; the most
popular is called "back-propagation" (or, usually, just "back-prop").
Using this technique, networks can be effectively (albeit slowly)
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trained to correlate certain inputs (e.g., detection of the presence of
an x) with certain outputs (e.g., guidance of behavior appropriate to
the presence of an x). In particular, the states mediating this
correlation meet all of Dretske's criteria for the attainment of
intentional state status.
There is a good deal of debate, even within the mind-
modelling contingent amongst PDP researchers, as to which states
within PDP systems are the bearers of content. This issue is all the
more contentious because there are two dimensions to consider: ( 1
)
Is it the unit level or the patterns over units level that provides the
correct level of analysis of a PDP system as a model of the mind?
(Are the intentional states, the contents of which are quantified over
in mental causal laws, to be found at the unit or at the pattern
level?) (2) Is it the unit output state that is the sought after
representational state, or the weight state, or perhaps both together?
In my analysis of PDP as a model of the mind, I identify the output4
plus weight state over patterns of units as the states that, by virtue
of their content, participate in mental causal laws. This content, like
that associated with the causally efficacious states within
traditionalism, is at the level of word-concepts and propositions (i.e.,
again, as with traditionalism, those objects and statements that are
easily representable in natural language).
PDP is useful as a model of the mind because the transitions
between these states can be studied (both within the framework of
particular experiments and theoretically) in isolation from much of
^Technically speaking, I adopt the activation value as one component of the
meaning state, not the output. This difference, though, is not of any
theoretical importance.
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the psychologically irrelevant details that co-occur in humans. The
mathematical basis of the syntax of PDP systems is fairly well
understood, and can be tapped to provide information on the
constraints governing transitions amongst these states. PDP as
model of the mind holds that these constraints are operative in any
mind-possessing being, and result from the causal governedness of
mental state transitions.
The final of the four key phrases within the statement
"traditionalism and PDP are qualitatively distinct models of the
mind" relates to qualitative distinctness. What is it? What criteria
must be satisfied when two models are qualitatively distinct? My
choice of words indicate that what I am after is a general framework
for deciding whether two scientific theories (irrespective of their
domain) are the same theory with a difference in terminology,
distinct theories differing only in quantitative respects, or really two
theories with differences that allow neither an easy intertranslation
nor an easy shifting from one to the other by a change in the value
of some constant appearing in both theories. My initial reaction to
this need was to use Kuhn's "incommensurability" to try to
accomplish this task, but I quickly abandoned that concept as
inappropriate. I therefore developed the notion of qualitative
distinctness, which is, perhaps, best explained by giving the
algorithm that tests for it. The algorithm consists of two stages. In
the first, one asks whether the two theories differ with respect to
their ontological commitments. This is accomplished by giving a
realist interpretation to each of the two theories, and asking, for
each one: what must exist if this theory is true? Among the
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ontological commitments of a theory are its very broad metaphysical
assumptions, plus a commitment to the existence of the objects and
their states quantified over in the causal laws forming that theory.
If the two theories differ with respect to their ontological
commitments, then they are qualitatively distinct. If not, one
continues to the second stage of the test for qualitative distinctness.
This second stage involves sameness of posited causal
processes. Given that both theories have the same ontological
commitments with respect to the causally efficacious entities, one
first matches up the corresponding entities across the two theories.
The two theories are qualitatively distinct when the causal relation
within the one theory is not isomorphic to the causal relation within
the other, using the correspondence mentioned above as mapping.
When such an isomorphism exists, the two theories are qualitatively
indistinct.5
Once this (extended) bit of stage-setting is complete in Chapter
5, I can give my answer: traditionalism and PDP are qualitatively
distinct models of the mind. .Although the two theories make the
same ontological commitments, the constraints on the possible sets
of causal laws imposed by the two implies that there will be no
possible isomorphism.
5 Actually, this is too simple, for this way of putting it distinguishes theories
differing only in quantitative ways.
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1.2 Relation of Issue to Other Areas of Philosophy
Even the above sketch is sufficient to show that this
dissertation is not easily pigeon-holed into one of the traditional
areas of philosophy. While my top-level concern is in the
philosophy of mind, I also deal with issues more properly part of the
philosophy of science.
The most obvious classic philosophical issue that I address is
the nature of the mental. For both traditionalism and PDP, to have a
mind is to engage in mentation; to engage in mentation is to possess
representational states, the transitions between which are governed
by the mental causal laws; the mental causal laws are those laws of
nature that advert to content. The main difference between
traditionalism and PDP relates to the transition function between
mental states. It is just as important to note what is omitted in
traditionalism ' s and PDP' s account of the mind. We see no mention
whatsoever of an aspect of human mentation that some philosophers
take as a defining characteristic; namely, consciousness.
In both traditionalism and PDP, the overarching goal (so
overarching, that most researchers within both camps are probably
unaware of it) is to explain mentation, and, in particular, to make
room for the causal efficacy of mental states within a broad
physicalist framework. In this regard, they find company with those
philosophers who reject both eliminativism and dualistic-based
attempts to argue for the reality of mind. Even traditionalism, with
its Cartesianesque rationalist assumptions with respect to the
14
innateness of the mental conceptual framework, thoroughly rejects
Cartesian metaphysics.
In addition to the above issues, this dissertation also deals in
depth with some topics most often associated with the philosophy of
science. The most prominent of these surrounds the nature of
causation: what is it in general, and how is the causal efficacy of
mental states in particular to be understood? As already mentioned,
I adopt a Lewisian construal of causation, but modify it so as to
make it more realist in general, and more amenable to the existence
of causal processes at levels other than that of basic physics. The
appropriateness of the attribution of realism to this modified view is
achieved by (1) assuming that a rationalist explication of the (true)
simplicity and strength criteria can (at least, in theory) be given, and
(2) giving a realist interpretation to the closeness ordering on the
possible worlds. My motivation for bringing in possible worlds
(which are, I think, best to be avoided if at all possible, given their
metaphysical suspectness) is to help explain how content can be
causally relevant. I emphasize repeatedly (especially in Chapter 2)
that philosophers have been too quick to discard content. Thus we
see Stich's "syntactic theory of the mind" and Fodor s
"methodological solipsism" as rather misguided attempts to justify
the continued use of terminology referring to the mind and to
mental states. Their respective attempts are counterproductive, in
my view, for the theory of the "mind" that remains after meaning as
a causally relevant property has been removed is no theory of the
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mind at all . 6 I trace this misguided rejection of content back to a
misconstrual of the counterfactual testing for the causal relevance of
content. The need for a worked-out interpretation schema for the
analysis of counterfactual statements thus drives me to Lewis.
A second topic that I take up in this dissertation that is also
labelled as a part of the philosophy of science involves the autonomy
of scientific disciplines. If both models of the mind are through and
through physicalist, then there must be either reductive or at least
supervenient relations linking mental states and physical states.
Doesn't the presumed existence of these relations make all non-
physical states (in particular, mental states) causally inert? The
generally assumed ceteris paribus nature of all causal laws outside
of basic physics lends additional weight to the argument that causal
processes, properly understood, occur only at the level of basic
physics. In the course of arguing against this limitation of the scope
of "causation", I consider evidence both pro and con relevant to the
topic.
A third area of concern (also a quintessential part of the
philosophy of science) within this work is the relationship between
two models attempting to explain the same level of reality. If
traditionalism and PDP both are models of the mind, must they
necessarily be understood as competing (in the sense that
consistency requires that the acceptance of one implies the rejection
of the other)? If it is possible for them to be non-competing, what
would that mean for their relationship to one another and for the
6 Fodor is less than consistent in his rejection of meaning as causally relevant;
thus, 1 isolate the "solipsistic" tendency within his writings as the less
representative of his view as reconstructed by me.
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nature of the mind? While I examine this issue using traditionalism
and PDP as examples, the same concerns and questions apply to
other scientific domains.
There are a few other subtopics within the philosophy of
science that I touch on (e.g., the sociology of scientific practice a la
Kuhn), but they are best viewed as side-issues, not directly relevant
to the line of argument that I develop in the following four chapters.
1.3 Relation of Issue to Other Disciplines
The issues being considered in this dissertation span not only
multiple areas within philosophy, but also multiple disciplines. In
particular, the other disciplines with interests in cognitive science
(i.e., psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience) are the
suppliers of many of the concepts and theories that appear
throughout the rest of the work.
Artificial intelligence 7 is the provider of the two models being
compared. Normal scientific practice within AI is not concerned
with the implications, whether conceptual or psychological, of its
research. Rather, the usual methodology is to isolate some
interesting task and to then try to build a particular system that can
solve it. While AI is thoroughly empirical, the issue of whether the
constructed system solves the task in the same way as a human
would is irrelevant. Perhaps a human task-solver can serve as a
7
1 include under this rubric all attempts at producing intelligence via non-
natural svstems. Thus, PDP is just as much a part of AI as traditionalism. When
I mean to refer only to the traditionalist wing of AI, I use the phrase
"mainstream AI".
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source of ideas for strategies to use in the construction of the
artifical system, but the question of whether the machine is doing
the same thing as the human is a non-issue. To this extent, AI has
remained faithful to Turing's original advice vis-a-vis testing for
intelligence: roughly, if a system s behavior leads you to think it is
intelligent, then it is . 8 The traditionalist and PDP models, as tools of
AI, help to constrain the search for a system that can solve the task.
So, for example, a PDP researcher identifies a target task, and sets
about answering the question: can an artificial system with a PDP
architecture solve this task?
It is only in the hands of the cognitive psychologist that the
two AI frameworks take on the role of genuine mental models. A
reconstruction of the process by which psychologists have come to
accept either of the two models might go something like this. AI has
produced artificial systems that can solve some cognitively
interesting tasks. Perhaps the abstract architecture implemented
within (either traditionalist or PDP) AI systems is the same as that
implemented in the mind. Let's work on that assumption and see if
the data from psychological experiments fits the model. The
theoretical advantage of the AI models over some other potential
candidate model is that the former are consonant with physicalism,
and the vast majority of psychologists assume a physicalist
metaphysics. As with my above portrayal of AI, this portrayal of
cognitive psychology is also an oversimplification. Of course, some
8 Clearly, this portrayal of "normal science" is a generalization of what goes
on in the process of research within AI labs. Many AI researchers are
interested in reproducing not only I/O behavior related to human task-
solving, but also the intermediate steps involved. In doing so, however, they
are entering the domain properly belonging to psychology.
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cognitive psychologists have research interests only tangentially
related to that above (e.g., those psychologists interested in the
relationship between mind and brain are a case in point). And, of
course, people outside of cognitive psychology are interested in
empirical support for one or the other model. Indeed, Fodor's
language of thought argument is, I think, best viewed as belonging
to the domain of psychology .9
It is clear that my concern here is philosophical rather than
psychological, for I explicitly state my lack of interest in empirically-
based arguments of any kind. (I expend effort in examining the LOT
argument only to help elucidate the traditionalist position vis-a-vis
the level of reality represented by mental states and to consider but
then reject the transcendentalist interpretation of it.) I state here
and will from time to time reiterate this lack of interest. One result
is the neglect of the question: which of the two models is the best?
While the traditionalism versus PDP debate revolves around this
question, I disregard it as outside of the proper domain of
philosophy.
The last discipline to consider within cognitive science is
neuroscience; in particular, that area of neuroscience concerned with
the relationship between neural and mental level phenomena. This
dissertation contains very little of interest to the neuroscientist. In
fact, I only touch on neuroscientific issues in providing a brief
history of the development of PDP.
9
1 shall interpret the LOT argument, not as a transcendental argument, but as
an inference to the best explanation.
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1.4 Personalities and Their Positions
Many writers have expressed their view on the issue of the
superiority of either traditionalism or PDP as a model of the mind.
Within these writings, one can often tease out assumptions relating
directly to the topic of this dissertation: namely, are the two models
qualitatively distinct?
The philosopher most often cited in the literature on this topic
is Jerry Fodor. He clearly enunciates his view that the two models
are qualitatively distinct. His reasoning is that empirical evidence
supports the interpretation of traditionalism as a model of the mind
and PDP as a model of the implementation level of the mind.
Because the two models are models of different things, they must be
qualitatively distinct . 10
Another author whose views are often cited is Paul Smolensky
(an AI researcher and supporter of PDP as the correct model of the
mind). He is likewise of the opinion that the two models are
qualitatively distinct, although, as one might guess, his reasons differ
from those of Fodor and Pylyshyn. For him, PDP at the unit level of
description is the correct model of the mind, and traditionalism is an
approximation to the gross characteristics of pattern level activity.
Thus he, like Fodor and Pylyshyn, understands traditionalism and
PDP as modelling two distinct levels of reality. He describes the
relationship between traditionalism and PDP as analogous to that
10Recause Fodor co-wrote with Zenon Pylyshyn (a computer scientist and
mainstream AI researcher) the first work in which he explicitly mentions
PDP, I use both names whenever I refer to the LOT argument as applied
specifically to the issue of the adequacy of PDP as a model of the mind.
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between Newtonian and quantum mechanics: the laws of quantum
physics are the true, counterfactual supporting laws governing all
transitions between physical states. The laws of Newtonian physics,
while offering accurate predictions over a limited range of physical
phenomena, are only an approximation of the underlying, genuine
physical laws. Thus, in a sense, quantum physics implements
Newtonian physics (at least to the extent that the laws of the latter
can be derived from an averaging over a very large number of
individual quantum mechanical processes). Just so, PDP provides the
true mental causal laws, and traditionalism approximates the mental
microprocesses by averaging over a large number of these causally
determined microprocesses. On this view of their relationship,
traditionalism and PDP are qualitatively distinct.
Some philosophers who have of late contributed to the
traditionalism versus PDP debate on the side of the latter fall outside
the scope of this work, for their main motivation in supporting PDP
involves interpretting it as eliminativist. An example in this group
is Patricia Churchland . 11 Stich can perhaps also be put into this
group, although he denies being an eliminativist . 12
1.5 Outline of Rest of Dissertation
Before embarking on the body of this work, I would like to
give the reader a general idea of where various topics are taken up,
and of which views and arguments are original, and which are re-
USee her Neurophilosophy.
12See Ramsey, Stich, and Garon's "Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the
Future of Folk Psychology".
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hashes of the ideas of others. Each of the remaining four chapters
includes a detailed analysis of one of the four key phrases in the
thesis title.
In Chapter 2, I provide the description of mental causation
that will be presupposed in the other chapters. In the first section, I
describe how I will be understanding causation as a general relation.
As already mentioned, I use Lewis' theory as a starting point.
However, given the large number of amendations that I make to it, it
is not at all clear that it is correctly described as "Lewis' view".
Indeed, I would assume that, if asked, Lewis would openly reject it.
To my knowledge, no one else has written on how a Lewis-style
interpretation of causation would need to be changed to make it
applicable to the special sciences in general, and to psychology in
particular. In the second section, I try to delimit the mental realm
from the rest of reality: what properties do mental phenomena
possess that set them off as mental? While identifying mental
phenomena as those governed by laws adverting to content is not
new, I do produce several arguments working out some of the
ramifications of this equation, both in general and as relevant to
traditionalism and PDP as models of the mind. Most of the third
section is taken up with an (original) argument that content is
causally relevant, even supposing a physicalist metaphysics. The so-
called problem of mental causation is one among the several classic
problems in applying the notion of causation to the mental realm. In
this third section, I also consider and suggest solutions for some of
the others. The fourth section gives my view of the relationship
between a model and the scientific domain being modelled. Along
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the way, I make a distinction between two types of models
(explanatory versus merely predicting) that seems to me to be
important to understanding what role traditionalism and PDP are
playing within psychology. As far as I know, this distinction and the
working out of its implications are original. In the fourth section, I
try to tie together the various views put forward in the first three
sections to produce a coherent picture of the relationship between a
model of the mind and mental causation.
Chapter 3 deals with an explication of the traditionalist model.
In the first section, I describe traditionalism, both its implicit and its
explicit assumptions. I have tried to make this section as unoriginal
as possible, lest I be accused of presenting a false picture of
traditionalism. In the second section, I work through the
implications of what I have written in the first section in the light of
my view of the relationship between a model and its domain. Along
the way, I isolate the ontological commitments of traditionalism and
the constraints that it places on the form of the mental causal laws.
Another subject taken up in Section 2 is an analysis of computational
statehood as that concept is used within traditionalism. Again, to my
knowedge, this is original.
Because PDP is perhaps new to some readers, I give a slightly
different treatment to the topic of PDP as a model of the mind than
the one I used in Chapter 3. I start off the fourth chapter with a
brief history of PDP, and provide some sample quotations from the
literature showing the diversity that fits under the PDP banner. This
section is mostly summary and direct quotation. In the second
section, I give a syntactic description of PDP systems, again, on the
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assumption that this is all new to the reader. I describe the building
blocks of PDP networks, and try to give a feel to the reader for the
dynamics of such systems. Sections 3 and 4 cover the same ground
for PDP as Chapter 3 covered for traditionalism. I distinguish
between two differing views of the model of the mind being offered
by PDP (namely, the local and distributed interpretation schema),
and argue for the superiority of the latter as offering the most
coherent model of the mind. Along the way, I need to explain how
PDP states come to have content. The first stage of the
naturalization of content for PDP systems is the enunciation of a
theory of representation. I adopt Dretske s, wholecloth. The
remainder of this project is wholly original. I give general principles
for explaining how the PDP states come to have content and
illustrate it with an example of a particular state ' s coming to have a
particular content. Once all of the pieces are in place for
interpretting PDP as a model of the mind, I identify the ontological
commitments made and the constraints on the causal laws offered
by it.
The final chapter begins by providing an explication of the
fourth key phrase: qualitative distinctness. The concept as such is
new, but the parts out of which it is constructed are borrowed. The
idea of comparing ontological commitments comes from Kuhn, and
the idea of checking for an isomorphism between items originates
with Putnam (although, his functional isomorphism needed some re-
working to make it fit an inter-model comparison). I try to illustrate
and make clear what I mean by qualitative distinctness with several
examples. The second section is not directly relevant to the main
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line of argument in this work, but it was fun to think about, so I
included it anyway. In this section, I examine Kuhn's theory of
scientific evolution (with particular emphasis on the role played by
incommensurability within that theory) and apply it to the current
state of cognitive science with respect to the traditionalism versus
PDP debate. I include some criticisms of Kuhn's theory, and
distinguish his incommensurability from my qualitative distinctness.
The title of the third section ("Some answers given by others") might
lead one to mistakenly believe that the section is nothing but
summarization. However, many of the writings in this area are so
ambiguous and require so much "reading between the lines" that the
arguments found in this section are more original than not. My way
of approaching that topic is to isolate a clearly-stated view from one
or another person who wrote on this topic, and, using that as a
premise, try to construct an argument either that the two models are
or are not qualitatively distinct. In the fourth section, I consider and
then discard several arguments within the traditionalism versus PDP
debate relating to computability. I then consider and reject the
interpretation of Fodor's LOT argument as supplying necessary
conditions for something s being a mind. The argument is old, this
form of its rejection is new. The final section gives my preferred
answer to the question: are the two models qualitatively distinct?
My aim in the first 200-odd pages of this dissertation is to set the
stage, so that my conclusion "yes, they are" would follow in a
straightforward manner. I hope that I have succeeded.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS MENTAL CAUSATION, ANYWAY?
The logical place to begin a work dealing with a comparison of
cognitive models is with a description of what it means for
something to be a model. After all, not any old system counts as a
model of a domain, so the question arises: what features of a system
make it a possible candidate as a model of another system? I
maintain that, at a minimum, there must be a correspondence
between the constituent parts of the modelled system (at a suitable
level of description) and the modelling system. For example, were I
to model our solar system (say, with a desktop reproduction of it),
the relevant parts that I would need to include in order for the
desktop system to be a genuine model of the solar system would be
the sun and planets. In order to be a genuine model, the desktop
version need not reproduce every detail of the actual solar system.
A second necessary condition for modelhood is that the important
interrelationships between the parts of the modelled system are
reproduced in the modelling system. What is important is relative
to the use to be made of the model. When it is to function in a non-
explanatory mode -- merely keeping track of places -- the causal
relationship amongst the parts of the modelled system need not be
reproduced in the modelling system. When, however, the model is
intended as providing an explanation of the modelled system, it
must reproduce the relevant causal relations.
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A simple thought experiment should convince the reader of
this assertion:
Imagine I set a pendulum in motion and a child
approaches me and asks: "Explain to me the motion
of the pendulum, especially its going from the one
extreme to the other." Suppose further that my
response is as follows: "You see, there exists
(abstractly) this Turing Machine with the two states,
51 and S2, such that SI corresponds to the
pendulum's being at its left-most extreme position,
and S2 corresponds to the pendulum's right-most
extreme position. The look-up table of the Turing
Machine consists of two items:
(<S1 ! * (don't care)><S2 ! 0 ! no move>)
(<S2 ! * (don't care)><Sl ! 0 ! no move>) 1
So you see that the Turing Machine goes from SI to
52 and back again forever, and that explains the
motion of the pendulum."
My intuitions tell me that the above usage is improper: merely
displaying a correspondence between the states of an entity and the
states of some abstract machine (being put forward as a potential
model) does not explain the former. A more appropriate word to
use in this context is "describe": the abstract machine describes the
behavior. Explanation requires something more than just regular
correspondence -- in particular, it requires subsumption under
causal laws. Were I to retell the above thought experiment,
replacing my "explanation" with a description of the pendulum s
behavior as resulting from the effect of gravity and tension in the
iThe formalism I adopt for the items in the look up table of the Turing
Machine is :
(cnachine state at time Tlchar under read/write head at T>
<machine state at T+l!write at current head positionlmove head>)
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pendulum' s string, my intuitions would immediately change, and I
would submit that, in that case, "explain'' was properly used. It is
for this reason that I must begin this work with an explication of
causation -- both in general and in the mental domain. Returning to
our desktop solar system as place-holding example, the relevant
relations would include relative distances among the sun and planets
and relative diameters. If the desktop system is to model not the
solar system at a particular time, but rather the solar system as a
dynamic system, then an additional interrelationship that the
desktop system must capture is the relative rotational velocities of
the planets. If, on the other hand, we wish to use the desktop solar
system as an explanatory model of the real solar system, we will
somehow have to capture the causal relations which underlie the
behavior of the real solar system in our desktop model. Because of
the difficulty of overcoming the interfering causal relations to which
the desktop (but not the real) solar system is subjected, this is
nearly impossible on earth. Hence, such a desktop model could not
serve as an explanatory' model of the real solar system. While the
solar system example is rather simple, it serves to illustrate the
sorts of considerations that go into construing one system as a model
of another.
Returning to the task at hand, what are the parts and their
relevant interrelationships in a cognitive system? Unlike the solar
system case, the "parts" are not physical parts (this must be the case,
even if one believes that all mental states are reducible to physical
states, for, as a description of a cognitive system, it is states as
mental that are relevant, irrespective of how those states are
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realized). Rather, the parts of a cognitive system include intentional
states. 2 A cognitive system may also include non-intentional states
(for example, pain states and other qualia) as parts. The relevant
interrelationships among these states that any adequate model must
capture are the causal interrelationships. It is for this reason that I
begin an explication of modelhood with a discussion of causation.
2.1 What is Causation in General?
It is seldom that a philosopher of mind begins a paper with an
explicit account of the theory of causation being assumed whenever
she uses terminology adverting to causal interaction. Rather, the
general rule is to use causal terminology without making it clear
what is meant thereby. This can result in misunderstandings when
the reader assumes one theory while the author assumes another.
Particularly prevalent are situations in which one party assumes a
realist understanding and the other party an irrealist understanding
of causal terminology. To avoid such possible misunderstandings, I
will lay out in advance the underlying theory being assumed
whenever I use the word "cause" and its cognates, laying emphasis
on where I am making ontological commitments. In addition, this
2
It has come to be the standard practice in the philosophy of mind to mention
Brentano' s assertion that the hallmark of mental systems - what sets them
apart from all other types of systems — is that they consist of states which are
essentially representational. I shall follow standard practice in this regard.
Some (notably eliminativists) may maintain that there are no mental states,
and that the totality of cognitive capabilites are explainable without recourse
to mental/intentional type talk; however, as stated in Chapter 1, I am
assuming the contrary. Cognition has an essential mental component, and
what distinguishes mental states is their intentionally.
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section will aid in fleshing out the sorts of objects that are relevant
to a model.
Stated broadly, the goal of a scientific discipline, whether it be
astronomy, biology, or psychology, is to identify the rules which
capture the regularities of the state transitions of the objects of
concern to the discipline (that is, rules with the form S1->S2, where
SI and S2 are state descriptions of an object or of objects (possibly
complex), and is not logical, but rather nomological implication).
For astronomy, the relevant objects are celestial bodies, and the
regularities to be captured involve repeated patterns of motion of
those bodies. The rules are, however, assumed to be more than
mere generalizations, true of the observed state transitions, but
possibly not true of unobserved or yet-to-be-observed state
transitions. Rather, they are assumed to codify an underlying
natural (or, in accordance with philosophical terminology,
nomological) relationship, such that not only the observed state
transitions and the yet-to-be-observed transitions, but also the
counterfactually observed transitions, proceed in accordance with
the rules. That is, the rules justify sentences of the form: "if it were
to be the case that SI, then it would (shortly thereafter) be the case
that S2". So, at a minimum, a theory of causation must support
counterfactual claims regarding state transitions. A particular state
transition is causally-produced when it is an instance of one of these
rules. (My treatment of causation specifically discounts event
causation -- ie, the analysis of causation at the level of particular
events, without the requirement of subsumption under a causal
law.) So, si is the cause of s2 if and only if si is an instance of SI,
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and s2 is an instance of S2, and it is a causal law that S1->S2 (this
can be read in English as "SI ' s are nomologically sufficient for S2 ' s"),
and si is followed by s2.
Two potential difficulties arise regarding the interpretation of
this. The first involves statistical laws: what if S2 '
s
follow upon Si's
with a probability less than 1.0 (i.e., not every SI is followed by an
S2, but of those that are, the S2 is caused by the SI)? We see such
statistical laws in quantum physics. The interpretation of
nomological sufficiency for the case of statistical laws is slightly
different from the case of non-statistical laws with respect to
prediction: we cannot say that if an instance of SI occurs, an
instance of S2 will immediately follow. However, the role that
statistical laws play with respect to explanation remains the same as
with non-statistical laws: after the fact, when an S2 immediately
follows an SI, si was the cause of s2. We can easily cover this case
by extending the meaning of S1~>S2 to include statistical laws: so
now, S1-->S2 means "Si's are nomologically sufficient for S2 ' s with
probability p". While it is an empirical question whether
psychological laws are statistical in nature, I will (admittedly,
without any attempt at justification) assume that they are not. As
my ultimate concern is an explication of mental causation, I shall
henceforth treat causation and causal laws as non-statistical: to say
that Si's cause S2's is to say that, given an SI, an S2 will (with
probability=1.0) follow, subject to ceteris paribus constraints, as per
below.
The second potential difficulty regarding my theory of
causation involves the status of non-strict (so called ceteris paribus )
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laws. It is (universally?) accepted that all non-basic laws have a
suppressed ceteris paribus proviso: only for the most basic physical
laws do S2 s always follow upon Si's, irrespective of all other facts
about the world. Does this mean then that all non-basic laws are not
precisely-speaking genuine laws? The consequences of accepting
such a view are far-reaching. For the physicalist, this amounts to
the capitulation that all "laws" other than those dealing with state
transitions in basic physics are not genuine laws, but merely
approximations. In particular, psychological laws (and, hence,
mental causation) are impossibilities.
One way out of this dilemma is to reject physicalism: there are
basic laws quantifying over something other than physical states. In
particular, for the non-physicalist who is keen on maintaining the
existence of psychological laws under this precise construal of
"lawhood", there are basic (hence, potentially strict) laws quantifying
over intentional states. This is not an option that I can take, for in
describing traditionalism and PDP as cognitive models, I must
remain faithful to traditionalism and PDP as they are understood by
their proponents: in each case, it is assumed that the causally-
interacting objects are ultimately instantiated in physical matter.
This leaves only two options: either accept the claim that
there are no causal laws covering state transitions of objects that are
not the entities of basic physics, or relax the criteria for causal
lawhood to include non-strict (i.e., ceteris paribus) laws. As Jerry
Fodor has persuasively argued in Chapter 5 of A Theory of Content,
choosing the first option means not only that all purported
psychological laws are not entitled to the claim to lawhood, but also
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that all purported laws in all disciplines other than basic physics are
non-laws. If a discipline is a science by virtue of locating the causal
laws relating state transitions of its relevant objects, then all so-
called special sciences are not genuine sciences. I, along with Fodor,
take this as a reductio of the appropriateness of the equation of
"causal laws" with "strict laws". Any adequate theory of causation
must allow for non-strict laws.
Here I would like to distinguish two sources of non-strictness
in causal laws, roughly characterizable as countervailing tendencies
and unsatisfied implementation-level assumptions. By
"countervailing tendencies" I have in mind the existence and
instantiation of other causal processes that tend to produce the
opposite effect as that produced by the causal law in question. An
example from Newtonian physics illustrates this source of non-
strictness. It is a law that rigid bodies move in the same direction of
an applied force with an acceleration equal to the strength of the
force divided by the mass of the body. Strictly-speaking, this law,
even as applied to middle-sized rigid bodies, is not exceptionless, for
there may be other forces exerted on the body that tend to move the
body in the opposite direction. Newtonian physics has developed
the handy notion of the vectorial summation of forces (which, in
reality, is not a particular force being applied to the body) to explain
the "exceptional cases" to this law. Thus, even though I may apply a
1 Newton force to a rigid ball, it is nomologically possible that the
ball does not accelerate in the direction of the application of the
force, because in addition to this 1 N force, there is a second 1 N
force being applied along the same axis as the first, but in the
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opposite direction. Consider an example of countervailing tendencies
closer to the domain of this work. Suppose that it is a psychological
law that if I desire to eat x, and I believe that I have unrestricted
disposal rights to x, then I will eat x. Suppose further that I have a
desire to be well-respected, and a belief that I will be well-
respected if I publicly give x to some needy person. Suppose further
that it is also a law that if I have a desire to achieve condition y and
see the means to achieve y as readily available to me, then I will
(via those means) achieve y. Even though I may desire to eat x
myself, the countervailing causal process explains my failing to eat x
and my giving of x to the needy person. Just as in the case of
countervailing (physical) forces, we see that the mere satisfaction of
the nomologically sufficient conditions does not guarantee the
obtaining of the effect.
The second source of non-strictness in causal laws
(summarized above as the lack of satisfaction of implementation-
level assumption) is what is usually intended to be captured under
the rubric "ceteris paribus" (at least, as Fodor uses the term). The
"ceteris paribus" is intended to capture the fact that (assuming
physicalism) all objects are implemented in physical stuff, all
causally-governed state transitions of the non-basic objects occur as
a function of the causally-governed state transitions of the objects
implementing constituents, and occasionally, the background
assumptions of a causal law (statable only in the vocabulary of the
science of the implementing constituents) are not satisfied. 3
3 One may argue that the need for ceteris parihus laws shows that the objects
postulated by the special sciences do not "carve nature at the joints", but that
the objects are merely "close approximations" to the true strict causally
34
Returning to the formulation of cuusul luwhood, SI—>S2" meuns
"Si's are nomologically sufficient for S2 ' s, ceteris paribus". When a
particular SI, si, is followed by an S2, s2, si is the cause of s2,
simpliciter: the non-strictness is only at the level of lawhood, not at
the level of particular causal interactions. It is arguable that the
statement that psychological laws are non-strict is incompatible with
traditionalism (the model of the mind to be discussed in Chapter 3).
However, such an argument, while interesting as a counter to the
claim that Fodor ' s various views relevant to the nature of the mind
are consistent, would not be directly relevant to the topic of this
work.
So far, I have not specified what makes a state transition
description a causal law. One aspect involves the "naturalness" of
the connection between the two states. I mentioned previously that
in order for a generalization relating two states to be a causal law, it
must hold not only for all actual Si s, but also for all counterfactual
Si's. How is this condition to be understood?4 Most importantly,
interacting aggregates, and, rather than capitulating to the tendency to
accept the status quo in the special sciences, we should withhold the title of
"science" from those disciplines which have not yet located the true causally
interacting aggregates, on the assumption that, eventually, the special
sciences will be able to locate the "natural" objects and the strict causal laws
relating their states. While I find this line of argument somewhat compelling,
I take the universality of non-strictness of laws in the special sciences to
indicate that it is not that the scientists in those disciplines are sloppy, nor
that the disciplines are qualitatively less well-developed than basic physics,
but rather that the non-strictness (and, hence, the need to accept ceteris
paribus laws as laws) is a fact of nature: there are no non-basic objects whose
state transitions obey strict laws.
4 In what follows, I shall adopt a highly modified version of David Lewis'
explication of causation and counterfactual support. As my main concern in
this chapter is describing mental causation, 1 must relax some ol his
constraints on lawhood. This is because Lewis treatment of causal lawhood in
Coun terfactuals is most naturally viewed as applicable only to strict laws,
which as argued above, exist only in basic physics. Similarly, his assumption
of tvpe-tvpe bridge laws between basic physical states and higher-level states
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causation is a natural, rather than conventional relationship: there is
a fact-of-the-matter about whether a particular succession of states
is causally related and there is a fact-of-the-matter about whether a
generalization relating states is a causal law. Specifically, I reject all
instrumentalistic construals of causation, whereby the ground for
perceived regularities of succession is left as wholly mysterious.
Instances of a cause (both actual and counterfactual) necessitate
their effect because there is some property of the cause that forces
the transition to the effect. For the case of special science laws, the
forcing property(ies) are grounded in the causal laws relating the
states of the implementing constituents. For the case of the laws in
basic physics, the forcing property(ies) are not analyzable: the
regress stops here at the level where the forcing of the effect given
the cause is a brute fact of nature . 5 A description of the causal
structure of the world can be given in terms of possible worlds. I
adopt this approach because of the ease with which it can be used as
a framework for analysing counterfactuals . 6
is an issue on which I am trying in this work to remain agnostic. (His
reductionistic predilections are clearly expressed in the chapters on the
philosophy of mind in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1.) In making this
change, I introduce difficulties not found in his original theory — this is the
price that must be paid in converting a clean but generally inapplicable
theory of causation into one that can be used for disciplines other than basic
physics. I also diverge from his theory in my analysis of the similarity
relation, as described below.
5 Admittedly, this leaves the ground for causation as mysterious as that
resulting from instrumentalism: positing "brute facts of nature" is merely a
philosophical device for stopping what would otherwise be an infinite
regress. So be it.
6 1 am not clear that I want thereby to commit myself to the existence of these
possible worlds (a la Lewis). Rather, all that 1 think is necessary is that I am
committed to the non-conventionality of the closeness ordering of the
possible worlds. In particular, there is a matter-of-fact about which possible
worlds are close to the actual world, and which are not.
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The set of causal laws forms an approximate hierarchy, with
the laws of basic physics at the base. Assuming that the current
"disciplinization" of science is complete and accurate
,
7 each level of
the approximate hierarchy corresponds to a scientific discipline.
Within each level, the causally-interacting objects (i.e., the objects
whose state transitions are quantified over in the causal laws), while
implemented in lower level objects, really do exist . 8 However, the
causally-interacting objects and the causal laws form a package deal,
determinable only a posteriori. A distinct scientific level of analysis
exists if both the state transitions of objects at that level are
describable by causal laws and the objects and their states fit
smoothly into the overall quasi-hierarchy of scientific disciplines.
This "smoothness of fit" criterion is the analog of the strength and
simplicity criteria for causal lawhood within a level, as described
below. Within a level, the causal laws are determined using Lewis'
and Ramsey's simplicity and strength criteria for lawhood in basic
physics, whereby the laws are analogous to axioms, which, in
combination with additional axioms describing the initial state of the
world, yield the set of facts. Lewis describes it thus:
7 This assumption is being made at this point only for expository purposes: so
as to allow me to use simpler locutions such as "the laws of chemistry", rather
than the strictly more correct locution "the laws of chemistry, under the
assumption that chemistry is a proper discipline of completed science".
Nothing at this point hinges on this assumption, and I shall in later chapters
explicitly disassume it when discussing the status of psychology as a scientific
discipline.
8
I know this way of putting the point sounds silly. However, 1 must say it in
order to make clear my view that, even on the strong claim that the causally-
interacting objects are reducible to their lower level constituents, causally-
interacting objects are never "mere artifacts" of a discipline, useful but
ontologically-speaking fictitious. If the states of an object are quantified over
in a causal law, then that object and these states exist; they are not
epiphenomena of their respective constituents.
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Whatever we may or may not ever come to know,
there exist (as abstract objects) innumerable true
deductive systems: deductively closed, axiomatizable
sets of true sentences. Of these deductive systems,
some can be axiomatized more simply than others.
Also, some of them have more strength
,
or information
content, than others. The virtues of simplicity and
strength tend to conflict. Simplicity without strength
can be had from pure logic, strength without simplicity
from (the deductive closure of) an almanac. ... What
we value in a deductive system is a properly balanced
combination of simplicity and strength - as much of
both as truth and our way of balancing permit. We can
restate Ramsey' s 1928 theory of lawhood as follows: a
contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only
if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true
deductive systems that achieves a best combination of
simplicity and strength. A generalization is a law at
world i, likewise, if and only if it appears as a theorem
in each of the best deductive systems true at i.9
This theory of causal lawhood has been widely discussed, and many
of its weaknesses have been pointed out. My purpose here is not to
enumerate them, but to focus on two of them that are particularly
relevant in light of the uses I want to make of the theory. The first
of these involves the apparent irrealism presupposed by this theory:
nowhere in this definition of causal lawhood is mentioned causation
as a natural (as opposed to conventional) relation. It is possible that
the axioms/laws that form the "best fit" to the data (in terms of
simplicity and strength) fail to cut nature at the joints -- either
because the "true" causal laws do not conform to our somewhat
aesthetically-based criteria of simplicity and strength or because
there are no natural joints, hence no "true" (in the realist s sense)
causal laws to be determined. My response to this charge of
9 Counterfactuals, page 73.
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irrealism against my adopted theory of causation is as follows: it is a
brute assumption of mine that there (really) are causal laws - I
make absolutely no claim to be able to justify it. Given this
assumption, the second of the two possibilities is not a problem.
What of the first possibility (i.e., that the axioms/laws thus
determined fail to cut nature at her (true) joints)? This objection, if
left uncountered, would prove to be the undoing to my otherwise
thoroughly-realist account of causation. Lewis notes and in some
passages accepts this charge, as in the following, where he considers
the possibility that there will be no "best set" of generalizations:
We may hope, or take as an item of faith, that our
world is one where certain true deductive systems
come out as best, and certain generalizations come out
as laws, by any remotely reasonable standards -- but
we might be unlucky . 10
In order to remove this potential source of irrealism, I must make
another change to Lewis ' original formulation: let the laws be those
generalizations that appear as axioms in the deductive systems of
the actual and all nearby possible worlds. As stated above, my
realism extends to the existence of a similarity relation between the
actual and all possible worlds. Lewis waffles on this point. For
example, there are realist-sounding passages such as:
It is a fact about a town that it is situated near to one
city rather than another, and in the same way it is a
fact about our world that its character is such as to
make some antecedent worlds [that is, those worlds in
which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is
true] be similar to it, and others not . 11
10 Counterfactuals, page 74.
11 Counterfactuals, page 69.
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However, the more often stated view is less realist with respect to
the similarity relation (although he does presuppose that the
similarity relation is something more than mere whim) as in:
[T]he relative importance of respects of
comparison, and thereby the comparative similarity
of worlds, are at least roughly fixed. Not anything
goes. It can happen that a counterfactual is true (at a
world) according to some permissible systems of
spheres but not according to others, so that its truth
value will be indeterminate by reason of vagueness.
But it can happen also, and often does, that a
counterfactual has the same truth value according to
all permissible systems of spheres, and so is
definitely true or defintely false . 12
As my aim here is not exegesis of Counterfactuals, but rather the
description of the causal theory I shall be assuming, I feel free to
reject the latter (admittedly, more representative) view in favor of
the former, realist, view of the similarity relation. This said, there
will be a matter-of-fact about which worlds are nearby to the actual
world. This matter-of-factness grounds a matter-of-factness with
respect to the truth value of counterfactuals (or, at least the truth
value of counterfactuals whose antecedent does not stand in
contradiction to the causal laws in the actual world). When I say
that I am a realist with regard to causal laws, this is what I mean.
Let us assume that the similarity relation as regards a world
and its nearest neighbors (using Lewis spheres terminology, the
centered world, i, and the set of worlds constituting the sphere
immediately surrounding i) is symmetrical and transitive. That is, if
i is a nearest neighbor of j, then j is a nearest neighbor of i, and, if i
12 Counterfactuals, page 93.
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is a nearest neighbor of ;, and j is a nearest neighbor of k
,
then i is a
nearest neighbor of A. 13 Then, a world and its nearest neighbors will
have the set of causal laws in common. Stepping back and viewing
the ordering that the nearest neighbor relation imposes on the set of
possible worlds, we see that they form equivalence classes, each
class having the set of causal laws in common. The similarity
relation for a world as relates to the possible worlds other than its
nearest neighbors may be non-symmetrical and non-transitive.
A second criticism of the counterfactuals via possible worlds
formalization of causation involves the possibility that there are
multiple but mutually-orthogonal sets of best fit axioms, hence,
given Lewis' initial criterion14
,
that there are no causal laws. This is
particularly relevant to the topic of mental causation in two respects.
First, ontological space must be made for mental states to be
causally-efficacious, even presuming a physicalist metaphysics. If
psychological generalizations are redundant in the sense of
producing the same predictions at a macro-level as those made by
the laws of basic physics at the micro-level, then the simplicity
criterion will rule them out as possible laws of nature. Lewis views
this as being not a flaw, but a feature, as he maintains that the only
13 This is yet another divergence from Lewis, who explicitly denied the
general symmetricity of the similarity relation, as noted on page 51 of
Counterfactuals "This assumption of symmetry for the similarity measure
implies a constraint on similarity ordering derived from that measure. ... But
that constraint would be unjustified if we suppose that the facts about a world
i help to determine which respects of similarity and dissimilarity are
important in comparing other worlds in respect of similarity to the world i."
However, the assumption of limited symmetry and transitivity (holding only
between a world and its nearest neighbors) is much more well-founded, since,
as Lewis himself notes, it is features of the centered world that influence what
worlds are similar to it — and those similar worlds should have similar
features.
14 That to be a law of nature is to be a member in all of the best sets.
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laws of nature are to be found at the level of basic physics anyway.
(This is, I think, his view in the most consistent reading of
Counterfactuals. He does in other works explicitly mention causal
laws other than those of basic physics, however.) I shall discuss the
issue of the supposed causal inertness of mental objects in a later
section. Suffice it for now to say that this result, if allowed to stand,
makes the traditionalism versus PDP debate irrelevant, since neither
are in that case potential candidates as mental models. Therefore, I
need make yet another change to Lewis ' original theory. The change
involves only one word, yet its acceptance transforms the theory^
from one wherein all the so-called special sciences are not genuine
sciences to one where sciences other than basic physics can truly
speak of causal laws in terms of their own special vocabularies. This
change is as follows: replace Lewis' definition of "law of nature"
with "a contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it
appears as a theorem (or axiom) in ANY of the true deductive
systems that achieves a best combination of strength and simplicity."
Lewis' reasoning behind not using this definition is that it
leaves open the possibility that events can be causally over-
determined. This is not the cornerstore variety of over-
determination, the classic example of which is the shattering of a
glass after being simultaneously subjected to being struck by a
hammer and being exposed to the soprano's high-C, both of which
are alone nomologically-sufficient for the glass' breaking. Rather,
the over-determination is deeper, in that it involves something akin
to diverging ways of conceptualizing the world as a causally-
describable system. It was this deeper over-determination that
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troubled Lewis. For me, on the other hand, this form of over-
determination is a necessary feature of a layered view of the
sciences -- hence, it is to be sought out rather than avoided. This
acceptance of over-determination is not inconsistent with a realist
understanding of causation, for realism does not imply that only one
causal process can be operative in a dynamic system. Consider a
particular chemical reaction. The events taking place (broadly
construed) can be causally explained at either of two levels of
description: the chemical and the atomic (physical). The former
recognizes whole molecules and their states as the causally relevant
objects and properties. The latter, on the other hand, explains the
same event (broadly construed), yet makes no mention of molecules
nor of molecular states. Both explanations, however, truly describe
the causal processes taking place during that event. Realism alone
does not exclude this as a possibility.
There is a related point (the second manner in which it could
turn out, on Lewis' original definition of "law of nature", that there
are no laws because there are multiple best sets). Even within a
level (i.e., within a scientific discipline), it might be the case that an
event is over-determined, 15 perhaps because two theories have laws
which quantify over the states of different objects. This possibility
is perhaps less obviously compatible with realism than over-
determination by virtue of the existence of causal processes at
distinct levels. Even here, though, I see no basic antagonism with
realism: perhaps the world just is so constructed that there is a
15
I use the term "event" broadly, such that the same event can be picked out
in two different ways of carving the world into objects and their states.
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basic indeterminacy in the natural joints that carve it into its
causally efficacious objects. The picture of such a possibility is of a
dynamic world in a superposition of causal descriptions. This
superposition is different from that as normally understood within
quantum physics, in that the totality of facts (stated in a causation-
neutral way) for the particular moments of time are the same across
the superposed causal worlds. With this as a possibility, one needn' t
be forced into an exclusive either/or position, whereby one model ' s
being true implies the other ' s being either false or true at a distinct
level of description of phenomena. If this seems like a non-sensical
feature for a theory of causation to have, like something a
phlogiston-theory based researcher would say against mounting
evidence in favor of the opposing view ("maybe we can both be
right"), I beg to differ. For one thing, it is an empirical matter
whether the phlogiston theory was true. It turned out not to be.
But more importantly, as the recent developments in physics have
shown, our common notions of what sort of theories "make sense" is
changeable. Even though the acceptance of over-determination
within a level as a genuine possibility consistent with realism is not
absolutely necessary (indeed, I nowhere make explicit use of this as
a possibility), it does make the overall question that I am addressing
in this dissertation more approachable: if I can isolate the question
"are the two models qualitatively distinct?" from the need to choose
between the two, it will make the conceptual analysis required to
answer it easier.
A final set of remarks concerning my understanding vis-a-vis
the reductionistic versus supervenience versus strict autonomy of
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levels views of science is in order. As stated previously, I hold the
view that the sciences form a quasi-hierarchy. (The "quasi" is
inserted for two reasons: ( 1 ) it seems to me that a failure to qualify
the word "hierarchy" gives the impression of strict reductionism,
which I do not wish to imply, and (2) it may turn out that some
sciences (a good candidate being biochemistry), while circumscribed
enough to constitute a science, nevertheless cut across the levels
defined by other disciplines.) There are then several possibilities
with respect to the relationship between the objects whose states
are quantified over at the various levels. The first possibility to
consider is that the objects are strictly autonomous. Under this
assumption, it could happen that two objects in the same world are
identical in every physical respect, yet disparate with respect to
some or all chemical, biological, or psychological respects: the
chemical, biological and psychological levels are wholly autonomous
from the physical. As I am assuming a physicalistic metaphysics,
this is not a serious option. Supervenience and reductionism are
both consistent with physicalism. The source of the general
supervenience hypothesis is Donald Davidson' s "Mental Events":
Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent,
or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such
supervenience might be taken to mean that there
cannot be two events alike in all physical respects
but differing in some mental respect, or that an
object cannot alter in some mental respect without
altering in some physical respect. 16
The literature sparked by this hypothesis has been immense, and
has produced several distinct flavors (strong versus weak, global
16
"Mental Events", in Essay s on Action and Events, page 214.
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versus local) of supervenience. Of most concern to me, however, is
the relation of supervenience to reductionism, and the appearance of
incompatibility of a non-reductive (but supervenient) layering of the
sciences with the existence of causal laws at levels other than basic
physics. (For a sample expression of this view, see Loar' s Mind and
Meaning
,
pages 15-25.)
Supervenience was put forward as a way to make the
existence of mental objects compatible with physicalism. Previously,
it was believed that physicalism implied reductionism -- the view
that object state types outside the purview of basic physics were not
only implemented in basic physical stuff, but also identical with
basic physical stuff. In particular, non-basic object state types were
identical with some (likely very complicated) complex of basic object
state types. Were this the case, causal laws relating states of non-
basic objects would be strictly-speaking superfluous. Relating this to
my theory of causation, the simplicity criterion for lawhood would
rule out as potential laws of nature any such redundant
generalizations. The fear among philosophers in general, and
philosophers of mind in particular, was that reductionism implied
the epiphenomenalism of all non-basic object states. (Of special
concern to philosophers of mind was the feared epiphenomenalism
of mental states, although, as remarked previously, all of the special
sciences are in the same boat with respect to the epiphenomenalism
of their object states.) Supervenience was seen as a way out -- it
allows a connection of implementation of non-basic states in basic
state complexes, yet avoids the strict reducibility of the former to
46
tiie latter. 1 ' One advantage of reductionism over supervenience is
the philosophical cleanness with which one can explain regularities
of state transitions among non-basic objects. If those objects (or,
more correctly, object-types) are complex aggregations of basic
objects, and the causal laws at the level of basic physics happen to
be such that the non-basic objects persist, giving the appearance of
regularity of state transitions, then some (if not ontological, at least
pragmatic) room is made for causal laws among non-basic objects.
With supervenience, however, the lack of strict basic-object-state-
type/non-basic-object-state-type equations seems to rule out the
possibility of non-basic causal interaction, the desire for which was
the very thing that led philosophers to embrace it. This is because
causal interaction presupposes a causal law, and, without a law-like
equation relating non-basic-object-state-types to their implementing
basic-object-state-types, there is no mechanism to undergird non-
basic causal laws. (Loar argues this point in Mind and Meaning
,
pages 16-17.) Given my previous assumption, however, this line of
argument is unsound. Granted that non-basic objects are
implemented in basic objects (note here that I am speaking of object
tokens, not object types), it can still be consistently maintained that
there are causal laws relating state transitions of non-basic objects
types. For example, suppose I have a certain desire (to drink some
water) and a certain belief (that there is a glass containing water in
front of me), and suppose it is a psychological law that such beliefs
and desires cause water-drinking behavior, then (ceteris paribus, of
17 This is in theory what supervenience accomplishes, yet there is not
unamimity on this point. See, for example, John Heil' s The Nature of True
Minds, Chapter 3 for an overview of the debate.
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course) I will drink the water (that is, that desire and belief will
cause my water-drinking behavior). Now, supervenience requires
that my belief and desire are implemented physically (either in the
current state of my nervous system or in the current state of my
nervous system plus certain physical relations with the external
world ). 18 It is not a requirement of logic, however, that in order for
a law to relate the belief/desire state with the behavior, there must
be a law-like equation of the belief/desire state type with a basic
physical state type and the behavior state type with another basic
physical state type. In this sense, supervenience represents a
middle ground between the complete autonomy of levels and the
complete reducibility of the less-basic level to the more basic. In
any event, I do not wish to commit myself to either supervenience
or reductionism as the correct understanding of the relationship
between the sciences: I take it as an empirical question, well outside
the purview of philosophy.
Given the large number of amendations to Lewis ' theory that
have been made in the last several pages, it may be useful to
summarize my theory of causation without reference to Lewis. (I
should reiterate that what I have been trying to do in this section is
to lay out a theory, not argue for it. My occasional use of motivating
arguments has been intended more than anything as a means of
clarifying my own view, particularly in respects in which it diverges
from one more commonly held.) My theory of causation is realistic:
there are as a matter-of-fact laws of nature, and the objects whose
18 To use Davidson's terminology, the mental event described and the physical
event that implements it are one and the same event, under different
descriptions.
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state transitions are quantified over in those laws really do exist.
There is a matter-of-fact about whether a particular counterfactual
conditional is true. This matter-of-factness is grounded in the
existence of a real similarity relation which orders possible worlds
as a function of how close they are to the actual world. To be a
causal law is to be a member of the set of generalizations that serve
as axioms in any of the "best sets" of axioms that describe the actual
world and all of its closest possible worlds, where "best" is
understood as involving strength and simplicity considerations.
Thus, the actual world and all of its nearest neighbors share the
same set of laws. Causal laws quantify not only over the transitions
of objects in basic physics, but also those of objects in the special
sciences.
Given my agnosticism in choosing between reductionism and
supervenience, I must separate my description of how I square the
strength/simplicity requirement for sets of causal laws, with the
existence of causal laws at levels other than that of basic physics.
(1) (Assuming reductionism) In this case, non-basic laws are, when
one considers just the actual world, redundant. The state type
transitions quantified over in non-basic laws are equivalent to
complex state types at the basic level. However, as the set of "facts"
(both actual and those at the actual world s nearest neighbors) that
need to be deducible from the set of axioms, given the initial
conditions in each of those worlds, may involve differing manners of
reductions (i.e., the reduction equations at the actual world may
differ from those in the nearby worlds), the door is left open to non-
basic causal laws. I am assuming that this is the case, for otherwise
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my analysis does not allow non-basic laws (because any non-basic
generalizations would be excluded from the "best set" by the
simplicity criterion). Admittedly, it may be that the reduction
equations in the actual and nearby worlds are identical: it is merely
another asumption of mine that they are not. As an example, on my
analysis it may be the case that chemical objects are reducible to
physical objects in some nearby world in a manner other than the
way they are reducible in this world.
(2) (Assuming supervenience) The difficulty here arises not out of a
fear that the simplicity requirement will rule out redundant non-
basic laws, as per above, but out of a concern that the existence of
ceteris paribus laws is threatened: one might imagine that the
simplicity and strength criteria would prefer strict laws over non-
strict laws, leaving the latter again non-members of the best set. My
answer here is that the notions of simplicity and strength are so
undeveloped that I cannot say for sure that ceteris paribus laws are
obviously ruled-out. The fact that the current state in the special
sciences is such that ceteris paribus laws are universally used lends
credence to their usefulness. Whether this translates into such laws'
being in the best set is yet another assumption on my part for which
I have no argument.
2.2 What is the Mental?
First and foremost - I am working on the assumption that
eliminativism is false: there is such a thing as the mental realm,
populated by causally-interacting mental states. In the final
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analysis, the truth or falsity of eliminativism is an empirical issue,
determined by whether generalizations quantifying over state
transitions of mental objects manage to make it into the best set;
hence, an attempt at an a priori argument against eliminativism is
certain to fail right from the get-go. (This is, however, not to say
that an a priori argument against the belief in eliminativism suffers
the same fate.) The relative success of mental-based explanations of
some human and animal behavior lends a modicum of support to my
assumption, but it hardly constitutes an argument. This is the last
time I shall mention eliminativism as a hypothesis.
As the section title indicates, I shall attempt here to describe
my theory of the mental: in particular, what distinguishes mental
states from non-mental states? Stated glibly, the mental is the level
(or levels) of description corresponding to the true psychology. This
needs quite a lot of unpacking. I do not hold the view that science is
complete, hence, that psychology as it is currently practiced must
correspond to the true psychology. However, I accept what I take to
be the two underlying assumptions of psychology. The first of these
is that psychology fits into the quasi-hierarchy of science. That is,
psychology is compatible with physicalism (either via reduction or
supervenience of its objects on more basic physical stuff). Also,
psychology, like other scientific disciplines, is concerned with the
discovery of the causal laws grounding the regularity of succession
among the states of its objects.
The second underlying assumption of psychology is that the
vast majority of the states over which its causal laws quantify are
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contentful
.
19 Hence, psychology is the science concerned with
discovering the causal laws pertaining to being an intentional agent,
such that those laws are expressed using intentional terms.
Although I want to postpone a detailed explanation of how mental
states get their meanings according to the two mental models being
considered, I feel compelled at this juncture to at least suggest some
possible approaches one might take to answering this question. I do
this in order to avoid the appearance of assuming something (i.e., the
existence of meaningful states) which is an utter impossibility
according to physicalism. Two approaches that have been widely
discussed in the literature are the evolutionary role explanation and
the causal pathways explanation. Briefly, the first (teleological) view
contends that our physical states can come to have meaning by
virtue of being correlated with a condition in the external
environment. In particular, a physical state comes to refer to an
external condition because those ancestors of ours who succeeded
(by the evolutionary standard of success: reproduction) did so at
least partly in virtue of the correlation of this internal physical state
with the survival-relevant environmental condition. The most
familiar proponent of such a view of meaning is Ruth Millikan .20 She
summarizes her basic approach to explaining how physical states can
come to be meaningful in terms of the proper functions (also called
the "teleo-functions") of those states:
19 Recall, I am allowing that some non-intentional states (eg, pain states) may
also play a role in psychological laws; hence, I cannot make the blanket
statement that all states are meaningful.
20 See particularly Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.
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To describe the biological function of an item is ... to
describe the role that its ancestors played in a
particular historical process, a concrete cyclical
process of birth, development, and reproduction
extended over a number of generations. It is to tell
how earlier items involved in this historical process
that are homologous to this functional item
characteristically contributed to continuation of the
cycle (thus helping, of course, to account for this
item' s existence ).21
She continues:
The position is that psychological classification is
biological classification: hence proceeds by reference
to teleo-function. This means that categories such as
belief, desire, memory, percept and purposive
behavior are biological function categories . 22
This theory, if successful, grounds the contentfulness of certain
physical states naturalistically: it does so without having to deny
physicalism (although, more than the complete current physical
description of an intentional agent is needed in order to determine
what, in particular, a specific physical state means). Millikan
remarks on this feature of her theory:
The position is that intentionality is grounded in
external natural relations, Normal and/or proper
relations, between representations and representeds,
the notions "Normal" and "proper" being defined in
terms of evolutionary history ... [T]his means that
there is not a way of looking just at a present-
moment, eg, ... at his neural network patterns, that
will reveal even the intentional nature of his ... inner
representations, let alone reveal what these
represent .23
21
"Explanation in Biopsychology" in Mental Causation, pages 211-212.
22
"Explanation in Biopsychology", pages 212-213.
23 Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, page 93.
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A second candidate theory for the naturalization of content is
what I shall call "the causal pathways approach". As a first
approximation, a certain physical (brain) state of mine has a
particular meaning by virtue of being caused by the entity that it
represents. In naive terms, a brain state of mine (for example, a
brain state that occurs while I am looking at a cat) means this cat by
virtue of being caused by the cat -- counterfactually, had the cat
that my brain state represents not been there, that brain state
would not have occurred. For cases of a meaningful physical state
instantiation not directly caused by its referent (i.e., the non-
perceptually-based production of a meaningful physical state), the
content of the state needs to be explained in other terms than by its
immediate distal cause. In fleshing out this general framework,
Jerry Fodor develops and refines what it is for a physical state (or,
using his terminolgy, a "tokening") to refer to something. He does
this in terms of the counterfactually-based asymmetric dependence
of the causal relation in false tokenings (between the distal cause of
the tokening and the tokening) on the causal relation in true
tokenings. Formally, his criteria for a tokening, "X" meaning X are:
1. Xs cause "X'V is a law.
2. Some "X"s are actually caused by Xs.
3. For all Y not = X, if Ys qua Ys actually cause "X"s,
then Ys causing "X"s is asymmetrically dependent on
Xs causing "X"s.24
24 A Theory of Meaning, page 121.
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As stated above, I do not want to argue for or against either of these
theories of meaning; rather, I include them to head off a criticism
that the very idea of meaningful physical states is absurd.
I now return to my description of the true psychology. This
general approach to circumscribing a scientific discipline is not
unique to psychology. One could similarly describe biology as the
science concerned with discovering the causal laws underlying a
subset of processes (i.e., those pertaining to life), such that those
laws are expressed in the vocabulary of biology. Some caveats are
in order. First, psychology is not about explaining all behavior of
intentional agents. (For example, it is no criticism of psychology that
it cannot explain -- ie, that its laws do not include -- reflex reactions,
for such behavior is not intentional per se.) Rather, psychology is the
science that seeks the causal laws underlying the behavior of
intentional agents qua intentional agents.
A second caveat relates to a general character of the domain of
psychological states. While I am not a behaviorist, I do maintain
that psychology must (like all other scientific disciplines) ultimately
deal with external behavior: its ultimate experimental domain is
observable. This is not to say that there will not be many
intermediate, non-observable states posited as parts of causal
chains; however, the initial cause and final effect must be
observable. All of the initial causes, final effects, and intermediate
states are the purview of psychology, so long as they play a role in
causal laws and are expressed in intentional terms. A second reason
for tying psychology down to behavior is that, unlike in other
sciences, there is a tendency within psychology to populate the
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realm of non-observables with states based only upon the subjects'
post-introspective reports. Introspection, however, is notoriously
untrustworthy. (This is not a problem for other sciences: it is not
even an option for a physicist to ask an electron "How do you feel,
spin-wise?") True psychology, properly practiced, cannot assume
that certain non-observable states obtain, merely because subjects
say that those states obtain (however, subjects thus saying so is
behavior -- hence, in the purview of psychology). This requirement
also keeps an illegitimate argument relevant to my topic here from
gaining acceptance. The argument goes:
(PI): Subjects describe their mental states in the
language of traditionalism.
(P2): Subjects always introspect and (when
attempting to be sincere) describe their mental
states accurately.
(P3): The language of traditionalism is not the same
as the language of PDP.
(C): PDP cannot be the true model of the mental.
Thus, my way of describing true psychology does not assume that
introspection gives an accurate "snapshot" of the subject's mental
state. Whatever mental states take part in causal laws will fall out
on their own.
A third question which often arises in the context of
discussions of alternative systems as mental models is: what types
of beings have minds? I hope that my (biologically-neutral) way of
describing psychology will save a lot of quibbling on this topic. If
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dogs (or computers'
,
or martians') behavior is non-trivially2 5
explainable by reference to causal laws quantifying over intentional
objects, then such beings have minds. Similarly, the fear that clearly
non-intentional-state-possessing objects (e.g., lecterns) will also be
included in the set of things possessing minds, because their
behavior is "explainable" in terms of causal laws quantifying over
their "mental" states (e.g., their "desire" to remain where they are)
can be likewise allayed within my framework, for such entities'
behavior is only trivially "explained" by reference to causal laws
quantifying over intentional objects.
--"’What I mean here by inserting the modifier "non-trivially" is something
like this: one can assume that the causes and effects in causal laws
quantifying over intentional objects will form a network of relations (ie, the
objects will be mentioned as causes or effects in many causal laws). To cite a
particular example using the traditionalist model: my belief that p may be a
cause (or one of several collectively nomologically-sufficient conjuncts) in
several causal laws, and the effect (or one of several nomologically-
necessitated effects) in other causal laws. In order for an entity's behavior to
be non-trivially explained by reference to laws quantifying over intentional
objects, the entity must be such that at least counterfactually, it can
participate in a large subset of these causal laws, where the accessibility
relation for the resolution of counterfactuals is limited only to the actual
world and its nearest neighbors. (Recall that on my construal, causal laws --
both mental and non-mental -- are shared by the actual world and all of its
nearest possible worlds.) Lecterns and the like fail to satisfy this "non-
triviality" constraint -- the number of causal laws quantifying over
intentional objects in which they can actually and counterfactually
participate is very limited. This condition of non-triviality also rules out the
existence of so-called "punctate minds": "minds" only capable of having one
or a very few intentional items. That such a non-triviality condition is not
unique to the discipline of psychology can be seen from the following:
certain non-living entities may be seen as exemplifying a biological law. For
example, it has been argued by some that the earth's biosphere+atmosphere as
a system is subject to many of the homeostatic laws regulating the behavior of
biological entities, yet I (and, I think, most biologists) would not therefore
maintain that such a system constitutes a living entity, because the number of
biological laws that such a system could participate in is so very limited.
Similar considerations can be seen in the debate as to whether viruses are
living. Previously, it was believed that the number of biological laws in which
viruses could potentially participate was very small (in particular, a subset ot
the laws dealing with reproduction). The consensus has now shifted in favor
of viewing viruses as living entities, as their capacity for participation in a
much larger subset of biological laws as come to light.
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A final clarification: I take the proper role of psychology to be
the discovery of all of the intentionally-based laws, not just that
subset which, for lack of a better way of describing it, I call "the
subset corresponding to the activities of our 'reason'." It is an
empirical issue whether there are intentional laws covering "non-
reasonable" or "sub-reasonable" aspects of mentation. This is
particularly relevant to the traditionalism/connectionism debate, as
one part of Fodor's language of thought argument against
proponents of PDP is that their model cannot explain the "fact" that
the belief that if p then q and the belief that p is nomologically
sufficient for the belief that q. Whether this rule is a causal law is
an empirical issue, just as it is an empirical issue whether the belief
that if p then q and the belief that not-p is nomologically sufficient
for the belief that not-q . 26 I hope to describe psychology so as not
to prejudice either in favor of or against a model that is closely
connected with the existence of only rationally-defensible inferences
as existent. These caveats have been explicitly given so as to make
it clear that I am not building a pro-traditionalism or pro-PDP bias
into my construal of psychology — and, hence, into my construal of
mental causation.
2.3 Problems of Applying Notion of Causation to the
Mental Realm
There are in general two major potential problems in applying
the notion of causation to state transitions in the mental realm. The
20 in my dealings with UMass freshman, I have found equal empirical support
for the latter (fallacious) inference as for the former.
58
first of these has already been briefly mentioned; the supposed
epiphenomenalism of psychological states assuming their
dependence on more basic physical states. The second (and, I think,
more threatening to the status of psychology as a science) involves
the causal efficacy of psychological states qua intentional. In this
section I shall describe each potential problem in detail and offer a
solution. Following this I enumerate some lesser considerations in
applying the notion of causation to the mental realm.
While many philosophers over the centuries have argued that
physicalism (whether reductive or supervenient) implies the
inefficacy of psychological entities, the locus classicus for this view is
the first half of Norman Malcolm's "The conceivability of
mechanism". In this paper, Malcolm describes a hypothetical (but
potentially realizable) completed neurophysiology "which is
adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies
except those caused by outside forces ".27 This completed theory
makes no mention of intentional states in any of its laws . 28 Thus,
even if one could identify generalizations describing psychological
state transitions, the states quantified over would be inefficacious.
27 Page 45.
28
I should note that Malcolm's portrayal of the intention/purpose-based
rival to this neurophysiological theory is not what I (or, I think, most other
philosophers) have in mind when speaking of the underlying laws to be
discovered by psychology. Indeed, Malcolm himself notes the tautologous
nature of the straw-man psychology that he puts forward, as in: "Premises of
the other sort fused in psychological laws adverting to intentional states]
express a priori connections between intentions (purposes, desires, goals) and
behavior." (Page 50.) And a paragraph previously: "Thus the universal
premise of a purposive explanation is an a priori principle, not a contingent
law." (Page 49.) As stated previously, my construal of the role of psychology is
as the discoverer of the contingent causal laws relating psychological states.
Nevertheless, I think the questions Malcolm raises concerning the efficacy of
psychological states given the hypothesized completed neurophysiological
theory are equally applicable to a more robust picture of psychology.
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Malcolm describes the rivalry between the neurophysiological and
psychological explanations of a man's behavior as he climbs up a
ladder to fetch his hat:
Given the antecedent neurological states of his bodily
system together with general laws correlating those
states with the contractions of muscles and
movements of limbs, he would have moved as he did
regardless of his desire or intention. If every
movement of his was completely accounted for by
his antecedent neurophysiological states, ... then it
was not true that those movements occurred because
he wanted or intended to get his hat .29
Malcolm is assuming here that allowing determination of the same
(broadly-described) event via two causal chains at distinct levels of
analysis is a philosophically-unacceptable form of
overdetermination. However, as Fodor (and others) have pointed
out, this overdetermination of causal transitions is a feature not only
of psychological laws, but of all laws in the special sciences. One
could just as easily construct an argument against chemistry by
substituting the phrase "chemical law" for "psychological law" and
the phrase "underlying physical explanation" for "underlying
neurophysiological explanation".
I see two reasons for rejecting Malcolm's conclusion that,
assuming such a completed neurophysiology, psychological entities
are inefficacious. The first is the reductio ad absurdum that
consistency would thus demand that all non-basic entities
(interestingly, including neurophysiological entities) are causally
29 Page 53.
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inert. Thus, all the laws put forward by all sciences apart from basic
physics are not really laws. We are more willing to give up on the
demand for non-overdetermination than on the status of the special
sciences as sciences; hence, psychology is saved.
In contrast to this negative argument, there is a positive
argument for the salvation of psychology. (While I do not think it
originated with Putnam, his name is most closely associated with it.)
Were one to insist that only those generalizations stated in the
vocabulary of basic physics can count as genuine causal laws, one
would miss out on a large number of counterfactual-supporting
generalizations relating state transitions of objects, where the
properties describing the states are not in theory expressible in the
vocabulary of basic physics. Indeed, the objects whose states would
partake in such regular transitions would not be mentioned by the
causal laws. (This is, I take it, true even if one is a reductionist and
assumes that the reduction relations in the actual world are also
valid in the nearest neighbor possible worlds.) The description of
such counterfactual-supporting, but non-basic, generalizations in the
vocabulary of basic physics would constitute a very ungainly
generalization indeed. Imagine a generalization encoding some non-
basic counterfactual-supporting rule (for example, the rule in
biology that, without energy input, a gradient of some substance
across a permeable membrane tends to equalize itself) in the
vocabulary of basic physics. Such a generalization would most likely
be a huge disjunction, in order to account for all the types of
membranes, all the ways those membranes could be permeable, all
the types of gradients, etc. (I doubt that there is some basic physical
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property that, for example, all membranes have, that might rein in
the number of disjuncts constituting the generalization.) Nowhere in
this generalization is there any mention of membranes or
permeability, which are necessary entities in seeing this
generalization as a true generalization. Here the strength and
simplicity criteria for the inclusion of a generalization in the set of
causal laws argues in favor of the inclusion of such generalizations,
for a very large number of counterfactual-supporting regularities
would otherwise be missed. And, as per above, the vocabulary
specifying the relevant objects and their states participating in such
regular transitions must be that of the corresponding level (rather
than that of basic physics) in order for the "generalization" to be a
generalization at all. So, even assuming a reductionist physicalism,
room can be made for causal laws outside of basic physics.
There is a second potential problem in applying the notion of
causation to state transitions in the mental realm. It concerns the
issue of how to understand the causal efficacy of psychological states
qua intentional. More specifically, the problem runs as follows. The
intentional content of a mental state does not in general supervene
upon the intrinsic physical properties of the object possessing that
state. Twin-earth thought experiments illustrate the essential
extrinsicness of content, in that they describe a situation in which
two people with physically-identical bodies fail to share all of the
same intentional states; hence, intentional states require something
more for their discrimination. In particular, they require the
consideration of certain relational properties between the person
and the world (usually understood in terms of the causal histories
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leading up to the tokening of a particular mental state). One needn' t
rely upon such exotica as molecular duplicates on twin-earth to see
that this rather homely point is true. What distinguishes the
reference of a visual experience of a desert oasis in the veridical
case from that of a mirage has nothing to do with the experienced s
physical state: we can stipulate sameness of physical state in both
cases. Rather, what distinguishes the fact that in the one case the
reference of the physical state token that implements the percept is
the nearby oasis whereas the reference of the other is something
else30 are the extrinsic properties of the experiencer. Granted then
that contentful states supervene on both intrinsic and extrinsic
physical properties of a subject, how can such states participate in
causal interactions — how can a subject's extrinsic properties be
causally relevant? (Note that, unlike the case with the first potential
problem described at the beginning of this section, this problem is,
among the special sciences, particular to psychology; hence, a Fodor-
style reductio won' t help.)
I see here two ways of answering this question. The first
route basically acquiesces (i.e., answers "they can t"): while meaning
does indeed supervene on both extrinsic and intrinsic properties, the
former are causally inert. This "methodological solipsism" has the
advantage of side-stepping this potential problem, but at an
enormous cost for psychology as the science of intentional states, for
it puts psychology in the untenable position of simultaneously
maintaining that there are causal laws relating contentful state
30
I am not sure what the reference of an illusion should be. In any event, it
cannot be the real nearby oasis, because, per supposition, there is no such
thing.
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types, yet each (tokened) causal state transition is not causal by
virtue of being subsumed under this law (for the law makes
reference to states in terms of their contents, which, on such a view,
are inert), but by virtue of some implementing mechanism. This
would set causation as understood in psychology totally apart from
causation in the rest of science, where it is the very properties
mentioned in the causal law that are causally responsible for its
efficacy. To make a parallel with the previously-mentioned causal
law of biology dealing with equalization of a gradient across a
membrane, it would be as if being a membrane were causally inert,
even though it is by virtue of being a membrane that something is
subject to this law. Thus, taking this tack with respect to the second
problem leaves one no protection from criticism with respect to the
first: the reason that the reductio is so intuitively effective is that it
is based upon the assumption that psychology is just like the other
special sciences; however, on this view, psychology is qualitatively
distinct from the other special sciences.
I find the advantage of the methodological solipsistic stance is
more than outweighed by its disadvantages (which, when taken to
their extreme, render psychology a non-science). Yet, I also take the
second problem of mental causation as serious -- hence, as requiring
a response. So, how do I explain the causal relevance of mental
states qua intentional? Here is an instance in which the specificity
with which I described my assumed theory of causation will pay off,
because, it allows a rather straight-forward explanation of mental
causation. (I am also of the opinion that much of the literature on
this subject consists of philosophers talking at cross purposes,
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because they are each making differing assumptions with respect to
the nature of causal interaction.)
Before giving my response I would like to state the problem in
what I take to be its most compelling form. Even if we grant that
some physical state tokens can have the property of meaning x, that
is still a long way from demonstrating that that property is causally
relevant, for a physical state that constitutes a cause has many,
many properties that are not relevant to its forcing the transition to
the effect. Perhaps the property of meaning x is one of these. So, to
cite a famous example
,
31 while the physical state corresponding to
the soprano s singing a high-C has the property of meaning A, that
property is causally irrelevant to the glass' shattering. Maybe the
meaningfulness of all physical states (including the states of
cognitive agents' nervous systems) is likewise causally irrelevant.
Maybe methodological solipsism is the best that we can get.
A solution to this problem would consist in identifying a
causally relevant difference between the property of meaning A in
the soprano case and the property of meaning A for a psychological
state -- a difference that can in principle leave the door open for the
causal relevance of meaning .32 My causal intuitions tell me that the
meaning of the soprano' s words is causally irrelevant — how is that
to be interpreted within the framework of my theory of causation? I
understand that as the counterfactual "had the soprano sung
something with a different (or with no) meaning, while all other
31 Dretske, Explaining Behavior, page 79.
32
I should re-emphasize, whether meanings are causally relevant is, 1 take it,
an empirical issue. What I am about here is demonstrating that such a thing is
not in principle ruled out by my theory of causation.
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properties of the physical state corresponding to the singing
remained either unchanged or changed as little as necessary given a
change in meaning, the glass would still have shattered". Hence, in
the nearest possible world in which she sang something with a
different meaning, the glass shattered. (I assume that the nearest
possible world in which this is the case is a nearest neighbor of the
actual world.) Therefore, there is no causal law relating the meaning
of the words with the glass' shattering.
What about the cases in which it is presumed that the meaning
of a physical state token is causally relevant? Let's return to
Malcolm' s case of the man climbing a ladder because he wanted to
fetch his hat. As mentioned earlier, Malcolm holds that ”[g]iven the
antecedent neurological state of his bodily system together with
general laws correlating these states with the contractions of
muscles and the movement of limbs, he would have moved as he did
regardless of his desire or intention". Is this the correct
counterfactual to use when assessing whether meaning is causally
relevant? I think not. Furthermore, I believe this way of construing
the problem of mental causation leads unavoidably to
methodological solipsism. Compare the two counterfactuals, where A
is the agent, N is the physical state possessed by A in the actual
world that produced behavior B (broadly construed), and N means M
in the actual world:
Cl: If it were to be the case that A was in state N,
but N did not mean M, then B would not have been
produced.
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C2: If it were to be the case that A was not in a
state with meaning M, then B would not have been
produced.
Malcolm (and many other philosophers) chose Cl as the correct
counterfactual to use in considering whether meaning is causally
relevant, whereas I maintain C2 is the correct one. It is obvious how
the adoption of Cl as the correct construal leads to difficulties: if it
is a law that N's produce B's, then in all the nearest neighbors in
which A was in state N, B would be produced. The question then
becomes: are any of these N-worlds also worlds in which N does not
mean M? The answer here is not so clear. If we are convinced by
the twin-earth thought experiments that meaning resolution
involves consideration of the causal history of a physical state
tokening (so N includes not just an "at-this-moment" snapshot of A'
s
neurological state, but also some of A's relational properties), one
could attempt to argue that there are no nearby possible worlds in
which N does not mean M; however, I am not convinced that this
must be the case. Therefore, the construal Cl leaves open the door
for someone like Malcolm to argue for the causal irrelevance of
meaning.
On construal C2, this argument is blocked. Let's consider how
C2 is analysed. We examine the nearest possible world in which
possessing the meaning M is not a property had by any of A' s states.
This could be so either because A was not in state N (in which case,
other things being equal, B would not be produced — therefore, C2 is
true) or because, a la Cl, A was in state N, but N did not mean M
(which leaves us back in the ambiguous case noted above). I
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maintain that the first of these two possibilities is closer to the
actual world than the second, because the number of important
changes needed to get from the actual world to the first is less than
that to get to the second. Because the meaning of an intentional
state depends not just on the intrinsic state, but also on the causal
history of the agent, the move from the actual world to the nearest
possible world in which the same intrinsic state had a different
meaning would require changing the causal history of the agent, in
comparison with the relatively smaller change in the intrinsic state
of the agent needed in the nearest possible world in which the agent
failed to have that intrinsic state. This change would also require
other changes (in particular, the minimum number of changes
necessary to accommodate the change in intrinsic state); however,
the overall quantitive amount of change is less is this case. While
this does not prove that there are in fact causal laws quantifying
over intentional entities, it at least demonstrates that such a thing is
not ruled out; one might rephrase this as: the problem of mental
causation is not a conceptual problem (hence, not a problem for
philosophers) but rather an empirical issue.
There are a few other lesser difficulties that relate specifically
to the application of causation to the mental realm. The first of
these involves the possible difference between ceteris paribus
conditions in psychological laws and in the laws of other special
sciences. As mentioned previously, the ceteris paribus condition is
meant to encode the background assumptions that must be satisfied
for the cause to be enabled to force the effect, where these
assumptions pertain to conditions at the implementation level;
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hence, if made explicit, the ceteris paribus conditions would be
stated in the vocabulary of the implementing mechanism. In the
case of psychological laws, however, it is sometimes assumed that at
least some conjuncts in the ceteris paribus clause are themselves
also at the psychological level. For example, one often reads in the
traditionalistic AI literature of the extreme difficulty of enumerating
all of the background beliefs, desires, etc. relevant to a psychological
law .33 I think, though, that this is an inappropriate use of the ceteris
paribus condition: those "background" beliefs, desires, etc. do not
constitute a background to psychological laws in the same sense as a
properly functioning brain constitutes a background. On my view,
such background beliefs, desires, etc. belong in the body of the
psychological law. If philosophers like Dreyfus are correct in
maintaining that the totality of background beliefs, desires, etc. are
not enumerable, then the enterprise of traditionalist psychology is
called into question. I don't have any particular counter against
33 Sometimes this difficulty is viewed as merely pragmatic: it is hard to
enumerate them all, but not in theory impossible. Sometimes, though, the
"difficulty" is portrayed more as a theoretically insurmountable hurdle,
founded on an essential differentness of psychological laws. A proponent of
this view is Hubert Dreyfus. He states in his paper "From Micro-worlds to
Knowledge Representation: AI at an Impasse":
My thesis ... is that whenever human behavior is analyzed in
terms of rules, these rules must always contain a ceteris
paribus condition, i.e., they apply "everything else being
equal," and what "everything else" and "equal" mean in any
specific situation can never be fully spelled out without a
regress. Moreover, this ceteris paribus condition is not
merely an annoyance which shows that the analysis is not
yet complete. ... Rather the ceteris paribus condition points to
a background of practices which are the condition of the
possibility of all rulelike activity. In explaining our actions
we must always sooner or later fall back on our everyday
practices and simply say "this is what we do" or "that s what it
is to be a human being." (Page 92).
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Dreyfus attack. In any event, the burden of proof is on him to show
(rather than merely assume) that this background is indeed either
infinite or necessarily regressive. His more recent writings in praise
of PDP leads me to believe that he doesn t take his concerns as
decisive against psychology per se, but rather as directed against
cognitive psychology as it is currently embodied in its strong
traditionalist form. As stated earler, I am not presuming that
present psychology is the true psychology; rather, that there is a
true psychology (i.e., a science that aims at discovering the causal
laws explaining human behavior in terms of intentional states). I
am not concerned in this paper with arguing for or against one or
the other models.
Another consideration in applying causation to the mental
realm involves the possibility of there being more than one distinct
level of organization of intentional entities that are causally related.
One sees a similar phenomenon within the (widely-construed)
discipline of biology as the science of entities qua living systems.
This discipline encompasses causal laws at the organellular (i.e.,
pertaining to parts of cells), cellular, organ-level, organism-level, and
ecological levels. Perhaps psychology is similarly laminar. One often
sees such a hypothesis in the more ecumenically-minded articles
describing PDP as a cognitive model .34 According to this
metapsychological thesis, there are two distinct levels of
organization of entities qua intentional agents, each of which
possesses its own causal laws stated in the vocabulary appropriate
34 An example is Paul Smolensky's "On the Proper Treatment of
Connectionism".
70
to that level, such that the traditionalist level is implemented in the
PDP level. This view allows that some PDP-modellable behavior is
not describable in traditionalist terms, but all traditionalist-
modellable behavior is implemented at the PDP level. Both levels
are in the domain of psychology because the laws within each model
make reference to meaningful states .33 While this possibility is an
interesting empirically-decidable issue, it is relevant to the question
I am posing in this present work in so far as it requires that the two
models correspond to distinct levels. Hence, the models are
themselves distinct.
The possibility of two psychological levels may appear to pose
problems for my theory of causation. Wouldn't the strength and
simplicity criteria rule out the adoption of the generalizations as
causal laws at both levels? A related concern involves the mutual
dependence (better known as circularity) of the entities and their
states quantified over in generalizations, on the one hand, and the
generalizations made, on the other. Which object-states are
considered potentially causally efficacious determines which
generalizations will be made. This is true not only at distinct levels,
but also within the same level, when there are two or more
competing ways of consistently "carving up" reality, each of which
produces a causal web relating the states within that way to one
another. We can assume that there is no theoretical reason to prefer
35There are also philosophers (noteably Fodor and Pylyshyn) who argue that
while it is possible that the model proposed by PDP is a true model describing
human behavior, and that it corresponds to the implementation level of
traditionalism, it is not itself a model of the mind, because the states related by
its causal laws are not intentional states. 1 shall have much more to say in
Chapter 4 on if and how PDP can be viewed as a model of the mind.
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one of the competing conceptualizations to another: both sets of
entities and generalizations "cover" the facts (broadly construed);
although, again, the "facts" (narrowly construed) to be explained
differ from one conceptualization to another. Applied to the
traditionalism versus PDP debate, this constitutes another
ecumenical possibility. Unlike in the case mentioned previously,
however, one would not be an implementation of the other. Does
this possibility pose a problem within the framework of my theory
of causation?
I think that in each case my theory not only handles these
potential problems, but also leaves the door open to a philosophical
analysis and comparison of traditionalism and PDP to an extent not
possible within the framework of a causal theory that allows only
one of several competing descriptions of the causally interacting
world to be true. (That is, I can isolate the, for present purposes
irrelevant, question of which model is correct from the question of
how the models differ.) Recall that a generalization is a causal law by
virtue of being a member of any36 of the best sets of generalizations.
The competing conceptualizations (if, per supposition, they provide
equivalent explanatory power) make it into distinct best sets; hence,
both sets of generalizations constitute causal laws. A similar result
is obtained when the theories are at least partly at distinct levels
(but where it is not the case that one completely reduces to or
supervenes upon the other). I view this not as a problematic aspect
of my theory of causation, but as a feature, both for providing a
36 A reminder: This is a departure from Lewis original theory, in which a
generalization was a causal law by virtue of being a member of all of the best
sets.
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framework for comparing traditionalism and PDP as well as for
elucidating the relationship between competing paradigms within a
discipline when both paradigms yield equally good strong-yet-
simple generalizations.
While the above considerations show that my theory of
causation has no theoretical difficulties in dealing with psychological
laws, yet, still the doubt remains that it does have certain practical
difficulties. In particular, the fact that most psychological laws will
relate non-directly-observable states, combined with the relative
generosity of my theory of causation in granting lawhood to
generalizations (with a concomitant ontological commitment to the
entities and their causally-interacting states), produces the fear that
there will not be enough restraint placed on which generalizations
are causal laws. This fear of a population explosion of causal laws
and entities is ungrounded, as the criteria for lawhood will
immediately exclude from any best set those generalizations which
do not contribute to the explanatory power of the set as a whole. By
way of illustration, consider the two sets of generalizations below:
Set 1:
Gn As cause Bs
Gn+1 Bs cause Cs
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Set 2:
Gn As cause Cs
Assume that Bs are mentioned only in generalizations Gn and Gn+1
within Set 1. If both sets are equally strong (i.e., postulating the
causal efficacy of Bs does not produce any increase in explanatory
power) then Set 1 is not a best set; hence, Gn and Gn+1 are not laws,
and there is no requirement for an ontological commitment to any
entities mentioned in B, unless it is mentioned elsewhere in Set 2.
Thus, each best set will be minimal relative to a host of sets within a
particular paradigm. While this example considers only the simple
case of a superfluous intermediate state, rather than a superfluous
web of states, I see no reason to doubt that the simplicity criterion
will likewise eliminate superfluous states that appear as conjuncts in
complex causes and/or effects.
2.4 Analysis of Mental Causation as Providing Model
of the Mental
I began this chapter with a brief overview of what I think a
model of a domain is, in order to motivate my subsequent
wanderings through the topics of causation in general and mental
causation in particular. Now it is time to re-examine the notion of
modelhood in light of the previous three sections.
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The first point to note is that, within common practice in
science, the word "model" is used ambiguously to include both
merely predicting (or, less pejoratively, simulating) models as well
as explanatory models. 3
7
The former grouping includes those models
that are constructed to mirror the state changes of the modelled
system, without regard to whether the causal laws producing the
state changes in the modelled system are the same as those
producing the state changes in the modelling system. My previous
example of the desk-top reproduction of the solar system is just
such a simulating model. This remains true, even supposing that, by
means of gears with carefully chosen ratios, I produce a dynamic
desk-top reproduction that mirrors not only the relative positions of
the real planets and sun at a particular time, but also the relative
velocities and positions of the real planets and sun through time. In
that case the toy solar system, while accurately reflecting the
location-state transitions of the real system, does not do so by virtue
of being subjected to the same causal laws underlying the location-
state transitions of the real solar system. Likewise, computer
models of physical systems (i.e., simulations by means of a computer
of the state transitions of the modelled system) are merely
predicting, even when the state transition predictions are based
upon an encoding of the relevant causal laws underlying the state
transitions in the modelled system. No one would say in either the
desk-top reproduction case or the computer simulation case that the
3, A more appropriate way of referring to this sort oi model would be to use
the phrase "implementing model". However, this usage may lead to confusions
when I discuss the implementing level of a model. Hence, I have closen to use
the less apt, but also less confusing phrase "explanatory model".
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models implement the systems in question, where "implement" is
understood in terms of the state transitions of the modelling system
being produced by the same causal laws as those governing the state
transitions of the modelled system. Hence, no one would argue that
such models are explanatory models. In contrast, many models used
in the sciences (the clearest example being animal models within
medical research) are based on the assumption that the causal laws
forcing state transitions in the modelled system (i.e., in the human)
are reproduced in the modelling system (i.e., in the animal).
Unlike the typical computer simulation of the state transitions of
a physical system (for example, the simulation of the progression
over time of a thunderstorm) it is not a forgone conclusion that a
computer model of the mind can be at most a merely predicting
model. This is because the causal laws that must be captured in a
concrete implementation of a mental model are not laws relating
physical state types but intentional state types and behavior. And it
is not clear whether or not the intentional state types and behavior
that are quantified over in psychological laws are reproducible on a
computer. I shall argue in Chapter 3 that traditionalism is
committed to the theoretical reproducibility in a computer of both
the intentional states quantified over in psychological laws as well as
the psychological causal laws themselves; hence, that traditionalism
is committed to the possibility of an explanatory model of mind
implementable in any computational device with certain capabilities.
In Chapter 4, I argue that PDP likewise assumes that their systems
will constitute an explanatory model of the mind. The relevance of
this will become apparent in Chapter 5, when I compare the two
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models. Traditionalism is committed to the computational nature of
mental causal laws — hence, to their computability. Some have
argued38 that the PDP model proposes (or, at least, does not rule out)
non-computable psychological laws. If this is true, then the two
models are distinct.
Both traditionalism and PDP offer a general summary of how
mental processing works. From these summaries, one can tease out
a theory of mental causation for each which describes the gross
characteristics of object states that take part in causal interaction
and the gross characteristics of the causal relationship. These form
the body of the respective mental models. One can thus view a
model of the mental realm as an abstract web whose interior "nodes"
are the causally efficacious state types and whose "directed
connections" are laws relating the partial cause and the partial
effect. I have in mind something like the following (this might be a
small section of a folk psychological causal web representing a model
of the mind)
.
Figure 1 -- Portion of folk psychological web
38 See for example Cummins and Schwartz' "Connectionism, Computation, and
Cognition" in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.
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In order to avoid misunderstandings I should reiterate that I am not
concerned here with what particular intentional states and causal
laws are mentioned in the causal web (that is an empirical matter)
but with the gross characteristics of the states and laws. For
example, what level of reality is represented by the causally
efficacious intentional states by each of the two models? By
considering the above question, one can determine the ontological
commitments made by a particular model. In addition,
traditionalism and PDP place constraints on what sorts of causal laws
are allowed and/or obligatory.
One final concern that I shall only mention here (but treat in
detail in Chapter 4) involves an ambiguity within the PDP literature
regarding which level of analysis of a PDP system to equate with the
model of the mind being offered. Obviously, the laws regulating
unit-level state changes and the intentional content of unit-level
activation differ from the laws regulating pattern-level state
changes and the intentional content of pattern-level activation;
hence, the unit-level description of PDP systems produces a distinct
model of the mental from the pattern-level description of PDP
systems.
I would like now to summarize the most important points of
this chapter. I take causation, whether involving object states in
basic physics or in any of the special sciences (including psychology)
as a real relation. A particular state transition is causal by virtue of
being subsumed under a causal law. Psychological laws are
distinguished by quantifying over intentional state types. To be a
psychological law is to be a generalization that, relative to a
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consistent paradigm, best encapsulates the regularities of the
behavior of humans (in addition to the other higher animals, and
any other entities capable of being governed by intentionally-
described states) qua intentional agents. It is possible that multiple
self-consistent but mutually-incompatible paradigms describing the
intentional level exist. That intentional states either supervene upon
or are reducible to physical states in no way shows the mere
epiphenomenalism of the former.
A model of the mind is first and foremost a theory of mental
causation. This theory is brought to light by abstracting away from
the particular vocabulary used to describe mental causal interaction
and focussing on the characteristics (in terms of possible
representational content) of the causally efficacious states and on
the constraints placed on the possible causal laws relating these
states. This abstract way of viewing a theory of mental causation
permits formalization of causation in terms of a relation and relata,
thus allowing a formal comparison of two presumably competing
theories of the mind.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONALISM AS A MODEL OF THE MENTAL
Traditionalism has most often been described in its folk
psychological version. As will become apparent later in this chapter,
I believe that there is sense to be made of traditionalism sans folk
psychology. However, the ubiquity of the examples illustrating
traditionalism using folk psychological constructs, and more
importantly, the dearth of non-folk psychological examples of
traditionalist causal laws, lead me to introduce traditionalism by
way of folk psychology.
In this chapter I shall describe what has been, until quite
recently, the predominant view of the mental realm within
psychology and philosophy in the latter half of this century. This
view (variously called "classicism", "computationalism", and
"traditionalism" -- I adopt the latter term for the remainder of this
work) offers a model of the mind which, among other things, was the
first to explain how our folk psychological theory of intelligent
agenthood may be realized, without contradicting an underlying
physicalist metaphysics. This fact is, I believe, the main reason for
traditionalism's popularity. The first section of the chapter is
devoted to a description of traditionalism as it has emerged with the
beginnings of AI (artificial intelligence) in the 1940's. Along the
way I make explicit some of the (oft-unmentioned) assumptions
inherent in traditionalism, and enumerate some of the various
flavors in which traditionalism comes -- this as an aid in identifying
the absolute minimal commitments of traditionalism. The second
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section of this chapter takes up the topic of traditionalism as
providing a model of the mind. In particular, I consider the
questions: What ontological commitments are made? What form
would causal laws posited by traditionalism take? Given that
traditionalism proposes that representational states are causally
efficacious, what level of reality do such states represent?
3.1 What is Traditionalism?
Folk psychology as a theory of intelligent agenthood has been
around for a long time. While I dare not hazard to guess how long, it
is clear that it pre-dates the advent of traditionalism. According to
folk psychology, the behavior of certain entities (including humans
and the other higher animals) is explainable by reference to the
beliefs, desires, etc. of those entities: ie, those beliefs, desires, etc.
are causally relevant to the behavior. Thus, one encounters in folk
psychology such putative causal laws as:
If A desires to drink some water, and
A believes that there is a glass of water in front of A,
then (ceteris paribus)
A engages in water-drinking behavior.
There are several problems with folk psychology that led
philosophers and psychologists to doubt that it could ever constitute
a serious (i.e., scientific) theory of mind. The most obvious
(philosophical) problem is how to square the causally efficacious
mental states posited by folk psychology with physicalism; hence,
how to find a place for the folk psychological ontology within the
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scientific quasi-hierarchy. (It is an assumption made by virtually all
mainstream philosophers that any respectable scientific theory must
presuppose physicalism -- to buck this assumption is to be
immediately branded "fringe".) How could something mental like a
belief be causally efficacious? Also, how could something as patently
non-physical as meaning play a role in a causal interaction? A third
concern (one whose consequences can be seen in the particular
psychological theory put forward in contraposition to folk
psychology in the latter 19th and earlier 20th centuries) involves
how folk psychology could ever be transformed into a science, given
that the causally efficacious states it posits - ie, beliefs, desires, etc.
-- are non-observable.
One found in associationism and behaviorism an attempt to
formulate a theory that can explain the behavior of intelligent
agents without recourse to their hypothesized mental states. Behind
this movement lay the hope that purely physical causal pathways
would be discovered (most likely, via the brain) linking stimuli and
response. Were this the case, philosophical concerns about making
the existence of mental states consonant with physicalism would be
avoided -- there would be no mental states in the usual sense (i.e.,
as identifiable using a non-physicalist vocabulary).
Two events (or, more precisely expressed, two movements) in
the mid-twentieth century turned the tide of favor within
psychology and philosophy against the associationistic/behavioristic
approach to explaining intelligent behavior and (back) towards a
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belief/desire-based psychology.! The first of these was the feeling
(identified most strongly with Chomsky's attack on behaviorism)
that the associations approach could not explain the facts of human
behavior.- For later purposes in my comparison of traditionalism
and PDP it is important to note that a working hypothesis of
behaviorism was the learned nature of concepts; the attacks against
behaviorism were more often than not attacks against this
hypothesis. Indeed, Chomsky's attack against behaviorism related
to the inability of the latter to explain how children could learn the
concepts expressed within the language, not how they could learn
the language itself. Thus, in psychology in the post-behaviorist era,
there has been a return to a Cartesian view of concepts: they are
atomic entities that are built into the mind. (When speaking of
concepts entertained by natural creatures, this corresponds to the
thesis that concepts are innate.)
The second movement leading to the decline of behaviorism
was the progress in AI in making the very idea of causally
! I want to reiterate that traditionalism need not be identified with folk
psychology. (Indeed, traditionalism is silent on whether the causally
efficacious mental states are beliefs, desires, and/or something else.) If
anything, folk psychology is best viewed as one among many specifications of
traditionalism. In its pure form, traditionalism is silent on which particular
generalizations are causal laws. Folk psychology, on the other hand, includes
(perhaps even consists solely in) the set of commonsense generalizations
purportedly providing explanations and predictions of the behavior of mind-
possessing entities. Many of these commonsense generalizations have been
called into question by various schools within traditionalist psychology, and
many additional generalizations not a part of the folk psychological
repertoire have been advanced. A clear example of the latter category is
Freud's psychological theory, which, while belief/desire-based (hence,
consonant with traditionalism) is not typically considered a part of folk
psychology.
2The identified short-comings of behaviorism were based on a posteriori
considerations: it was not that behaviorism was in principle incorrect as a
theory of intelligent behavior, but rather that it failed to explain certain
aspects of human behavior -- in particular, human language acquisition.
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efficacious mental states conceivable within the framework of
physicalism. The importance of the computer metaphor in bringing
about the hegemony of traditionalism within cognitive psychology
cannot be overstated. Philosophers saw in the computer an
existence proof that one aspect of the mind-body problem (i.e., how
a meaningful state could be causally efficacious) was readily
solvable: the meaningful states were also (token identical with)
physical states whose physical/syntactic properties were sufficiently
related to their meaning, so that the transition from one physical
state to the next mirrors the transition from one meaningful state to
the next. In the case of the computer, the meaningfulness was
derived — so, the analogy between computer and human was not
exact. However, it was believed that at least part of the mind-body
problem was solved; all that remained was the naturalization of
original intentionality. (This is a project that is still ongoing. See my
Chapter 2, Section 3.) Giving the historical roots of traditionalism
points out one of its underlying assumptions: any mental state, in
order to be genuinely efficacious, must be explicitly represented in a
physical state. This holds true both for systems (like the computer)
with derived intentionality as well as for systems with original
intentionality. Even the most abstract (i.e., remote from details of
physical implementation) cognitive psychological diagram of the
mind, with its belief boxes and arrows showing the flow of
information, is based on this assumption: there must be a set of
physical states and physical pathways that instantiate the depicted
mental states. Jerry Fodor, perhaps the most unambiguous
proponent of traditionalism, makes clear this underlying assumption:
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So, then, what exactly is RTM [his version of
traditionalism] minimally committed to by way of
explicit representation?
... According to RTM, mental
processes are transformations of mental
representations. The rules which determine the
course of such transitions may, but needn't, be
themselves explicitly represented. But the mental
contents (the thoughts', as it were) that get
transformed must be explicitly represented or the
theory is simply false. To put it another way: if the
occurrence of a thought is an episode in a mental
process, then RTM is committed to the explicit
representation of the content of the thought . 3
With this assumption as background, the psychologist, like any
researcher in the other natural sciences, need not concern herself
further with the particulars of implementation, but can remain
conceptually isolated within the vocabulary of beliefs and desires.
The historical relationship between traditionalism and AI
points out another of traditionalism' s groundlying assumptions: the
computability of the function governing mental state transitions .4
For present purposes, it is most fruitful to define computability in
terms of rule-governedness of manipulation. Using the vocabulary
transferred over from the computer metaphor, the representational
3A Theory of Content, pp. 23-24.
4Computability theory as a subdiscipline of computer science pre-dates by
several decades the construction of the first electronic computing devices in
the 1940' s; hence, the definition of what constitutes a computable function is
given, not in terms of the modern von Neumann-style computer (with its CPU,
instruction registers, and addressable memory), but in terms of the luring
machine. A function is computable if and only if it is Turing-computable (ie,
if and only if there is a Turing machine that can, for each element in the
domain of the function, return the function's output for that element). It just
so happens that the computational power of the universal I uring machine
and the (non-resource bounded) von Neumann-style computer are the same:
anv Turing-computable function is von Neumann-computable and vice versa.
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states being manipulated are explicitly stored, and the program that
refers to and transforms these states corresponds to formal rules
governing the manner of manipulation. (The computability thesis
carries with it a set of restrictions on the form that mental causal
laws can take. I shall discuss this topic later.)
We see in traditionalism an even stronger interpretation of the
computer metaphor than as a mere analogy to aid in clarifying
mental vocabulary. From the beginnings of AI it has been a thesis
that, once the rules governing mentally-describable state transitions
were discovered and encoded, a computer program implementing
these mentally-describable states and their corresponding rules
would not only simulate a mind, but implement a mind. In the
vocabulary introduced in Chapter 2, the thesis is that an explanatory
model of the mind (rather than a merely predicting model) is in
theory achievable. Even the name first mentioned by John McCarthy
in the 1950 s for the fledgling field reflects this assumption: notice
the distinction between the import of the phrases " artificial
intelligence" and "fake intelligence" -- the former implies that
genuine intelligence, albeit via human-manufactured entities, is the
goal, not a simulation of intelligence. This, along with the often tacit
assumption that only things with minds can have genuine
intelligence, implies that part of the goal of AI is the production of a
mind. Perhaps the most well-developed espousal of this strong
computational theory of mind view is to be found in Pylyshyn's
Computation and Cognition . A typical passage is:
As we see below, in the case of cognitive psychology,
explanatory adequacy depends on a stronger sense of
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equivalence [than mere correspondence of I/O
behavior], particularly on knowing the details of the
process at a suitable level of abstraction. What, then,
recommends computation as the appropriate vehicle
for that task? To provide a framework for discussing
this question, let us first look at computation from a
more abstract point of view. That will help bring out
further similarities in the relationship of
computational devices and computational processes,
on the one hand, and brains and cognitive processes,
on the other. It is the failure to distinguish
computation as a type of process from the particular
physical form it takes in current computing machines
that has prevented many people from taking
computation as a literal account of mental process. If
we understand computation at a fairly general level
(as, in fact, it is understood in theoretical computer
science), we can see that the idea that mental
processing is computation is indeed a serious
empirical hypothesis rather than a metaphor . 5
A similar statement equating mental processes with computational
processes can be found in the writings of other traditionalists, such
as Fodor. For example:
There are, as it happens, some reasonably persuasive
theories about the nature of such mechanisms
[dealing with mental phenomena]. The one I like
best says that the mechanisms that implement
intentional laws are computational .6
One can see now the truly pivotal role that the emergence of
AI has played with regard to saving a place for causally efficacious
mental states within the framework of physicalism. Computers (like
brains) are physical devices, subject to physical (and chemical and
5 Page 55.
6A Theory of Content, page 145.
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thermodynamic, etc.) laws. While embodying a computation process,
a computer has, in addition to its physical (and chemical and
thermodynamic, etc.) states, certain computational states.
Computational states possess some interesting properties, three of
which are particularly relevant for present purposes. The first is
that, while implemented in a physical medium, such a state qua
computational is not physical. Rather, the property that makes it the
computational state that it is is its functional role within the context
of an abstract process. This functional role is understood in terms of
the relation between this state and its preceding and following
computational states. A particular physical state implements a
particular computational state by virtue of being a token of a
member of an equivalence class of physical state types that are
related to other equivalence classes of physical state types in the
same way as the corresponding computational states are related to
one another. A second relevant property of computational states is
the rule-governedness of their succession upon one another. One
can identify, by means of an algorithm (at the abstract level) or a
program (at a more concrete level), the rules that govern the
manipulation of data structures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in seeing the
contribution of the computational theory of mind to the partial
solution of the mind/body problem, computational states are
intentional states. As already mentioned, their intentionality is
strictly derived from the original intentionality of the
observer/creator of the computational process. When embodied in a
concrete computational device, the physical characteristics of the
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physical state that implements a particular computational state bear
a relation to the meaning of that state, such that the physical laws
that force the transition from the current physical state to the next
physical state that is a token of a member of a distinct equivalence
class constituting another computational state are isomorphic to the
rules governing transitions between the computational states. This
correspondence is "built in" to the computer: the designer designs it
so that this correspondence between the computer's physical
properties and its computational properties (when it is engaged in a
computational process) obtains. (I am finding it very difficult to
express this in English — see the diagram for a pictorial
representation of this relationship between physical states and
computational states.)
Corn p - state -hypeA conn p-s tate-hype - 2
* • •
Figure 2 -- Relationship between physical and
computational states
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We see one single computational state transition depicted in the
diagram (i.e., the transition from comp-state-type- 1 to comp-state-
type-2). At the computational level of description, the transition is
governed by one of the rules that constitute the (abstract)
computational system. It is possible to implement a computational
system in a physical system (e.g., in a von Neumann-style
computer). Each computational state type corresponds to an
equivalence class of physical state types, as shown. Computers, as
artificial devices, are designed to take advantage of relevant
physical causal laws to allow relatively easy implementation of
computational systems: one can guarantee (ceteris paribus) that the
computer s physical state transits from one of the states in phys-
state-type-1
... phys-state-type-m to one of the states in phys-state-
type-m+1
... phys-state-type-n if and only if the computational
system s computational state transits from comp-state-type- 1 to
comp-state-type-2. A particular physical state of a computer (e.g., a
token of phys-state-type-1) is meaningful by virtue of instantiating a
computational state type (for this case, it inherits the intentional
content of comp-state-type-1). For the case of a computer, we can
guarantee a correspondence between computational states and
equivalence classes of physical states only because the (human)
designer of the computer has built in the correspondence. What
guarantees such a correspondence between computational/mental
states and equivalence classes of physical states in the human, or
any other natural being? How a traditionalist responds to this
question depends upon which method for the naturalization of
original intentionality is assumed. A traditionalist leaning towards
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the evolutionary approach to naturalization will answer that, in the
history of a species, it has offered selectional advantage to have a
body (or, more narrowly, a nervous system) whose physical states
follow upon one another in the manner of Figure 2. Whether or not
such a correspondence between classes of physical states of the
nervous system and computational states obtains is an empirical
issue which is not yet decided.
While the computational-nature-of-mind thesis is in one sense
liberating to the study of mental phenomena (in that it frees the
psychologist from a concern for the implementational details of the
computational/mental states), it can also be seen as constraining.
This is because it limits the candidate functions describing the
mental realm to the set of computable functions. There are,
however, many functions which are known to be non-computable
(i.e., there is no computational system that computes these
functions). Perhaps the mind is a system that implements a non-
computable function. The ramifications of this possibility are only
recently becoming understood within psychology. Although rarely
mentioned explicitly in traditionalist writings, the computability
assumption is so integral that it cannot be removed from
traditionalism without destroying the integrity of the entire model.
This is because the intentional content of the physical state
implementing a mental state is determined by the computational
state type that it is a token of. (I am taking as the received view
among traditionalists the thesis that computational statehood carries
with it wide content. As mentioned in Chapter 2, I assume that
psychological phenomena are identified by their subsumption under
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causal laws that advert to (wide) representational content.) But
something s being an instance of a computational state type makes
sense only within the context of a computational process -- a process
which, at a minimum, can be described by formal rules.
This restriction to the set of computable functions constrains
the sorts of learning in which a traditionalist system may engage. In
particular, learning must be confined to changes in the manipulated
structures, for changes to the program take us outside of the realm
of computation. This restriction makes sense, given how the
program is interpreted within tradtiionalism: the program encodes
the mental causal laws, which themselves remain unaffected by
learning. In order to stay within the guidelines set by the
computationalist assumption, the program is unalterable. Some may
object that computers running self-altering programs are not only
conceivable but also actual, and this is certainly true. However, in
implementing such a function, the computer is not implementing a
computational process. (In general, a physical computer is capable
of performing many tasks other than computing functions. For
example, a computer can implement the function d = 0.5 a t**2 when
I drop it out a window; however, the computer's states relevant to
its implementation of this function (namely, its displacement from
its location of release) are non-computational. It is important to
keep in mind that what the computationalist assumption (and its
accompanying restriction) buys for traditionalism is representational
content.
As we shall see in Chapter 4, PDP systems, while most often in
practice limited to the implementation of computable functions, are
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not in theory
'
thus limited. Whether PDP researchers believe that
the possibility of implementing non-computable functions is an
important feature of PDP systems vis-a-vis mental modelling is not
an issue on which there is any consensus in the literature. I shall
discuss this topic in more detail in Chapter 5, Section 4.
In the last several pages I have described the set of
hypotheses within traditionalism stemming from its AI roots: (1)
mental states are computational states and (2) these
mental/computational states must be explicitly represented. I
would like now to examine more closely the features of these states.
A major assumption within traditionalism is that mental states are
often structured: 7 they are composed of parts, each of which, in
combination with its "semantic" position within the state, contributes
something to the overall meaning of the mental state. The meaning
is nothing over and beyond the synthesized meaning of its parts. In
addition, the meaningfully-relevant parts correspond to physically-
isolable structural parts of the physical state that implements the
mental state. Additionally, any meaning-relevant position is also
reflected by some physical relationship. So, if a mental state consists
of three parts (mental-parti, mental-part2, and mental-part3) such
that this specific order is important (i.e., a different ordering of the
parts would constitute a different mental state), then the physical
state that implements it will also have three parts (phys-partl,
phys-part2, and phys-part3), such that phys-partl implements
mental-parti, phys-part2 implements mental-part2, and phys-part3
7On this view, not all mental states need be structured, but the vast majority
will be.
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implements mental-part3 and this ordering of the parts is somehow
encoded. When asked to give a reason for insisting on structured
representations, traditionalists most often cite Fodor's language of
thought argument. As I discuss this argument in Section 2 of this
chapter (in the context of an examination of the level of reality
represented by mental states), I shall not do more than merely
mention it here.
Traditionalism is the theory of mind most often assumed in
mainstream (non-PDP) AI and cognitive psychology. It is well
advised, therefore, to sample some of the writings from researchers
in these fields, if for no other reason than to prove that
traditionalism is not just a theory of interest to philosophers.
Perhaps the earliest sign of an inclination toward traditionalism
within the field that would later develop into AI is to be found in
Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", first
published in 1950, in which he refers to the "human computer" and
compares processing in the digital computer with processing in the
(human) mind. 8 Another important figure in the early history of AI,
Allen Newell, describes the close relationship between psychology
and computer science:
[My purpose] is to call your attention to the use of
symbolic models in many places through out
experimental psychology. ... I maintain that a shift
8This paper originally appeared in Mind LIX, in October 1950, pp. 433-460. It is
reprinted in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by M. Roden.
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in the Zeitgeist in psychology has taken place toward
a view of man as an information processor
.
9
And, a few pages later in the same article:
In the discussion of the possible relationship of
information processing models to psychology we
opted for the use of such models as detailed theories
of behavior, rather than, say, metaphors or exercises
in the discipline of operationalism
.
10
In a later work, Newell gives his own theory of human cognition. He
writes:
At this point I wish to be explicit that humans are
symbol systems. ... They might be other kinds of
systems [eg, biological systems] as well, but at least
they are symbol systems . 11
He defines "symbol system" in terms of being a "form of universal
computational system ." 12 I am taking Newell's views as
representative of those among researchers in AI, as is corroborated
by Haugeland, in:
Formal systems [ie, computational systems] can be
interpreted: their tokens ["token" here is being used
in a slightly restricted sense. A token is not any old
instance of a type, but refers specifically to the
9
" Remarks on the Relationship between Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Psychology" in Theoretical Approaches to Non-Numerical lYoblem Solving,
page 376.
111
"Rem arks on the Relationship between Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Psychology", page 378.
1
1
Unified Theories of Cognition, page 113.
1
2
Unified Theories of Cognition, page 76.
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physically instantiated objects (i.e., concrete
realizations of computational states) manipulated by a
system] can be assigned meanings and taken as
symbols about the outside world.
... [I] f artificial
intelligence is right, the mind itself is a (special)
interpreted formal system
.
13
Traditionalism is also the model of choice among cognitive
psychologists. I take John Anderson as typical of that group.
Production systems are particularly general in that
they claim to be computationally universal -- capable
of modelling all cognitive activity
.
14
One point of contention amongst traditionalists relates to the
issue of the requirement for the explicit representation of the
rules/program governing the transition from one computational
state to another. As the above-quoted passage from Fodor
demonstrates
,
15 he is willing to allow that the rules may be built in.
Thus, it may be that mental processing corresponds to computational
processing on a dedicated, rather than on a general purpose
computer. Newell and Simon, on the other hand, understand the
computational nature of mind thesis as requiring a separation into
universal computational device and particular program running on
that general purpose device -- thus, the rules, along with the
manipulated symbols, must be explicitly represented. I do not take
this difference as crucial to the understanding of traditionalism, for
13Artificial Intelligence, pp. 99-100.
14 The Architecture of Cognition, page 13.
15
"The rules which determine the course of such transitions may, but needn't,
be themselves explicitly represented." A Theory of Content, page 24.
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all three agree on the computational nature of mind, and on the
thesis that a special purpose device (e.g., a special purpose Turing
machine) can implement a computational system. Hence, I side with
Fodor in allowing non-explicit rules within traditionalism. The issue
is often brought up in the context of comparisons between
traditionalism and PDP, in that the latter not only permits non-
explicit rules, but requires it by the very nature of PDP systems. I
shall have more to say on this topic in Chapters 4 and 5. Suffice it
for now to note that, as I do not believe the explicit representation
of rules is a necesary condition for a traditionalist model, I will tend
to be dismissive of this line of argument in distinguishing the two
models.
I am able at this point to state what I take to be the defining
marks of traditionalism: a realist understanding of mental causation,
the equation of mental processes with computational processes, and
the structured nature of the mental/computational representations
being manipulated. Tienson has summed up this view quite nicely
as follows:
The "twin minimal commitments" of [traditionalism]:
syntactically structured representations and structure
sensitive, rule-governed computational processes. 16
It may be useful to examine traditionalism in light of various
criticisms of it raised by dissenting philosophers; I do this in order to
make crystal clear some of its ramifications. The most famous
opponent of traditionalism is John Searle. In his oft-cited article
16From the introduction to Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, page
23.
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Minds, Brains, and Programs " 17 his rejection of traditionalism can
be summed up by his rejection of the computational theory of mind:
he states that "no reason has been given to suppose that when I
understand English [he uses understanding English here as an
archetype representing all mental processing] I am operating with
any formal program at all ." 18 Rather, he claims, causal laws relevant
to mental goings-on (including those relevant for establishing a
mental token as meaningful) reach down to the biological level;
hence, it is in theory impossible to implement an explanatory model
of the mind in a computer.
Steven Stich, on the other hand, accepts the computational
theory of mind (in a slightly modified form), but rejects the
traditionalist hypothesis that the mental tokens thus manipulated
are representations (i.e., are intentional). He summarizes the
conclusion of his arguments against the strong representational
theory of mind (i.e., a theory according to which mental laws advert
to con ten tful states )
:
The question at hand is whether the notion of belief
and related folk psychological notions will find a
comfortable home in cognitive science. One view that
urges an affirmative answer is the Strong
Representational Theory of Mind, which sees a mature
cognitive science postulating representational states
and adverting to content in its generalizations. ... [T]he
cognitive scientist is ill advised to adopt the Strong
RTM paradigm . 19
17 Originally published in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), pp. 417-
424. Reproduced in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by M.
Boden.
18 The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, page 71.
1
9
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, page 160.
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He puts forward an alternative theory of the mind (dubbed the
Syntactic Theory of Mind) which is computational, yet "[avoids] any
appeal to content in cognitive generalizations." 20
A third route to the rejection of traditionalism is to adopt an
instrumentalist construal of mental state tokens. Under the rubric
"instrumentalism" I include both the standard interpretation (a la
Dennett) and (for lack of a better label) the non-explicit
representationalists. Both groups reject the realist assumption of
traditionalism — they reject the thesis that there corresponds, for
each mental state token, an implementing physical state token.
A final group of cognitive scientists (most of whom are
experimental psychologists working in the field of mental imagery--
eg, Kosslyn and Shepard) argue against traditionalism on the
grounds that it gets the nature of the structure of mental
representations wrong. They base their opposition on a set of
famous psychological experiments, 21 which purport to show that (at
least some) mental processing consists of rule-governed
manipulation of pictorial, rather than quasi-linguistic, tokens. (That
is, they maintain that the manner in which the part/whole relation
of some mental tokens is to be understood is in terms of the
part/whole relation typical of pictures or images, rather than that of
complex sentences.) I believe that Fodor's language of thought
argument (to be discussed in Section 2 of this chapter) presupposes
that the structure of causally efficacious mental tokens is quasi-
20From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, page 160.
21 See, for example, Mental Images and their Transformations, by R. Shepard
and L. Cooper.
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linguistic. While I would not want to base my interpretation of
traditionalism solely on the views of Fodor, the centrality of the LOT
argument in the traditionalism versus PDP debate inclines me to
exclude, at least in the context of this work, pictorialists from the
traditionalist camp.
3.2 Traditionalism as a Model of the Mental
In this section, I convert traditionalism (as defined by a
commitment to a realist theory of mental causation, in which mental
processes are computational processes, such that the
mental/computational representations manipulated are structured)
into a model of the mind. Before I begin, I would like to reiterate
that a model of the mind is an abstract model, in that it makes no
mention of concrete mental causal laws. In particular, I want to
explicitly distinguish traditionalism and folk psychology, because the
latter includes a set of presumed causal laws. Indeed, the above
description of traditionalism is even silent on whether causally
efficacious mental tokens are beliefs, desires, and/or any other type
of attitude that one typically finds in folk psychology. What exactly
the true mental tokens would be, if not beliefs, desires, etc., is
unclear; however, traditionalism in its purest form allows that they
might be some other sort of representational states.
As described in Chapter 2, Section 4, a model corresponding to
a particular theory of the mind is intimately related to the form that
the causal laws take within that theory. Hence, I begin this section
with an analysis of mental causation according to traditionalism.
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While traditionalism is committed to the physical instantiation of all
mental states, mental causal laws quantify over states qua
intentional — ie, a state takes part in a mental causally-determined
transition in part because it bears a particular meaning. (It may also
be that some other aspects of the state are causally relevant -- for
example, that it instantiates a certain attitude of the agent towards
the representational content. Using the belief/desire-based
specification of traditionalism, the physical state may instantiate a
belief that p. This is a distinct mental state type from a desire that
p, even though the representational content of the two states is
identical. Presumably, mental causal laws advert to both content
and attitude.) The rules that specify the transition from one
computational state to another are the mental causal laws.
One important aspect of causal lawhood (both on my particular
construal given in Chapter 2, Section 1 and in general) involves the
analysis of counterfactuals. How are they to be understood a la
traditionalism? Consider a particular hypothesized mental causal
law:
C s cause E's
where C and E are mental state types, each of which may be a
complex conjunction composed of more basic mental state types.
Suppose that a particular instance (i.e., a token) of C (call it "c")
occurred in the actual world, and that it was followed by a particular
instance of E (call it "e"). Given the relationship between mental
states and physical states according to traditionalism, this means
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that there was a token of some physical state type which
implemented c, in that it was a member of the equivalence class of
physical state types that form the computational/mental state C. A
similar relationship holds between e and the physical state that
implements it. Call the state type of the physical state that
implements c "Phys-C", and call the physical state token that, on this
particular occasion, implements c, "phys-c". Similarly, Phys-E is the
physical state type and phys-e is the token of the physical state that
implements e. As mentioned, we are assuming that "C' s cause E s" is
a law, and that c (an actual token) caused e. How are we to
understand the following counterfactual?
If a C hadn ' t occurred,
then an E would not have occurred.
We first consider the nearest possible world in which this instance of
C did not occur (presumably, this world is one of the nearest
neighbors of the actual world). Now, there are three possibilities to
consider with respect to the properties at this possible world. Either:
(a) phys-c occurred, but phys-c in this world is not a
token of C, or
(b) phys-c did not occur, but some other state (call
it phys-o) did occur, and phys-o is an instance of
Phys-O, which is a member of the equivalence
class constituting C in the actual world, but
not a member of the equivalence class forming
C in this possible world, or
(c) phys-c did not occur, and no other token of a state
that is a member of the equivalence class constituting
C in the actual world occurred.
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Recall in Chapter 2, in the discussion of analysis of counterfactuals in
general, I argued that the possibility represented by (a) above is not
the possible world to consider in analysing the corresponding
counterfactual, for it is farther away from the actual world than (b)
or (c). We can see the similarity of this case with the one used in
Chapter 2 by considering the following: phys-c s instantiation of the
mental state type C gives to phys-c in the actual world its meaning.
So, possibility (a) is analogous to the case from Chapter 2 in which
the man was in the same physical state, yet that physical state did
not correspond to the belief and desire that led him to climb the
ladder in the actual world. But the difference between the actual
world and this world needed to effect the change in meaning for the
identical physical state is greater than the difference between the
actual and some other world in which the meaningful state is altered
because the physical state is altered. Thus, whether a token of E
occurs in the possible world corresponding to (a) is irrelevant.
Now consider possibility (b). The antecedent of the
counterfactual is satisfied only when Phys-O, while a member of the
equivalence class forming C in the actual world, is not a member of
the equivalence class forming C in this possible world. Thus, we
have the same situation as that described for the above case: the
equivalence class forming the computational/mental state is not
constant across the possible worlds -- ie, from the actual world to
the possible world described by (b). And, as above, the quantity of
change needed to effect this is greater than the quantity of change
needed to go from the actual world to the possible world
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corresponding to (c). As above, therefore, whether a token of E
occurs in this possible world is irrelevant.
So, this leaves us with (c) as the world to consider when
analyzing the counterfactual: neither phys-c nor any other physical
state token that is an instance of a physical state type that
constitutes the equivalence class C occurs. If, as hypothesized, the E
in the actual world was caused by the C in the actual world, then the
physical mechanism implementing this interaction was phys-c 's
causing phys-e. (This is so, because, according to traditionalism,
phys-c s being a token of C is conditioned upon its nomic ability to
produce a physical state (in this case, phys-e) that is an instance of a
member of the equivalence class that constitutes E). But, according
to possibility (c), there is no reason to believe that an E would be
caused, unless E was overdetermined in the actual world. (That is, it
is also a causal law that, for example, C*'s cause E's, and both an
instance of C as well as an instance of C* (call it "phys-c*") occurred,
and both were nomologically sufficient for the production of phys-e).
In this case, however, we would not say that the C caused the E, but
rather that both the C and the C* caused the E. Hence, we needn't
consider this possibility. So, in this, the closest possible world, the
counterfactual turns out true, as expected.
Up until this point, I have been somewhat sloppy in my
characterization of computational/mental states. I would like to
think that my sloppiness is merely a reflection of the sloppiness to
be found in traditionalist writings on this topic -- given that I have
often been engaged in summarizing the views of others in the first
part of this chapter, it is reasonable that I should adopt the
104
vocabulary' used in the literature. Now, however, I must of necessity
adopt a more precise and standardized vocabulary. According to the
classical computer science definition, a computational state of a
computing device consists of the complete computational state of the
device at a time step. Using the Turing machine as archetype of a
computing device, a computational state is the triple:
<current-machine-state
,
22
tape-contents,
position of read/write head> 23
Thus, the Turing machine progresses from one computational state
to another at each time step . 24 A concrete Turing machine, were one
to construct it
,
25 would be a physical device with physical
components (a tape, a R/W head, and some sort of controller that
could store the current machine state and perform the physical
actions corresponding to the formal actions specified in the machine
state tansition table). Corresponding to each computational state is a
(very large) equivalence class of physical states that can instantiate
it. One can think of this physical diversity as the consequence of
implementing a quantized device in a world whose ultimate level of
220ne of a finite number of states accessed by the state transition table. The
machine state makes no mention of head position or items stored on the tape.
23An equivalent formalism for describing the computational state of a luring
machine is: ccurrent-machine-state, contents of tape to left of R/W head,
contents of tape from R/W head to the right (inciusive)>.
24Turing machines, like digital computers, are assumed to have a clock that
synchronizes all the changes necessary in going from one computational
state to the next. Thus, computational states are quantized: it makes no sense to
ask, for example, "What state is the machine in as the R/W head moves from
square 201 to square 200?".
2 ^Technically-speaking, this is not possible, because a Turing machine has
access to an unbounded amount of tape. As no one believes the (non-resource
bounded) Turing machine is true in all respects in depicting the attributes of
the mind, this short-coming can be glossed over.
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quantization (if there is one) is much lower than that of the device.
So, there might be many distinct ways of being in the state <S24,
0010000..., 3>. Some of the diversity results from the various
precise physical configurations corresponding to the R/W head
scanning the 3rd square of the tape. There are many other sources
of diversity. (As mentioned, in general, the equivalence class of
physical state types will be very large.) A von Neumann-style
computer, while differing in some of the above details, produces an
analogous picture. The traditionalist thesis is that so too does the
human nervous system (or, more generally, the nervous system of
any creature possessing a mind).
There is, however, a slight problem of terminology in squaring
this (monolithic) view of a computational state with the more finely-
grained usage outside of the theory of computation literature.
Namely, psychologists and philosophers talk as though it is a proper
part of the complete computational/mental state of an entity that is
causally responsible for some change of mental state or some
behavior. Returning to the folk psychological example, it is only my
desire for water and my belief that there is a glass of water in front
of me that causes my water-drinking behavior. I have many, many
other beliefs, desires, etc., that play absolutely no role in this causal
sequence. In particular, my belief that 2+2=4 is causally irrelevant
to my drinking. However, on the monolithic view imported from
computer science, it is my whole computational/mental state that
caused my water-drinking behavior.
Is there a way to make psychological and philosophical usage
of the computational theory of mind consistent with computational
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theory simpliciter? What traditionalism-cum-folk-psychology needs
is a way of subdividing this monolithic computational/mental state
into substates that correspond to beliefs, desires, etc., while
preserving the individuation of these substates along computational
lines. There is, I think, one avenue open to the traditionalist. Recall
that one of the commitments of traditionalism is to structured parts:
the parts of the mental state (i.e., the individual conjuncts
constituting the monolithic computational/mental state) correspond
to physically-isolable parts of the physical state implementing the
mental state. (While usually intended --eg, in Fodor's argument
from systematicity of mental representation26 — to cover the
part/whole relation between single propositions and their
constituents, the structured nature of mental states is a thesis that
also applies to conjunctive mental states.27 ) So, on this theory, each
conjunct is itself physically-isolable: within each physical state type
that is a member of the equivalence class that constitutes a mental
state is a physically-isolable "sub"-state type, tokens of which
implement the corresponding mental state parts. The " sub" -state
types are themselves physical state types. We have the following
picture:
26See, for example, the section on the systematicity of cognitive
representation in Fodor and Pylyshyn s "Connectionism and Cognitixe
Architecture: A Critical Analysis", pp. 37-41.
27 See, for example, the section of the systematicity of inference trom the
same work, pp. 46-48.
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Figure 3 -- Relationship of monolithic and sub-state types
To say that my belief that there is a glass of water in front of me
and my desire for water caused my water-drinking behavior is to
say that, for each of the monolithic physical state types that is a
member of the mental state type, only a subset of that monolithic
physical state is, strictly-speaking, necessary for the production of
water-drinking behavior. (In particular, when mental-state-type-
1
is instantiated by a token of monohthic-phys-state-type-b, only the
subset of b identified by the two circles within b are necessary to
cause the circle in monolithic-phys-state-type-w. 28 ) Clearly, how
28The subset need not be limited to spatial parts of the monolithic physical
state; rather, it is a subpart that is isolable using physical vocabulary.
Spatially-isolable parts are only one among many parts thus isolable.
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structured and causally-isolable the monolithic-phys-state-type
parts are is an empirical issue.
In the idealized case where such parts are perfectly causally-
isolable, a picture emerges of multiple computational processes
running in parallel, implemented in a single sequence of monolithic
physical state tokens. It is analogous to a parallel-processing
computer executing several programs simultaneously. There are
two computational levels: one corresponding to the overall
computational process encompassing all of the subprocesses, and a
second level corresponding to many separate computational
processes, one for each individual program running in parallel. I
think it is this picture that best fits the terminology adopted by
mainstream traditionalists. (It should be noted that parallelism as
described above does not increase the computational power to a
level above that of a serial von Neumann-style computer: both
(non-resource bounded) serial and parallel computers can compute
exactly the same set of functions as a Turing machine.) An aside:
this picture, in conjunction with the further thesis that the various
processes running in parallel are relatively compartmentalized,
results in faculty psychology, a la Fodor' s Modularity of Mind.
It is interesting to note the relationship between this picture
and my comments in Chapter 2 on how to interpret "ceteris paribus"
in the context of mental causal laws. Recall that, in that discussion, I
distinguished two interpretations assigned to ceteris paribus clauses.
The first supposes that ceteris paribus clauses, if cashed out, would
be seen to encapsulate a bunch of background beliefs and desires
that, while strictly-speaking necessary, are omitted because this
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background has proven recalcitrant to enumeration. I rejected that
explication of ceteris paribus as insufficient! if the background
beliefs and desires are nomologically necessary to produce the
effect, then they belong in the body of the causal law. The second
interpretation of the role of ceteris paribus clauses also has it that
they stand for the background assumptions causally necessary for
the effect. However, on this interpretation, these assumptions are at
the level of the mechanism implementing the causal law (hence, if
cashed out, they would be stated in the vocabulary of the discipline
implementing the causally-related states). For example, suppose
that a desire for water and a belief that there is a glass of water
cause water-drinking behavior, ceteris paribus. Most traditionalists
take neural hardware as either the implementing level, or perhaps,
the implementing level of the implementing level of mental states.
(In any event, not too far below mental states in the scientific quasi-
hierarchy.) The ceteris paribus clause is not satisfied when the
neurological hardware is not functioning as assumed. Were I to
have particular tokens of the above-mentioned belief and desire,
yet, just as my water-drinking behavior was about to commence, I
suffered a serious stroke, or was shot in the head, the ceteris paribus
conditions would not be satisfied, and water-drinking behavior
would not be caused. Similarly, were the motor end of my central
nervous system to sudddenly become damaged, the expected water-
drinking behavior would not commence. This is, I think, the only
interpretation that can be consistently maintained. Within the
context of traditionalism, it means something like this: each
monolithic physical state type that is a member of mental-state-
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type-1 shares the "sub’’-state types that implement the belief and
desire, as shown. Strictly-speaking, these "sub"-states are not
nomologically sufficient for the production of the "sub"
-state-type
corresponding to the water-drinking behavior. Rather, in at least
one of the monolithic-phys-state types, there is an additional part of
the physical state that, in conjunction with the instantiation of the
belief and desire, cause the effect. However, this part is not shared
by each of the monolithic physical state types constituting the
equivalence class in such a way that it could either form a new
computational subpart or be consistently encompassed within the
belief or desire. So, the boundaries of the belief and desire, if
interpretted as surrounding the parts of the monolithic physical
state types causally sufficient for production of the effect, "leak" a
bit. Looking back to my example of failing to engage in water-
drinking behavior because of damage to my motor control system,
the current state of my motor control system is not a part of the
relevant belief or desire, yet is included in the monolithic physical
state type describing my current physical state. This aspect of my
physical state prevents the water-drinking behavior: it is in this
sense that I say that the boundaries of the belief and desire "leak" in
order to accommodate all of the causally relevant parts of my
monolithic physical state.
Is this fatal for traditionalism? Does it show that those
sneaking suspicions about belief/desire psychology in particular, and
the computational nature of mind thesis in general, were justified
after all? One possible line of argument against traditionalism, based
on these considerations, is that the computational states which play
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such a central role within traditionalism could not be isolated if they
"leak"; hence, there would be no physically-isolable units to be the
bearers of meaning. I really don t know whether such an argument
could show that traditionalism is incoherent. My inclination is to
pull a Fodor-style reductio: but the other special sciences suffer
from the same "causal leakiness". In any event, I am not here so
much concerned with attacking or defending traditionalism, so
further discussion of this topic will have to be postponed until
another occasion.
I cannot, however, postpone any longer an examination of
Fodor s language of thought argument and its consequences for
traditionalism. In particular, I shall focus on what the LOT argument
has to say about the level of reality that is represented in causally
efficacious mental states. Fodor' s argument29 is supposed to show
that certain features of the cognitive capabilities of humans and
other mind-possessing entities are best explained by postulating a
language of thought, whereby mental representations possess
combinatorial syntax and semantics, and the processes that
manipulate those representations are sensitive to their structure.
His argument can be summarized as follows: traditionalism is the
model of the mind that best explains certain empirical features of
cognition. These features of cognition are: (1) the systematicity of
inference, (2) the systematicity of mental representation, and (3) the
productivity of mental representation. I shall focus on the first two
29Actually, the LOT argument did not originate with Fodor, but rather, with
Chomsky. I associate it with Fodor because, particularly in the context of the
traditionalism versus PDP debate, he has been the most vocal promulgator of
it.
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of these on the way to arguing that the level of reality represented
by causally efficacious mental states and their causally efficacious
parts are propositions and the concepts expressed by words in our
natural (i.e., public) language.
In arguing for traditionalism on the basis of the systematicity
of inference, Fodor makes it quite clear that the causally relevant
parts of some complex mental representations are propositions. To
say that inference is systematic is to say that representations with
logically similar forms are all processed in the same manner. Fodor
and Pylyshyn cite a particular example: "it's a psychological law
that thoughts that P&Q_tend to cause thoughts that P and thoughts
that Q, all else being equal ." 30 In order for this to be true, the parts
that this rule must be sensitive to are the conjuncts that constitute
the overall mental representation that P&Q. So, one level of reality
represented by causally efficacious mental states corresponds to
propositions.
The argument for traditionalism based on the systematicity of
mental representation presupposes that some mental states have
parts which correspond to concepts expressed by words in our
public language. There are, I think, four reasons for asserting this.
First, the overall structure of the argument from systematicity of
mental representation is basically an argument from analogy with
public language: you never find someone who is a native speaker of
a language who can understand (for example) "John loves the girl"
but cannot understand "The girl loves John". The ubiquity of this
phenomenon is explained by the fact that the well-formed sentences
30
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 46.
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of a public language are not primitive, but rather are composed of
elements (i.e., words) according to certain rules (i.e., the grammar).
Just so, you never find someone who can think "John loves the girl"
but cannot think "The girl loves John". If an analogous explanation
of this phenomenon of mental representation is to work, one must
assume that the parts of the mental representation correspond to
the words used to express the proposition that John loves the girl.
Secondly, I cite one version of the argument from the
systematicity of mental representation:
A fast argument is that cognitive capacities must be
at least as systematic as linguistic [public language]
capacities, since the function of language is to
express thought. ... You can't have it that language
expresses thought and that language is systematic
unless you also have it that thought is as systematic
as language is .31
By closely tying the systematicity of mental representation with the
systematicity of public language, Fodor commits himself to the view
that the parts that are necessary to explain the systematicity in the
language of thought form a one-to-one correspondence with the
parts (i.e., the words) that are necessary to explain the systematicity
in public language.
A third reason for identifying the parts of mental
representations with the concepts expressed by words is that, in
each case, when Fodor illustrates what he means by systematicity of
mental representations with a particular example, the parts of the
3
1
Psychosematics, page 151.
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mental representation correspond to the concepts expressed by the
words which collectively express the proposition.
Finally, Fodor and Pylyshyn cite the example of existential
introduction as an aspect of the systematicity of inference that must
be explained. They write:
We can reconstruct such truth preserving inferences
as if Rover bites then something bites on the
assumption that (a) the sentence Rover bites' is of the
syntactic type Fa, (b) the sentence ' something bites' is
of the syntactic type Ex(Fx) and (c) every formula of
the first type entails a corresponding formula of the
second type (where the notion corresponding
formula' is cashed syntactically; roughly the two
formulas must differ only in that the one has an
existentially bound variable at the syntactic position
that is occupied by a constant in the other).32
In order to explain this systematicity of inference, the syntactic
parts of the proposition ' Rover bites ' that is represented in the mind
must be 'Rover' and bites' -- otherwise, the systematicity remains a
mystery.
These considerations make it clear that, at least in the view of
Fodor and Pylyshyn, traditionalism is committed to the theses that:
(1) many mental representations are complex
structures, with a combinatorial syntax and
semantics,
(2) those mental representations that are conjunctive
have causally relevant parts that correspond to the
individual propositions that make up the conjunction,
and
3 2 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis , page 1 ).
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(^) those mental representations that correspond to
individual propositions themselves have causally
relevant parts that correspond to the concepts
expressed by the words that form the sentence
expressing the proposition.
Thus, the level of reality represented by the causally efficacious
mental representations are propositions33 and the concepts
expressed by words in the public language. As noted previously,
traditionalism per se is not committed to this close linkage between
the language of thought and the public language. However, given
the general endorsement of the LOT argument by most
traditionalists, and given the lack of an alternative thesis among
traditionalists as to the nature of the parts of mental
representations, I shall henceforth accept these assumptions of the
LOT argument as descriptive of traditionalism in general.
One point of comparison I shall use in Chapter 5 in trying to
distinguish traditionalism and PDP as models of the mind is the
ontological commitments inherent is each. Therefore, I end this
chapter with an enumeration of the ontological commitments made
within traditionalism. First and foremost, traditionalism, while
based on a physicalist metaphysics, assumes that there are causally
efficacious mental states. These mental states are explicitly
instantiated in physical states, presumably in the physical states of
the brain. Each meaningful physical state has its particular meaning
by virtue of its functional role. Mental causal laws advert to the
content of these states, whereby the "units" of content are the
33Conjunctive sentences express (complex) propositions, on my use of the
word "proposition".
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concepts expressed by words in public language and propositions;
thus, mental causal laws quantify over states which can represent
reality at the level of word-concepts and/or the level of
propositions. The computability assumption inherent in
traditionalism places restrictions on the form that mental causal
laws can take. In particular, they must be formally specifiable. In
order not to transgress the underlying physicalism, the physical
states implementing the mental states must have a structure that
mirrors the structure of the meaningful units of the mental state.
For example, the mental state that represents "John loves the girl"
has causally relevant parts corresponding to "John" and "loves" and
"the" and "girl". The physical state that implements this must
likewise have causally relevant parts, one of which represents
"John", another "loves", another "the", and another "girl ".34
Furthermore, this physical state must encode the structure of the
sentence "John loves the girl" (i.e., it must capture in a way that is
causally relevant that John is the actor and the girl is the recipient of
the loving relation).
34 It is consistent with the views stated by Fodor and Pylyshyn that some
groups of words function as a unit, for example, "the girl" may function as a
unit, such that there is no causally relevant part of the physical state
implementing this mental state that corresponds to "the" alone. All that is
necessarv for my above analysis to go through is that, by and large, there is a
correspondence between the words in the sentence expressing the
proposition and the causally relevant parts of the physical state instantiating
it.
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CHAPTER 4
PDP AS A MODEL OF THE MENTAL
In this chapter, I present parallel distributed processing as a
model of the mind. In doing so, I must restrict myself to one version
of PDP (or, more precisely, one version of PDP s self-image). This is
because researchers within this field display a wide variety of views
about such basic issues as what PDP systems are understood as
modelling. Perhaps because of PDP' s relative youth as a research
endeavour, or perhaps because the researchers who have of late
flocked to PDP represent by-and-large two distinct ways of
describing intelligent activity (i.e., from the field of psychology, with
its "mind-centered" approach to explaining intelligent behavior and
from the field of neuroscience, with its "brain-centered" approach),
the literature shows no consensus on even this fundamental
question. 1 Similarly, a myriad of less-basic but still important issues
regarding the "correct" understanding of PDP have yet to be resolved
(or, quoting one of the more useful analogies from PDP research, the
field is still in the process of settling into its stable state). Along the
way, I shall hint at the variety of opinion within PDP (particularly in
1 My choice of the neutral name "parallel distributed processing" over the
more common, but also more partisan names "neural networks" or "neural
network processing" is quite intentional — the latter gives, 1 think, the strong
impression that the entity being modelled is the brain. If the mind is
simultaneously modelled, it is only coincidentally so. Also, this name gives
more information on the nature of such systems than does the name
connectionism.
As an historical aside, the name "PDP" derives from the title of perhaps the
most influential work in the recent past of this paradigm (ie, Parallel
Distributed Processing, Volumes 1 and 2), which, in turn, repeats the name of
the research group responsible for its publication.
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the first and second sections); however, I will often lapse into that
mode of speech which presumes a unified view. I merely want to
warn the reader that this mode does not reflect true unity of
opinion.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 1, I
briefly describe the history of PDP from the 1940's onwards. The
purpose of doing this is to shake the reader out of the mindset that
traditionalism is the only model of the mind at present. The second
section provides an introduction to PDP from a "syntactic"
perspective (i.e., one that describes PDP networks qua isolated,
arepresentational systems). This section will serve to bring the
reader up-to-speed with regard to PDP, so that a non-superficial
analysis of PDP as a model of the mind can proceed in Sections 3 and
4. Any reader who is already knowledgeable about PDP may wish to
skip the first and second sections, as the terminology that I adopt for
later use is the literature standard. (A disclaimer: Given my
purposes in describing PDP in so far as it provides a general model
of the mind, I consider myself justified in overlooking many of the
technical details of such systems. As even the most cursory’ perusal
of a work dealing with the mathematical basis of PDP systems will
show, a considerable amount of background knowledge - in linear
algebra, multivariate calculus and differential equations — is
necessary to understand in detail the dynamics of PDP systems.
While I have dutifully read the proofs -- with greater or lesser
comprehension: my academic background includes all of the above-
mentioned prerequisites - my general feeling is that such detail is
unnecessary for gaining an understanding of the philosophically
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interesting features of PDP systems, and would, if included here,
only confuse any reader without such a background.) The latter two
sections correspond to Sections 1 and 2 in Chapter 3. In Section 3, I
present one version of PDP qua representational system which,
among the alternative versions being circulated, offers I think the
best hope of providing a coherent model of the mind. Section 4 is
occupied with the actual description of PDP as a model of the mind
in light of my comments in Chapter 2, Section 4 vis-a-vis what it
means to be a model of the mind.
4.1 History of PDP
I, along with most commentators, begin the history of PDP in
the early 1940's with the work of McCulloch and Pitts. They
demonstrated that networks consisting of many simple processing
units were capable of non-trivial computation. Their motivation,
like that of the other early researchers in the field that would
become PDP, was in understanding how the brain could implement
the mind. In order to understand the import of their work, one
must imagine oneself back in the 1940's. It had been clear for
centuries that, for humans, the possession of an intact brain was a
necessary condition for the possession of a mind. Neuroscience at
that time was far enough advanced that the gross features of the
brain (as consisting of a huge number of highly-interconnected cells
which passed signals amongst themselves) were well known.
However, the huge conceptual gulf separating the activities of the
brain from those of the mind seemed unbridgeable. (As I shall
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report in Section 3 of this chapter, PDP as a model of the mind, like
traditionalism, downplays or ignores altogether those features and
capabilities of the mind not directly relevant to information
processing.) McCulloch and Pitts' work showed that the sort of
input/output processing that single neurons were capable of could,
within the context of a system of many interconnected neurons,
support computation. In particular, there exists, for every Turing-
computable function, a system of interconnected simple processing
units which can instantiate that function. Non- trivial processing,
indeed.
There was, however, still a crucial piece missing in the
spanning of the brain/mind gulf: McCulloch and Pitts never
developed a method by which their systems could learn. 2 For each
separate computable function to be instantiated, the system had to
be designed with the correct interconnections of processing units.
For all but the most trivial tasks, this is practically impossible.
Neurons in functioning brains, on the other hand, display the ability
to change their patterns of connectivity and to learn thereby.
Presumably, this brain-learning went hand-in-hand with the
learning that one could discern at the level of mind. The researcher
Donald Hebb published an influential work in 1949 which provided
a theory of how systems of interconnected neurons (and, not
coincidentally, systems of artificial simple processing units) could
2
1 am not suggesting that a solution to the learning problem would mean that
all philosophical issues on this score would also be solved. Far from it. Rather,
the presumed centrality of learning in the acquisition of representational
content for natural creatures requires that the mere ability to instantiate
computable functions is not sufficient for the possession of intrinsic
intentionality.
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learn. With this piece of the puzzle in place, work could begin on
developing new learning rules, 3 and running experiments on
systems of interconnected simple processing units. While there
were many researchers engaged in this project, the name that is
most often given as representative of the work within PDP during
the ensuing decade or so is Frank Rosenblatt. He was responsible for
developing a learning rule for changing the pattern of connectivity
between units in a restricted class of networks. It was proven that
the system employing this learning rule was guaranteed to converge
(with appropriate exposure to training instances) to a pattern of
connectivity which solved the given problem (i.e., instantiated the
desired function) if such a solution pattern of connectivity existed.
Along the way, he published results showing that the type of
network he used in his research was capable of instantiating (hence,
capable of learning) functions corresponding to non-trivial
classification tasks. (At this stage in its development, it would
certainly be premature to say that Rosenblatt's systems displayed
full-blown intelligence.)
Unfortunately for Rosenblatt, the type of network that he used
in his research was too simple to instantiate what seemed very basic
functions. As mentioned above, the perceptron convergence
theorem4 showed that convergence was guaranteed if the network
was, in fact, capable of instantiating that function. However, the
3Hebb's contribution consisted, not in the discovery of a particular learning
rule, but rather in the illucidation of a framework for learning in which
particular learning rules could be developed.
4" Perceptron" was the name chosen by Rosenblatt to identify his network-
type. These networks consist of a single layer of units, where each unit
computes an output based on the inputs to the system.
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class of functions that perceptrons could instantiate was
considerably less than the set of Turing computable functions. This
is because Rosenblatt s learning rule was only applicable to a limited
subset of all the possible types of networks. For example, it was
known that the sorts of networks used by Rosenblatt were capable
of instantiating (hence, learning) only those functions describeable
as classification of vectors into linearly separable sets. 5
The publication of Minsky’s and Papert’s Perceptrons in 1969
marks the end of the first epoch in the history of PDP. I have
included it here for several reasons. First, it emphasizes the fact
that a major motivation in the development of PDP has been the
prospect of bridging the mind/brain gap. Traditionalism, by being
so remote from neurophysiology, threatens to produce a psychology
not only isolated from its implementing levels, but also (so the fear
goes) irreconcilable with them. Second, the above history sets the
stage for understanding the central thesis of PDP: namely, that
"intelligence emerges from the interaction of large numbers of
simple processing units." 6
The recent history of PDP begins in the 1980's with the
development of a learning rule that is applicable to a more general
class of networks than that studied by Rosenblatt. In particular, a
(still circumscribed) class of multi-layered networks can now be
effectively trained. However, it is not guaranteed that the net will
finally converge to a connectivity pattern that solves the problem,
5 For present purposes, it is not so important that the reader understand
exactly what this entails. It is sufficient to note that many functions, tor
example, XOR (exclusive-or) fall outside of this domain.
6 Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. 1, page ix.
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even if one is possible. Rather, convergence depends on a variety of
factors, including the initial state (prior to training) of the network
connectivity and the nature of the problem space under
consideration. Current PDP research is directed at refining the
learning procedure to increase the probability of converging on a
solution, at fine-tuning learning parameters to speed convergence,
and at developing a new class of learning rule that is more
neurophysiologically plausible. (More on this below.)
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there is little
agreement at present on some of the most basic issues regarding
PDP research. The most troublesome source of contention is also the
most basic: what are PDP systems modelling, the brain or the mind
(or, perhaps, some as yet unnamed level in between)? My view on
this issue is clear, given my present purposes: PDP is assumed to be
a model of the mind (i.e., a model of the domain that encapsulates
the causal laws that quantify over contentful states). However, as
previously promised, I also want to recognize the diversity within
the field with regard to this question. It is often the case that, even
within the context of the writings of one and the same author, this
ambivalence is easily discernible. Consider, for example, the passage
from the Preface to Rumelhart and McClelland s Parallel Distributed
Processing :
We are cognitive psychologists and we hope,
primarily, to present PDP models to the community
of cognitive psychologists as alternatives to the
[traditionalist] models that have dominated cognitive
psychology for the past decade or so. We also,
however, see ourselves as studying architectures for
computation and methods for artificial intelligence.
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... Also, the PDP approach provides a set of tools for
developing models of the neurophysiological basis of
human information processing
...
7
There are unequivocal passages from this same set of authors which
clearly enunciate a mind-modelling understanding of PDP, as in:
... [T]he operations in our models can be characterized
as "neurally inspired". We wish to replace the
"computer metaphor" as a model of mind with the
"brain metaphor" as model of mind . 8
and:
We have not, by and large, focused on the kinds of
constraints which arise from detailed analyses of
particular circuitry and organs of the brain. Rather
we have found that information concerning brain-
style processing has itself been very provocative in
our model building efforts. Thus, we have, by and
large, not focused on neural modeling (i.e., the
modeling of neurons), but rather we have focused on
neurally inspired modeling of cognitive processing .9
On the other hand, there are also copious passages from the same
work which describe PDP as modelling something other than the
mind (presumably either the brain or a level between the brain and
mind), such as:
Parallel distributed processing models offer
alternatives to serial models of the microstructure of
~ Parallel Distributed Processing, page xi.
8 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 75.
9 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 130
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cognition. ... What PDP models do is describe the
internal structure of the larger units, just as subatomic
physics describes the internal structure of the atoms
that form the constituents of larger units of chemical
structure
.
10
and:
It would be wrong to view distributed representations
as an alternative to representational schemes like
semantic networks or production systems that have
been found useful in cognitive psychology and
artificial intelligence. It is more fruitful to view them
as one way of implementing these more abstract
schemes in parallel networks, but with one proviso:
Distributed representations give rise to some powerful
and unexpected emergent properties. The properties
can therefore be taken as primitives when working in
a more abstract formalism . 11
With such diversity of views espoused within the same text, it is
small wonder that the field as a whole is also not of one mind on this
issue.
A further muddying of the waters results from the fact that
PDP systems as currently structured are, many claim, very far from
neurophysiological plausibility . 12 In some cases, PDP systems fail to
model neural mechanisms or properties of neurons known to exist.
For example, an analog of non-synaptic communication between
neurons is wholly lacking, whereas it is known that such
communication (implemented by the dispersal of chemicals into
10 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 12.
11 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 78.
12 For a catalogue of such discrepancies, see pages 136-138 ol Rumelhart and
McClelland's Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. I.
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diffuse regions of the brain) plays an important role in learning.
Also, the finer details of neural spikes are omitted. It has lately
been conjectured that such "details" are what allow for the binding
of the patterns of excitation stemming from sensory stimulation
from multiple modalities into a single object. PDP systems,
construed as models of the brain, are also guilty of postulating
mechanisms which are known not to exist. The most important
among these is the hypothesized need for interneural connections
which can propagate an error signal back in the direction opposite to
that of the normal flow of information. All of these considerations
taken together underscore the difficulty in assigning a unified
objective to PDP as a field of research.
As already mentioned, the initial motivation for a PDP
approach to cognition was to bridge the gap between the brain and
mind. The line of reasoning suggesting PDP as a model providing a
means to this end has already been hinted at: the mind is
implemented in a physical medium (this is just the familiar
physicalist thesis that everything that exists must ultimately be
physical in nature). Empirical evidence suggests that the nervous
system of a creature is a key component of its mind . 13 In scientific
investigations of a domain in general, it often helps in refining the
causal laws at the level of that domain if one understands the causal
laws of the implementing domain. For example, the laws of
chemistry constrain the set of possible laws dealing with transport
13This way of putting it leaves open the possibility that the extracorporeal
environment of a creature may also be a part of the physical implementation
of the mind. Thus, it is not ruled out that relational states of a creature play a
role in mental causal laws.
127
of a substance across a membrane. Thus, a biologist investigating
the causal laws concerning transport of glucose across the
mitochondrial membrane can automatically discount many possible
candidates for laws of biology which may be consistent with the
phenomena when considered in isolation, but which contradict
known chemical laws. Just so, knowledge of the laws of
neuroscience may help constrain the set of psychological laws
consistent with the psychological data. Perhaps because of the
dualistic nature of much of the theorizing about the mind in which
philosophers have engaged in the past (back before psychology
broke off as an independent discipline), many physicalists cast doubt
on the reconcilibility of the existence of a mind (with causally
efficacious states) and the rest of science. In addition, the failure of
folk psychological states (such as beliefs) to dovetail nicely with
modern neurophysiological theories has only increased the
scepticism on the part of many (both philosophers and scientists)
that traditionalism (at least in its most familiar folk psychological
guise) could ever be vindicated as a science. Such sceptics will only
acknowledge psychology as a science when its states are shown to at
least supervene on neurophysiological states plus certain physically-
realized relational states. The recent rise in popularity of PDP is, I
think, attributable to the widespread view that it is a more likely
candidate than traditionalism to find a place in the scientific quasi-
hierarchy. If one listens to the "mind-modelling" contingent among
PDP researchers, this hope seems justified. The states quantified
over in PDP system laws are representational ; 14 hence, it is
14Although, as we shall see in Section 4 of this chapter, the most commonly
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legitimate to say PDP systems are modelling the mind. Furthermore,
at least on the surface, PDP promises to tie into neuroscience. In
responding to the charge that PDP systems lack neural realism,
Rumelhart and McClelland enunciate just such a construal of the aim
of their research:
[There are] two different ways in which PDP models
can be related to actual neurophysiological processes,
apart from the possibility that they might actually be
intended to model what is known about the behavior
of real neural circuitry. ... First, they might be
intended as idealizations. An alternative [the one
that they espouse] is that they might be intended to
provide a higher level of description, but one that
could be mapped on to a real neurophysiological
implementation. ... Specifically with regard to the
word recognition model [described previously, but
not reproduced here], we do not claim that there are
individual neurons that stand for visual feature,
letter, and word units, or that they are connected
together just as we proposed in that model. Rather,
we really suppose that the various abstract
informational states — such as, for example, the state
in which the perceptual system is entertaining the
hypothesis that the second letter in a word is either
an H or an A — can give rise to other informational
states that are contigent upon them . 15
used interpretation scheme among PDP researchers has it that units alone do
not represent, but rather take part in patterns of activ ation over many units
which collectively have representational content.
15 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 138.
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4.2 A Syntactic Description of PDP
In this section, I shall describe PDP on the assumption that the
reader knows nothing about such systems. I begin at the level of
the unit: what sorts if functions can it instantiate? How is it
typically connected (via its inputs and output) with other units?
Following this is a description of network behavior, including a
discussion of various learning rules and their convergence
characteristics, and a very cursory examination of the mathematical
basis of PDP systems. I then run through a simple example showing
how such a network behaves, and end with a "syntactic" description
of the sorts of tasks that PDP systems can perform. A "semantic"
account of PDP is the topic of Section 3.
The building block of PDP systems is the unit. 16 A single unit
(depicted in Figure 4) is, abstractly considered, a function over
numbers.
16 Because of PDP's history as emerging from neuroscience, one often sees
units referred to as "neurons". Similarly, connections (to be discussed shortly)
are sometime called "synapses". As with my choice of the more neutral name
"PDP", I have continued, whenever possible, to choose names least likely to
reinforce the "PDP as neural model" view.
Figure 4 -- The unit
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In particular, it maps the sum of the (input x weight) products to
another number. While the notion of an input is intuitively clear,
the meaning of "weight" may not be. In its neuron-modelling guise,
the weight corresponds to a measure of the synaptic efficacy: ie,
how easily a particular pre-synaptically produced signal is passed
onto this post-synaptic unit. Using neural-neutral terminology, the
weight, wj, corresponds to the strength of the connection between
whatever produced ij (call it "producer-of-j") and this unit. If
producer-of-j is strongly connected to this unit, then the magnitude
of wj will be relatively large. If producer-of-j is only weakly
connected, then the magnitude of wj will be relatively small. If
producer-of-j exerts an inhibitory influence on this unit (i.e., a large
ij makes it less likely that this unit will produce a large output), then
wj will be negative. In general, weights that are positive are called
"excitatory", and weights that are negative, "inhibitory". A weight of
zero signifies that producer-of-j exerts no influence on the unit; it is
as if producer-of-j and this unit were not connected to one another
at all.
There exists, within this framework, great variety on several
points. First, some PDP systems employ units which receive as input
only a subset of the integers (for example, an input line may take on
the value of 0 or 1). Some PDP systems, on the other hand, allow the
inputs to range over all of the real numbers, or perhaps some subset
of the reals (for example, values between 0.0 and 1.0). There is also
a wide range of possibilities with respect to the weights. They may
be restricted to the integers or a subset thereof, or they may take on
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real values. The sum Swjij is called the activation value of the unit,
and it may be likewise restricted in the values it can assume, as per
above. The output of the unit is a function, f, of the activation value
of that unit. Three of the most common choices for f are shown in
Figure 5.
fCa.vA
a.v.
function
Figure 5 -- Types of unit output functions
Alternative (a) depicts a linear function: the output is either
identical to the activation value (in which case the slope is 1), or is a
multiple of the activation value. Alternative (b) shows a typical step
function: the output is 0 until a certain threshold is reached, at
which point it changes to 1 for that and all greater activation values.
While I have, for simplicity's sake, shown the step function as
changing from 0 to 1 at an activation value of 0, this is only one of
many possible step functions. Another step function may be -1 for
all activation values less than 5, and +1 for all activation values of 5
or greater. Alternative (c), a squashing function, is seen quite often
in PDP systems. It has several advantages over a simple step
132
function 17 and over a linear function. 18 (While I have drawn the
functions (a), (b), and (c) as having real-valued domains, and for (a),
an unrestricted real-valued range, this is not universally the case.
As already mentioned, often the possible values of the i's and w's
restrict the corresponding domain (and range) to some subset of the
reals or integers.)
Figure 6 depicts a 3 -layered feed-forward network consisting
of 9 units.
Figure 6 -- 3 -layered feed-forward network
17A major advantage of the squashing function within the context of multi-
layered nets capable of learning is that, because it is continuously
differentiable, the most general learning algorithm yet developed for such
nets (back-propagation of the error signal in a direction opposite that of
forward information flow) is applicable to a network consisting of such units.
18 in general, a net consisting of units using linear functions has a more
limited capacity than one consisting of either of the two depicted non-linear
functions.
133
The inputs to the overall system (II ... 14) are supplied by the
environment — they could be the outputs from some other
network(s), or they could be some signal coming from the
environment, as normally understood. Each of the 4 input-level
units receives each input signal, and produces an output, as
described above. The output from the input-level units forms the
input for the hidden-level units. (They are called "hidden" because
they are not directly connected to the environment, either via their
input or their output.) Similarly, the output-level units receive as
input the output from the hidden-level units. The overall output of
the system is the output of the units on this level. There are several
things to note about this particular PDP system. It is a feed-forward
network. That means that information flows only in one direction.
Had it been the case that, for example, a hidden unit's output
supplied the input to a unit on the input level (thus producing a
loop), the net would no longer be feed-forward. Also, had the net
allowed for an output signal from one level to loop back and form
the input either for that unit itself or any other unit on the same
level, it would no longer be feed-forward. (Non-feed-forward nets
are also known as "recurrent nets".) Whether a feed-forward net or
a recurrent net is the appropriate choice depends on the task to be
performed by the net. (More on this later.) Note also that each unit
sends its output to all and only the units on the next lower level.
This condition on feed-forward networks, if satisfied, simplifies the
analysis of the network behavior. There is, however, no principled
reason why a feed-forward net must be thus fully-connected. Most
often, all of the units within a network are identical with respect to
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their allowable domain and range, and the function, f, which maps
the activation level to an output. As with the full-connectivity
condition, there is no principled reason for this: such a condition
merely simplifies the mathematical analysis of the network
behavior.
Thus far, my description of PDP networks has been as static
systems. The manner in which the temporal aspects of processing is
modelled varies. For the feed-forward case, one can simply assume
that the inputs to the system do not change, and that each unit
continuously computes its output function, so that, once the inputs to
a unit cease changing, its output remains constant. Thus, the overall
output of the system eventually achieves a constant value. For
recurrent nets in general, however, such a constant output condition
cannot be guaranteed: the dynamics of some networks are such that
the overall output never reaches a stable value, even though the
system's inputs remain constant. It is useful here to view the
network, not just as a monolithic structure from inputs to outputs,
but as a system constructed from individual units. This system-as-
units level of description will allow us to consider the overall state of
the system as the complex object consisting of the outputs (or, in
some cases, the activation values) of each unit. (An identical
perspective for viewing network behavior of recurrent nets is that
whereby the output of each unit is a part of the overall system
output.) It is known that, in the general case, such systems may
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never settle into a stable configuration. However, for a subset of the
class of recurrent nets, 19 such stability is guaranteed.
To get a feel for the dynamics of general recurrent nets, it may
be useful to consider some of the properties of the behavior of this
limited class of recurrent nets. Each possible state of the net with p
units is a p-dimensional vector, 20 where each of the p items
corresponds to the output of one of the units. (It is sometimes more
useful to consider, not the output of each unit, but their activation
values, in describing the overall network state.) A simple way to
understand the behavior of such nets is with a 3-D space analogy.
Imagine a topographical map depicting the contours of some wholly
self-contained group of idealized watersheds: 21 every drop of
precipitation that falls in the watershed ends up in a body of water
with no outflowing stream. Each body of water in this watershed is
a local minimum with respect to elevation, and corresponds to the
stable state for each drop of water that falls within the watershed
for this body of water. There may be many such bodies of water
depicted by the topographical map.
The behavior of an individual water drop is analogous to the
behavior through time of a recurrent net with the above-
19 For example, networks with (1) all units using the step function shown in
figure 5b, and (2) networks such that the weight from unit-n to unit-m is
equal to the weight from unit-m to unit-n, for every unit-n and -m) will
always settle into a stable configuration when the system inputs are held
constant.
2°A vector is a mathematical object with p "slots" for numbers, whereby the
particular ordering of the slots is encoded. So, for example, <1.2, -5.3> is a 2-
dimensional vector whose first item is 1.2 and whose second is -5.3. This vector
is distinct from both <-5.3, 1.2> and <1.2, -5.3, 0>
21 Idealized to the extent that raindrops do not soak into the ground, but rather
roll on the surface under the influence of gravity and friction, as they
minimize their energy level.
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enumerated properties in the following way. Each local minimum in
elevation (i.e., each body of water) acts as an attractor for all the
drops of water landing in its watershed. No matter where they land
within that watershed, they end up at the same local minimum. Just
so, the space of possible network states can be divided up into
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets, each of which
has a "local minimum" or attractor state associated with it. As with
the journey of each water drop, the evolution of the network state
may pass through many (non-stable) states on its way to its stable
attractor. Obviously, the analogy fails in many places. For example,
the network configuration is not transversing 3-D space, but a p-
dimensional space of unit outputs. Also, the initial state of a water
drop with respect to its position within the group of watersheds
determines which local minimum it will settle into; whereas, for the
network, it is the input vector (and, depending on the update rule
used, perhaps also the initial configuration of the net) which
determine the attractor-state settled into. Furthermore, not all
recurrent nets display this stability. (In particular, recurrent nets
with non-symmetric weights often do not.) Even with these sources
of disanalogy, I think that the group of watersheds picture is a
useful one to keep in mind when trying to understand the dynamics
of PDP networks.
Thus far, I have said nothing about how such systems could
learn. If a network produces (or settles into) the wrong output (as
judged by an external observer - the researcher, perhaps), how is it
possible to change the network so that, the next time it is presented
with that input, it produces the correct output (or, at least, one
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"closer" to the correct output than its previous one, in some as yet
undefined sense)? Hebb s work in the 1940 s suggested that
learning could occur by means of the changing of the units' weights
according to certain rules. There are two broad paradigms of
learning within PDP: supervised learning and unsupervised
learning. In supervised learning, some external entity must be
available to compare the produced output with the correct or
expected output for that input, and provide the network with
information, so that, if the produced output is wrong, it can change
its weights so as to increase the chances of producing the correct
output on the next occasion that that input is given. Supervised
learning further subdivides into two subtypes corresponding to how
much information is provided by the external entity. In learning
with a teacher, the net is supplied with the correct output. In
learning with a critic (also called "reinforcement learning") the
supervisor gives the net less information: it either informs the net
as to whether the produced output was correct or incorrect, or
informs the net as to the degree of wrongness of the produced
output. (I shall return to the topic of supervised learning shortly,
and discuss in general terms how such learning proceeds.) The
second learning paradigm is unsupervised learning.22 This style of
learning is appropriate when the network is to learn, not a fixed
input/output relation, but rather the regularities in the set of input
items that allow them to be effectively categorized. An important
aspect (particularly in light of the use made of PDP as providing a
model of the mind) of most PDP learning rules is that generalization
2
2
Neurobiologists often refer to this form of learning as "Hebbian learning".
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is automatic. The network not only improves its performance in
producing the correct output for a given input as learning
progresses, but also improves in its ability to make "reasonable"
generalizations with respect to the correct output corresponding to
an input on which it has not yet been trained. (Obviously,
"reasonable" in this context needs some serious explication, which I
take up in Section 3.) Generalization is automatic in the sense that no
additional learning rules need be used above and beyond those
associated with general learning.
I shall now look in more detail at learning in PDP systems. I
begin with a consideration of Rosenblatt' s perception convergence
procedure, which gives the learning rule for a feed-forward uni-
level network of units within the supervised learning paradigm in
which a teacher is available.
Figure 7 -- 3 unit network capable of learning
Suppose the initial weights connecting the three inputs to each of the
three units are set to small, random numbers. The training sequence
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is begun as an input vector is supplied via the input lines. The
supervisor then looks at Ol, 02, and 03 to see if they are the output
that should be produced for this input. Suppose that they are not;
hence, the weights must somehow be adjusted. To be more specific,
suppose that the input is (1,1,1) and that the correct output is
(1,0,0), and the output given by the net is (0,0,1) -- ie, 02 produced
a zero, as it should have; however, 01 and 03 both produced the
wrong value. Described qualitatively, we want to leave the weights
connecting the inputs and the middle unit unchanged, but change
the weights connecting the inputs to the first and third unit. The
first unit produced a zero when it should have produced a 1, so we
need to increase the weights connecting the inputs to this unit. For
the third unit, the produced output was 1 when it should have been
0; therefore, the weights connecting it and the inputs should be
decreased. 23 After adjusting the weights as per above, the network
is presented with a new input (for example, (1,0,0)), and once again
the supervisor checks to see whether the output produced is correct
or not. If the latter, then the weights are adjusted again. The
attentive reader has probably already noticed that it is possible that
the readjustments made on this second training pass may interfere
with the learning that occurred as the weights were changed after
the first learning pass. Obviously, then, we need to adjust weights in
such a way as to guarantee that, if enough training passes are made,
23The need for an increase or a decrease in a weight is, of course, relative to
the function, f, from activation value to output, as well as to the absolute value
and sign of the input associated with that weight. I chose the input (1,1,1) to
avoid having to specifically mention this relativity in the above discussion.
However, the reader should keep it in mind. In addition, this fact is reflected
in the perceptron learning procedure, described below.
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the network weights will eventually converge to a set that produces
the correct output for every input.- 4 Otherwise, we may keep
supplying inputs and adjusting weights, only to have the next weight
adjustment wipe out the previous learning. The perceptron learning
procedure tells us by how much the weights connecting the inputs to
a unit must be adjusted, so as to guarantee eventual convergence.
In particular, the weights should be adjusted in accordance with the
following equation:
delta-wj = eta x (E - O) x j (Eq. 4.1)
where "delta-wj" indicates the required change in the weight
connecting producer-of-j to this unit, j is the value on the input line
from producer-of-j, O is the actual output produced, E is the
expected (or correct) output, and eta is the learning rate (a positive
number that influences the convergence properties of the unit — eg,
how fast it converges).25 The perceptron convergence theorem states
that, if the above learning rule is consistently followed on a
sufficiently large set of training examples, then the network weights
will converge to a set that solves the problem.
As the capacity of such uni-layered networks to instantiate
different functions is very limited, it is necessary to have a learning
procedure which can be applied to multi-layer nets. For this case,
24This, of course, assumes that the problem is solveable by this network in the
first place. As mentioned above, many problems are not.
2
5
Strictly speaking, the above learning rule is a generalization of
Rosenblatt's perceptron learning rule, for which the convergence theorem is
valid. However, since we won't be looking at the convergence proof, this
version suffices.
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however, a difficulty not encountered with single layer nets arises:
namely, how much should the weight connecting one unit to another
be changed, given that there is more than one unit separating the
network input from the network output. In the case of a 2-layer
network (no hidden units), we cannot in general know whether an
incorrect output was given because the weights connecting the
output layer and the input layer were incorrect and/or because the
weights connecting the input layer and the inputs were incorrect.
This is called the "credit assignment problem", and its recalcitrance
until the development of the back-propagation learning algorithm in
the 1980 s meant that, at least with respect to functional capacity,
PDP remained stagnant during the 60 s and 70' s. As with my
description of the perceptron learning procedure above, I shall begin
with a fairly high-level view of supervised learning with a teacher
in multi-layered networks, and save the mathematical particulars
until later. I then take up the topics of supervised learning with a
critic and unsupervised learning in multi-layered networks.
Suppose that the network depicted in Figure 6 has weights
initialized to small random numbers, and that the function computed
by each unit is the squashing function with output between -1 and
+ 1, as shown in Figure 5c. In order to accommodate the back-
propagation of an error signal, we must embellish the network with
a communication line (one for each normal forward line) that passes
information in the direction opposite to that of the forward line. So,
for each forward connection from unit-n to unit-m, there must also
be a "learning line connection" from unit-m to unit-n. Note that this
learning line connection plays a role only in learning, not in the
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processing that ensues between introduction of the system input to
the input level units and production of the system output by the
output units
.
26 Training begins as the network is presented with a
new input. The supervisor then checks the output after a certain
period of time
.
27 If the output is incorrect, the weights (those
connecting the hidden level units to the output level units, those
connecting the input level units to the hidden level units, and those
connecting the system inputs to the input level units) need to be
changed. The supervisor tells each output level unit the output that
it should have produced. The weights connecting the hidden level
units to the output level units are then adjusted as determind by the
back-prop learning rule, described below. Then, an error signal is
passed back from the output level units to the hidden level units,
and the same weight-adjustment procedure is repeated on the
weights connecting the input level units to the hidden level units.
(For the general case of a network with multiple hidden levels, this
procedure can be repeated indefinitely.) Finally, an error signal is
passed back from the hidden level units to the input level units, and
the weights connecting the system input lines to the input level
units are adjusted. After this whole procedure is completed, the
260ne of the major objections against PDF qua neurally plausible framework
is its frequent use of a learning technique with a need for this sort of
backward flowing information line. In particular, neurobiologists claim that
no such means for back-propagating an error signal exists between real
neurons. This has led some in the PDP research community to reject the back-
prop technique for learning in favor of a more neurally plausible approach.
More on this below.
2
'Given that this is a feed-forward net, we know that the output will be stable.
However, as the link from input to output involves passing successively
through three units, we must wait long enough for the signal changes to
trickle down to the output level.
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process starts again as the next input vector is supplied to the
network. The actual back-prop learning rule used is as follows:
delta-wjk = eta x delj x Ok (Eq. 4.2)
where delta-wjk is the change of weight from the kth to the jth unit,
eta is again the learning rate, Ok is the actual output of unit k
(received as input to unit j via this connection), and delj is the back-
propagated error signal. For the case where unit j is on the output
level, delj is simply the difference between the expected and actual
output for that unit (i.e., Ej - Oj) times the derivative of the unit's
function, f, at unit j ' s activation value. (Recall that f in such multi-
layered networks using this version of back-prop must be a
continuously differentiable function; hence, the popularity of the
squashing function (Figure 5c).) Once the changes in weights for the
output level units are made, the delj for the hidden layer is
computed using the equation:
delj (non-output-level) = f j(av-of-j) xS(over-l) dellxwlj (Eq. 4.3)
where f 'j is again the derivative of fj, and 1 in the sum ranges over
all of the units to which unit j sends its output. The above equation
is then used to compute the del s for the next left-most layer, until
finally the input level units' weights have been adjusted.
Perhaps even this level of mathematical detail in the preceding
exposition is greater than strictly necessary for understanding PDP
as a model of the mind. I have included it because I want to make
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explicit a feature of this form of learning that will become important
in later discussions (particularly in Section 4 of this chapter). Notice
that no unit has any information about the global state of the
network. During the forward pass, each unit (except for the input
level units) receives information of the state of the other units only
from its immediate (backward-facing) neighbors in the form of the
output from those neighbors. Similarly, no unit gives its output to
any other than its immediate (forward-facing) neighbors. Even
considering the backward flow of information that occurs in the
back-prop technique, each unit receives information only on the
state of its (forward-facing) neighbors. This so-called locality
constraint on PDP systems will turn out to be relevant to a later
discussion of the relationship between mental causal laws and the
contentful states quantified over by them.
An analogy similar to the group of watersheds analogy for
describing the behavior of recurrent nets as they settle into a stable
state for a particular input is useful here. In this case, however, the
dynamics to be described involves how the network's weight-state
changes as learning progresses. (In the previous example, the
dynamics being mirrored in the analogy were the network s output-
of-each-unit state (or the activation-value-of-each-unit state).) As
before, one can picture the weight-state space of a network as a
group of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, idealized
watersheds. The x-y plane (perpendicular to the axis measuring
elevation) corresponds to the location of the network in weight
space, and the elevation corresponds to the "degree of wrongness" of
a particular system output vector for the given input vector. The
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aim of learning is to get to a place of zero elevation, where there is
no difference between the correct system output and the produced
system output. Since each input vector has a distinct topographical
map corresponding to it, the overall goal is to find a weight state
that has zero elevation in each topographical map. A good rule-of-
thumb in situations in which you want to decrease your elevation
from its current (non-zero) value to a value of zero is to head
downhill, taking as your preferred route that with the steepest
incline. Learning in PDP systems does exactly that. It uses a
technique called "gradient descent" that involves calculating the
direction of steepest incline at a location, and changes the system
variables (in this case, the weights of the network) so as to move the
system in this direction of steepest descent. After each training
pass, the weights are updated and a new input is supplied. If the
elevation (i.e., system error) is non-zero, the direction of steepest
incline is again calculated and the weights are again adjusted to
move the system in this direction. (Just to reiterate, this is only an
analogy. In particular, there is no one or no unit calculating the
gradient, etc. It is merely a property of the (strictly local) back-prop
procedure that it performs gradient descent in the weight-state
space.)
Unfortunately, gradient descent has some drawbacks as a
universal learning technique. Foremost among these is that it cannot
guarantee convergence of the network weights to a set that produces
the correct output vector for each input vector, even if the network
is in theory capable of instantiating this I/O relation. (This is in
distinction to the perceptron learning procedure, for which
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convergence is guaranteed, so long as the network is in theory
capable of instantiating the I/O relation.) The problem can be easily
visualized using the topographical analogy. Along with the
(presumed) global minimum with zero elevation, there may be one
or more wholly enclosed watersheds with a local minimum greater
than zero. (Alpine lakes, perhaps.) If the initial weight-state of the
network puts it in the equivalent of the watershed for an Alpine
lake, performing gradient descent will change its weight vector in
the direction of the local minimum. It is possible that the true global
minimum is in the opposite direction, so that "learning" actually
pulls the system in a direction away from a solution.
For any reader having difficulties visualizing this, I have a
real-life story that captures the "problem of local minima" perfectly.
I wanted to hike up Mt. Toby, but lacked a map. A friend offerred
the following bit of advice: "Well, Mt. Toby is the tallest mountain
in this part of Massachusetts, so if you consistently walk uphill,
you're bound to find it." This friend failed to take into account
something that I only found out after several hours of walking:
while Mt. Toby is indeed the tallest mountain in the area, there is a
little mountain (one of the peaks of Bull Hill) in between my location
at that time and Mt. Toby. Thus, a local maximum separated me
from my ultimate goal. Following the friend s advice allowed me to
find, not the desired, global maximum, but this undesired, local one.
Just so, gradient descent aims for whatever local minimum is in the
vicinity, irrespective of whether it also constitutes a global
minimum.
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There are several other shortcomings of gradient descent. For
example, if the space being searched is describable as steeply sloped,
with very small valleys, gradient descent tends to "overshoot" the
minima. Similarly, using gradient descent in a space that is nearly
flat results in very slow convergence. One thrust of current research
within PDP is to refine the search technique (as implemented by the
back-prop procedure) to mitigate some of these shortcomings. A
discussion of the particulars of these efforts would take us outside
the scope of this work, however. I should at least note in passing
that back-prop learning procedures for recurrent multi-layer
networks are available, although, as with back-prop for feed-
forward nets, convergence of the weights to a solution set is not
guaranteed.
As promised, I shall now illustrate network behavior with a
concrete example, both during the forward flow as the system
outputs are being computed, as well as during the back-propagation
of the error during the weight-update phase of the learning cycle.
In the example, I use a 2-layered feed-forward network with 2
input lines as depicted in Figure 8. Each of the three units uses a
squashing function as its f, also shown in Figure 8. 28
28 Squashing functions, even those passing through the origin and
asymptotically approaching -1 in the direction of decreasing activation value
and +1 in the direction of increasing activation value, can be distinguished
based on how quickly they approach their asymptotes. The squashing
function depicted is much less steep at the origin than what one sees in the
typical case. However, for the purpose of illustration, it is preferable.
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Figure 8 -- Learning example in 3 -unit network
We shall use a learning rate of 0.1. The initial weights are as shown.
Training begins with the vector (1,2). The activation values and
outputs for the units are:
av-1 = (0.5)(l)+(0)(2) = 0.5 :: f(0.5) = 0.75 (Eq. 4.4a).
av-2 = (2)(l)+(-l)(2) = 0 :: f(0) = 0 (Eq. 4.4b)
av-3 = (l)(0.75)+(-l)(0) = 0.75 :: f(0.75) = 0.8 (Eq. 4.4c)
The overall output of the network is thus 0.8. Suppose that the
correct output for this input vector is not 0.8, but -1.2. So, the
network weights need to be changed. Computing the delta-w's for
the 3 units yields:
delta-w3 , 1 = 0.1(-1.2-0.8)(0.5)(0.75) = -0.075 (Eq. 4.5a)
delta-w3,2 = 0.1(-1.2-0.8)(0.5)(0) = 0 (Eq. 4.5b)
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delta-w2,Il = 0.1(2)(-1)(-1)(1) = 0.2
delta-w2,I2 = 0.1(2)(-1)(-1)(2) = 0.4
delta-wl,Il = 0.1( 1)(-1)( 1)( 1) = -0.1
delta-wl,I2 = 0.1( !)(-!)( 1)(2) = -0.2
(Eq. 4.5c)
(Eq. 4.5d)
(Eq. 4.5e)
(Eq. 4.5f)
Therefore, the new network weights are as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9 -- Network, post-learning
(If we were to now re-try the input vector (1,2) on this network, the
system output would be -1.0; while still not correct, it is at least
closer.) Normally, training on such networks proceeds by presenting
the system with an input, cycling throught the learning phase, then
presenting the network with a new input. Usually, one must cycle
through the training sets many times in order for the network to
converge to a weight vector that yields the correct output for each
input. I shall, however, end the example here, with the hope that
the reader has gained at least an intuitive feel for processing in PDP
systems using supervised learning with a teacher.
As already mentioned, there is another form of supervised
learning in multi-layered nets (so-called "learning with a critic")
which has received attention in PDP research. In this case, the
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supervisor checks to see if the produced output is correct, and, if not,
either informs the system of this fact (without, however, supplying
the system with the correct output), or supplies the system with a
measure of the wrongness of the produced output. Learning with a
critic is also referred to as reinforcement learning to stress both its
gross characteristics and its greater plausibility as the form of
learning most often used by creatures operating in the real world.
(Neither I, nor anyone else within the scope of my reading, would
hazard to guess what percentage of learning in humans is described
as learning with a teacher, versus learning with a critic. Clearly,
both occur. Perhaps then, a complete model of the mind -- and its
concomitant model of learning — must include the capability for
supervised learning of both types.) As one might guess, convergence
of such systems is much slower than for learning with a teacher (if,
indeed, the system converges at all), as less information is available
to the network to aid in changing weights efficiently.
An interesting approach to reinforcement learning is the
models and critics approach, in which the PDP system consists of two
distinct sub-networks, one of which forms a model of the
reinforcement signal29 (I shall call this the "model" sub-network),
and the other of which performs learning with a teacher as
described above, but with the feature that the "correct output" is
supplied, not by the supervisor, but rather by the model of the
reinforcement signal. (I henceforth call this the "being-taught" sub-
network.) The first learning stage in the models and critics approach
2
9
In this version of learning with a critic, the net receives a measure of the
closeness of its output to the correct one, rather than a mere
"correctV'incorrect" signal.
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to reinforcement learning proceeds as follows. An input vector is
presented to the "being-taught" sub-network and to the "model"
sub-network. The former produces an output. The output is then
passed both to the supervisor for reinforcement information as well
as to the "model" sub-network. The "model" sub-network then
produces its estimate of the reinforcement signal for the given
output and system input, and compares it with the actual
reinforcement signal supplied by the supervisor. (Thus, the "input"
to the "model" sub-network consists of both the input to the system
and the output of the "being-taught" sub-network.) Back-
propagating the error signal (i.e., the difference between the
produced and actual reinforcement signal) back through the "model"
sub-network improves the ability of this network to predict the
reinforcement signal corresponding to an I/O pair. The weights in
the "being-taught" sub-network can be changed at random, since, in
this first phase, it is the "model" sub-network that is being trained,
not the "being-taught" sub-network. Once the "model" sub-
network's estimates of the reinforcement signal are accurate enough,
the second stage of learning begins. Again, an input is presented to
both the "being-taught" and "model" sub-networks. The former
produces an output, which is sent as before to the supervisor and to
the "model" sub-network, which, in turn, produces an estimate of the
reinforcement signal. Now, something different from Stage 1
learning occurs. An error signal equal to (0 - maximum-
reinforcement-signal) is back-propagated through the "model" sub-
network, but without the usual updating of weights. Rather, this
back-prop is performed with the purpose of producing a guess as to
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what the output that the "being-taught" sub-network gave should
have been. This guess is then used to perform learning a la
supervised learning with a teacher on the "being-taught" sub-
network. Stage2 learning continues as additional inputs are given
successively, and the whole process is repeated.
Unlike the two types of supervised learning described above,
in the unsupervised learning paradigm, there is no signal from an
external source indicating whether the produced output is correct or
not. This mode of learning is therefore not appropriate in cases
where a particular I/O relationship is to be learned. Rather, it is
used when regularities within a set of input vectors must be
identified, so that future input vectors can be classified as belonging
to one of the discovered classes, each of which corresponds to a
regularity type. This can be implemented in one of two net types.
In the first type (called "winner-take-all"), the desired result is to
train a network to classify inputs as belonging to one of several
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive types. The name
derives from the fact that the membership is indicated by the
production of a 1 on the output line corresponding to the input
pattern' s type, and a 0 on all other output lines. The applications of
this type of learning within cognitive processing are ubiquitous,
particularly in the area of perception, where, for example, a
particular input visual vector needs to be classified as an instance of
a particular object-type (for example, as a human face). The second
type of unsupervised learning involves discovering regularities in
the input data, so that future input vectors can be classified in terms
of their similarity (with respect to the discovered regularities) to the
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inputs presented during training. Within the sphere of theories of
cognitive level classification, this is a way in which a fuzzy
categorization scheme could be implemented. One particular
subtype of fuzzy categorization is Wittgenstein s "family
resemblance" theory, whereby the presence or absence of certain
features makes the object more or less exemplary of a given type.
Various learning rules have been developed for training networks
within the unsupervised paradigm. However, given the fact that I
have already gone into some detail in describing learning in the
supervised paradigm and the fact that the basic principles remain
the same, I shall omit further discussion of learning rules within this
paradigm. (I shall, however, pause to reemphasize that no external
teacher or critic is used or needed in unsupervised learning; hence,
there is no error signal to back-propagate. Instead, learning
proceeds by changing weights based only on the state of the unit
and the inputs received from and weights associated with its
backward-facing neighbors. This has led many within the brain-
modelling camp of PDP to adopt this paradigm of learning, as it does
not require the neurobiologically implausible passing of information
against the normal forward flow.)
I would like to end this section with an overview of four
important classes of tasks that PDP systems can (be taught to) do .30
In the first class, called auto-association, the network is presented
with a set of input vectors during the learning phase. The task to be
performed involves re-producing (at the output) the input vector
30The following is based on the discussion in Rumelhart and McClelland's
Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. 1, pages 159-161.
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most closely resembling the given one. The ability to do this is very
useful when a network is operating in an environment in which the
input is noisy (i.e., has occasionally spurious values on an input line
or lines) or in which the input is sometimes incomplete. Some
possible application areas include content-addressable memory and
functioning as a front-end to some other network within a noisy
environment.
The second class of task is similar to the auto-associator,
except that, rather than the input vector itself, some other vector
paired with that input during training is to be re-produced.
Learning consists of repeated presentation of the sets of two
patterns to be associated, so the number of input lines during
learning must equal the sum of the dimensionality of the vectors to
be associated. After learning, presentation of the first of any of the
now-associated vector pairs should result in the production at the
output of the other. The most obvious domain of applicability is one
in which a network is to guide action, in such a way that one thing is
to be done after another. For example, the learning of skilled motor
behavior involves the learning of complex sequences of individual
movements, all concatenated together. Such a sequence of vectors
(each corresponding to a single movement) can be associated, such
that the initial movement starts a cascade that produces each of the
others in turn. With appropriate feedback connections, a network
can learn a sequence consisting of many individual vectors.
Obviously, the time of production of each item in the sequence may
have certain constraints in order for the sequence as a whole to
achieve a necessary level of fluidity (as, for example, when a skilled
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pianist performs an arpeggio with a particular tempo). Indeed, for
some tasks, time is crucial not only to fluidity, but also to success. If
I tried to run by producing each of the individual muscle
contractions and relaxations associated with the running gait, but I
produced each item in the sequence 1 second apart rather than the
(more appropriate) 1 msec apart, I would likely topple over. Even
this time constraint can be built into the system, if the delay
characteristics of each unit are known.
A third task is that of classification. Here the network is
trained to classify a set of input patterns, so that future presentation
of either a wholly novel input vector or one slightly distorted from a
previously encountered input vector results in correct classification.
Within this task-type, it is assumed that there exists some
predetermined classification scheme, so that the initial learning
period consists of supervised learning on the training set.
A fourth task that PDP systems can learn to perform is
regularity detection. This typically occurs in the unsupervised
learning paradigm, and involves the extraction and encoding within
the network of regularities within the training set, so that future
novel inputs can be classified by means of the learned regularities.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the PDP literature
describing experiments run involving the third and fourth task-
types often have a common feature: surprise on the part of the
researcher with regard to the regularities in the data seized upon by
the network to accomplish the task. What often happens is that the
researcher examines the post-training network only to discover that
it has uncovered syntactic regularities in the training data not
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previously noticed by the researcher. In particularly complex
networks, it is sometimes even the case that the researcher cannot
figure out how the network is performing the task, although its high
level of performance after training demonstrates that it has isolated
regularities relevant to the overall problem to be solved. This issue
crops up again when I examine generalization in PDP.
4.3 PDP as Currently Practiced
The "mind-modelling" contingent among PDP researchers hold
several key assumptions in common with their traditionalist
counterparts. One of these is that mental activity is a certain kind of
processing. In this regard, the views of hard-core computationalists
like Pylyshyn (quoted in Chapter 3) are also applicable to PDP
theorists: the mind is the instantiation of a particular process,
whereby not only the I/O behavior, but also the means by which the
I/O behavior is brought about, is important. To be a mind is to
instantiate the mental process. The two camps part company (or, at
least, appear to -- in a sense, this entire dissertation is concerned
with figuring out whether they do indeed part company) in their
respective further elaborations of the details of this mental process.
Thus, PDP, like traditionalism, is committed to the explanatory,
rather than the merely simulating, nature of their model. A second
consequence of this view is the subordinate status within the theory
of the mind given to mental phenomena such as consciousness. If
consciousness is a by-product of mental processsing, then it may
accompany an instantiated mental process; the property of being
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conscious is, however, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for being a mind.
Another key assumption held in common by both PDP and
traditionalism is the contentfulness of mental states. In the previous
section, I confined myself to a description of PDP as
arepresentational. In depicting net behavior, the vocabulary used
was that of activation values and connection weights -- terms that
make no reference to anything outside of the network. Thus
described, PDP is not very interesting for a philosopher of mind.
This section, on the other hand, will deal with PDP systems qua
representational systems.
I begin this task, as usual, with a survey of quotations,
showing that my interpretation on this score is, if not universally
consented to, at least consistent with the view of an established
camp within the PDP literature. Rumelhart and McClelland clearly
understand their networks as possessing representations (i.e., states
picked out by virtue of being about something external to
themselves). In one passage, they occupy themselves with
distinguishing their approach to cognitive modelling from that of the
behaviorists.31
... [T]here is a crucial difference between our models
and the radical behaviorism of Skinner and his
followers. In our models, we are explicitly concerned
with the problem of internal representation and
mental processing, whereas the radical behaviorist
explicitly denies the scientific utility and even the
validity of the consideration of these constructs. The
3
1
Perhaps it is even debatable whether the term "cognitive model" is
applicable to behavioristic theories of intelligent behavior.
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training of hidden units is ... the construction of
internal representations. The models ... concern
internal mechanisms for activating and acquiring the
ability to activate appropriate internal
representations. In this sense, our models must be
seen as ... strongly committed to the study of
representation and process
.
32
Within the same work the authors devote an entire chapter to
arguing that distributed representation (the sort that most PDP
researchers use) is superior to localized representation (seen within
some PDP networks, but more commonly associated with the
traditionalist approach to representation). (I shall return to the
topic of distributed versus local interpretation schema later in this
section.) A second work within the PDP paradigm that has greatly
influenced how (in particular) philosophers understand PDP, its
assumptions and goals, is Paul Smolensky's "On the Proper
Treatment of Connectionism". He likewise enunciates a construal of
PDP according to which research has as a focus gaining a better
understanding of the concept of representation within cognition. A
sample passage is:
Hidden units support internal representations of
elements of the problem domain, and networks that
train their hidden units are in effect learning effective
subconceptual representations of the domain. If we
can analyze the representations that such networks
develop, we can perhaps obtain principles of
subconceptual representation for various problem
domains .33
32 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 121.
33Smolensky' s "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page 8.
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It is not enough, however, to state that PDP is committed to the
representationality of certain network states. In order for PDP to
constitute a genuine model of the mind, it must be the case that the
content of these states plays a role in causal interactions. I shall
have much more to say on this later.
If one is to take the above-quoted passages at their word, that
PDP is concerned with representation, then there must be an
explanation consistent with PDP principles that explains not only
how PDP system states can, in general, be contentful, but also how
particular contents are obtained. In other words, how can PDP
answer the question: "why does this particular state have this
particular meaning?" We saw in Chapter 3 that traditionalists have a
story to tell (as Fodor would say) about content. Namely, the
nervous system is a computer that implements a certain
computational process. The process is defined in terms of a set of
computational states and the rule-governed transitions between
those states. Thus, each physical state that is a token of a physical
state type that is a member of an equivalence class of state types
constituting the computational state acquires its content from its
corresponding computational state. This approach to explaining
content inheritance is not open to the PDP theorist, however, for
their system states (or, more precisely, the distributed system
states) are not describable as implementing a computational
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process. 34 Thus, I must start back at the beginning with an
examination of representation in general
.
33
I adopt the terminology of Dretske's theory of mental
representation (as described in his Explaining Behavior ) . He
distinguishes three types of representational systems.
Type I representational systems.
Representational systems of type I are those in which the entities in
the system both have no intrinsic power to represent and have their
reference stipulated by the user of the system. Dretske describes a
representation system of type I:
Let this dime on the table be Oscar Robertson, let this
nickel (heads uppermost) be Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,
and let this nickel (tails uppermost) be the opposing
center. ... With this bit of stage setting I can now, by
moving coins ... around the table, represent the
positions and movements of these players. I can use
these objects to describe a basketball play I once
witnessed
.
36
34The parenthetical remark must, for the time-being, remain somewhat
cryptic. An explication of it and the philosophical exploration of its
ramifications for representation a la PDP will take up a considerable part of
Section 4 of this chapter. Unfortunately, since writing (and reading) a paper
is a serial process, I must of necessity start somewhere, while making
statements whose meaning will not become clear until later.
3
3
In what follows, I am not making assumptions that in any way contradict
what I have said in Chapter 3. Rather, in Chapter 3 I could skip such an
examination because the equation of certain physical states with certain
computational states "bootstrapped" representation -- or, at least,
representation derived in terms of the purposes of an external observer of the
system. I shall remark at the end of this introduction to representation how
intentionality-via-computational-states fits into this scheme.
36Explaining Behavior, page 52-53.
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Type II representational systems.
In contrast, representational systems of type II are only singly
conventional: we assign a function to an element which has an
intrinsic capability to indicate, and thereby determine what the
indicator represents. Taking another example from Dretske, a
typical fuel gauge in a car can indicate many things: the amount of
fuel in the tank, the downward force on the bolts attaching the tank
to the car, etc. We (the users of the system) determine what the
indicator represents by assigning it a function -- in the fuel gauge
example, we assign the gauge the function of representing the
amount of fuel in the tank (and not the downward force on the
bolts), because it suits our purposes.
Type III representational systems.
Representational systems of type III have no conventional aspect:
no agent outside the system is needed to assign the representational
function of elements within the system. Such systems "are ones
which have their own intrinsic indicator functions, functions that
derive from the way the indicators are developed and used by the
systems of which they are a part." 31 Dretske describes a system
which embodies type III representation:
Some marine bacteria have internal magnets,
magnetosomes, that function like compass needles,
aligning themselves (and, as a result, the bacterium) ...
toward geomagnetic north. Since these organisms are
capable of living only in the absence of oxygen, and
since movements toward geomagnetic north will take
the ... bacteria away from the oxygen-rich and
therefore toxic surface water and toward the
31 Explaining Behavior, page 62.
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comparatively oxygen-free sediment at the bottom, it
is not unreasonable to speculate ... that the function
of this primitive sensory system is to indicate the
whereabouts of benign (i.e., anaerobic)
environments
.
38
Representational systems of type III, because they do not rely
upon conventional assignments of representational content, serve as
the grounding for all intentionality. The elements of type I and II
representational systems refer because we (i.e., human cognizers),
by virtue of possessing the capability for type III representation,
can stop the regress of derived intentionality: we ground all type I
and type II representation with our underived intentionality.
Type I and II representation are easily explained, because
there is (by supposition) an agent outside the system to assign a
function to a representational element in the system; this is not the
case with type III systems, for which the function is assigned by the
system itself in the way in which an indicator is developed and used.
What does it mean for an indicator to be so assigned? Dretske
hypothesizes that the assignment takes place when the indicator
comes to play a role in the causal sequence of an agent s behavior.
In the bacteria example, the direction pointed to by the
magnetosomes represents "benign environment this way" because
the indicator has been harnessed (via evolution) by the bacteria for
its advantageous results of allowing the bacteria to live (and hence,
to reproduce). To make this relationship between the indicator and
its representational function clearer, consider a slightly altered
38 Explaining Behavior, page 63.
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example. Suppose that biologists discover that oxygen is not toxic
for the bacteria in question. It turns out that the selectional
advantage to the bacteria of possessing a magnetosome playing a
certain causal role in the bacteria s behavior is that it draws the
bacteria toward the iron-rich sediment at the bottom, and away
from the iron-poor surface water. (Let us suppose that the bacteria
feeds on iron.) In this scenario, the magnetosome represents "good
feeding ground this way”. In fact, the magnetosome has represented
this all along, even though we mistakenly conjectured that the
selectional advantage offered by the magnetosome had something to
do with the relative toxicity of the water for the bacteria. This
illustrates that the representational function of an element in a type
III system is intrinsic: it represents what it represents in its
environment irrespective of the intentional states of systems other
than itself.
(Thus, looking back to my depiction of representational
capacity a la traditionalism, we see that computational states of an
artificial device have type II representationality. To move from this
derived intentionality to the original intentionality possessed by
computational states implemented in natural objects -- eg, nervous
systems -- there must be a causal story to tell about the advantage
gained by a creature at having this state which is correlated with
some external state-of-affairs. As I said in Chapter 3: "a
traditionalist leaning towards the evolutionary approach to
naturalization [of content] will answer that, in the history of a
species, it has offered selectional advantage to have a body (or, more
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narrowly, a nervous system) whose physical states follow upon one
another in the manner of Figure 2.")
A further distinction divides general type III representation
into two classes: those resulting immediately from evolution and
those gained as a result of learning during the lifetime of the
representational system. Dretske allows only the latter to hold title
to genuine intentional mental statehood. He explains this distinction
in terms of whether the behavior of an individual depends upon
what the internal state means or upon a particular genetic make-up
which was selected for what the internal state means (as in the case
of instinctive behavior). The bacteria is an instance of the latter; it
swims in the direction pointed to by its magnetosome, not because of
what the state of the magnetosome means for it, but rather because
it has a genetic make-up which predisposes it to act in that way.
According to Dretske, there is a qualitative difference between
learned versus inherited behavioral dispositions. Briefly, this
distinction is based upon the manner in which the representational
element comes to play its role in the causal sequence leading up to
the behavior. In the case of inherited dispositions, this occurs
because the ancestors of the organism (system) gained selectional
advantage by virtue of having a causal sequence where the
representational element played this role. This is not the case for
learned dispositions: one can give more than a selectional
explanation for why a representational element means what it does.
According to Dretske: "What explains why, during learning, R [an
internal registration of a type of objectA presence] was recruited as,
made into, a cause of M [a particular behavior] is the fact that R was
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a sign of O [the object type] and the organism had a need to
coordinate behavior -- in this case evasive movements M — with the
presence of O. ... Hence, the internal sign of O (namely R) was made
into a cause of M."39
Given the recent controversy surrounding the question of
whether Dretske really has explained meaning,49 I feel obliged to
defend my adopted account of meaning against the charge that it is
circular. First, though, a summarization of the charge: this account
fails because it is committed to the following three theses:
( 1) X ' s explanatory role is X ' s causal role.
(2) A state C has an explanatory role in virtue of having
meaning.
(3) A state C has meaning in virtue of having a causal role.41
The second thesis is the goal of Dretske ' s (and my) whole project: to
explain how it is that meaning is relevant. The third thesis
encapsulates the means by which this goal is to be achieved —
namely, to ground the meaning of a state in terms of its causal role.
I admit that Dretske' s account of the explanatoriness of meaning (as
depicted by theses 1-3) appears circular; however, I, along with
Dretske, want to distinguish "causal role" as it appears in the third
thesis, from "causal role" as it appears in the second thesis (under
the substitution of "explanatory role" with "causal role"). As Dretske
argues:
Explaining Behavior, page 19.
4()See, for example, L. Baker's "Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief 1 and
Dretske' s reply "How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker".
41 L. Baker, "Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief 1
,
page 100.
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... [CJurrent behavior, the causal process that the
meaning of C is called upon to explain (as structuring
cause) need not (and typically will not) be the same
sort of causal process as that which was responsible
(during learning) for C s acquiring that meaning. C got
the function of indicating F (hence, this meaning) by
being recruited to cause M, but what its having this
meaning is (typically) called on to explain is its causing
N, quite a different movement. And even if it is called
on to explain the production of M (the same type of
movement that it was recruited during learning to
cause), it wasn t its causing M that conferred an
indicator function on C. It was its causing something,
some movement or other (whatever movements were
rewarded in the conditions C indicates). So the causal
process (behavior) being explained by meaning is
never the causal process underlying the meaning that
explains it .42
How does Dretske' s account of the explanatoriness of meaning
apply to the issue of intentionality in PDP systems? This question is
highly relevant, for, if PDP wants to be a serious contender for a
model of the mind, then it must be able to provide a principled
explanation of how its systems ' states can be contentful. I would
here like to deflect a possible objection that a PDP system, at least as
currently embodied in the artificial computer science laboratory,
cannot possess intentional states because the inputs to the system
come not immediately from the environment of representable
objects, but rather mediately via the researcher. So, the objection
goes, this mediate-interaction version of PDP is not a possible model
of the mind, as such systems lack the capacity for representation .43
42
"How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker", page 115.
430ne also hears this objection raised against traditionalism. My argument
that the objection does not ultimately bear fruit applies equally well to PDP
and traditionalism as potential models of the mind.
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My response to such an opponent of PDP qua mental model is
an unqualified "yes and no". First, the "yes". I agree that the
mediateness of the stimuli to the system in such artificial
environments is relevant to the obtaining of intentional mental
states (in Dretske's sense of the phrase). The relationship of the
input supplied to the system with the real environment (of the
researcher) depends upon (i.e., is mediated by) the researcher. If
there is a counterfactual-supporting correspondence between a
particular input vector's being supplied to the system and a
particular state-of-affairs, the counterfactual support relies on
certain of the mental states of the researcher. The objection begins
with the thesis that representational content is determined by the
causal chain which results in the production of the representation.
When the causal "distance" separating the object purportedly
represented and the purported representation becomes too great,
the latter loses its representational content. When aimed at the
relationship between input to a system and objects or states-or-
affairs said to be represented therein in such an artificial set-up, the
causal distance is too great to support representation. Proponents of
this view measure causal distance not in purely quantitative terms
-- eg, how many causal laws need be invoked to get from A to B -
but in qualitative terms. In the case at hand, the causal distance is
too great because the causal chain passes through the mental states
of the researcher. A little reflection convinces one that this cannot
be an objection against representational status, for the causal chain
separating a person sitting for a portrait and the painted portrait
likewise passes through the mental states of the painter. We would
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not, however, say that the painting therefore fails to represent the
paintee. Perhaps, then, this objection is not so much directed at the
ability of the input to represent, but at the ability of the input to
support original intentionality in states of the system entered
subsequent to receipt of the input. With this interpretation of the
objection, it is not so clear that the painting case can serve as a
counterexample, for it is not obvious (at least, my intuitions do not
register a decisive response) that original intentionality is had by a
creature exposed only to paintings. In order to thwart the objection,
one can consider only the PDP systems which receive input
(relatively) directly from the environment (mediated only by the
necessary converters -- for example, a television camera that
converts the light energy impinging on the lens to a "brightness at a
point" matrix of numbers) as candidate models of the mind. (Thus,
the camera functions as an artificial eye.)
With the above proviso, we can pose the question: how do the
states of a PDP system come to have content? More precisely, how
do they come to be intentional mental states? To answer this
question, we must re-examine learning within PDP systems,
concentrating this time on the representational aspects of the
process. In what follows, I shall focus on supervised learning with a
critic. I do this for several reasons. First, it makes it possible to get
the researcher (and all other supervisory cognitive agents) out of the
learning loop: the reinforcement signal, like the input, can be
supplied by the environment itself. Thus, the objection that the
system has only type II representation, because the actual content
of the states is supplied by the supervisor (in her judging of the
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appropriateness of the produced response and supplying of the
correct one) is thwarted. A second reason for favoring learning with
a critic is that it is the predominant mode of learning in natural
creatures -- it is the exceptional case in which an external source is
available to supply information detailing the correct response to a
particular situation. As I am in the next few pages concerned
primarily with explaining how PDP states can be representational,
limiting myself to learning with a critic is justified. However, as I
mentioned previously, an adequate model of the mind must also
allow for exceptional cases (such as supervised learning with a
teacher); hence, mechanisms supporting both forms of learning must
be present. To simplify the exposition, I can merely assume that,
while content is determined in both types of learning cycles, the
content during learning with a teacher cycles is parasitic on the
content acquired during the more common learning with a critic
cycles.
So, the general framework has the environment (via
converters) supplying input vectors, and the environment (via the
reinforcement signal) supplying the feedback on the adequacy of the
produced output. The front-end of this set-up is fairly
straightforward: it is easy to construct (or imagine) audio and video
equipment pointing out at the world, converting the inflowing
information into a segmented signal capable of being used as input
to a PDP network. It is perhaps less obvious how the other end (i.e.,
the reinforcement signal) is constructed. Consider first the manner
in which reinforcement information is supplied in natural creatures.
The creature performs a particular action in the presence of a
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stimulus. If the action is immediately followed by a relatively
pleasurable experience (for example, a cessation of an unpleasant
thirst with a neutral feeling of equanimity), this serves as a
reinforcement signal, which tends to produce changes in the creature
such that, in the future, it is more likely to perform that action in the
presence of that (and similar) stimuli. Contrarily, when the creature
performs an action in the presence of a stimulus that is followed by
a relatively unpleasurable experience, the causal pathways linking
stimulus and response will change so as to make that response less
likely in the presence of that stimulus
.
44 This explanation works for
natural creatures, because they come equipped with (at least a
rudimentary') pleasurableness detector -- warm, fuzzy sensations
are pleasurable, whereas sharp, obtrusive sensations are not.
Evolution has supplied these detectors to aid in the survival and
reproduction of their possessors. This is because the sorts of
behaviors resulting in warm, fuzzy sensations (e.g., eating) tend to
be those that also aid ultimately in reproduction; whereas the sorts
of activities resulting in sharp, obtrusive sensations (e.g., burning
oneself) tend to be those that have a deleterious effect on
reproduction. Does it make sense to say that PDP systems likewise
come equipped with a detector which, like the above-described
pleasurableness detector, can supply a reinforcement signal given
environmental conditions (including the conditions of the system's
44
I am using this vocabulary, not to emphasize a connection with
behaviorism in general or instrumental conditioning in particular, but
rather as semantically-neutral descriptors of the signal received, input and
output of the system -- whether that system be natural or artificial. Given that
I have yet to argue that this process can result in intentional states on the
part of the learning creature, it seems premature to refer to an input as
"perception of the presence of x".
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physical parts)? While they would not be the product of the
evolution of the system s forebears, a system could certainly be
equipped with such detectors. Does this make a difference to the
status of PDP as a mental model?4 ^ I think not. I say this because
the purpose of the reinforcement signal is ultimately to establish
type III representational content, which in turn is necessary for
subsumption under mental causal laws. Qua mental model, a PDP
system need only be able to participate in such content-adverting
laws - whether the means by which content is determined within
PDP systems differs from the means employed within natural
creatures is irrelevant. (In other words, the means is merely an
implementation detail, not pertinent to PDP ' s status as a model of
the mind.) If I can explain how these artificial detectors can be used
to supply a reinforcement signal for training the net, and, in the
process, give content to certain of the system states, that is enough.
Strangely, among all of the recent works on PDP (written both
by PDP researchers and by philosophers), I have yet to encounter a
detailed explanation of how, exactly, PDP states represent .46 This
lacuna is particularly striking, given that the word "representation"
4
^It may seem as though I am getting rather far afield, but it is a common
assumption (among German neurobiologists, at least) that the biological
nature of a mind-possessing creature is important. (One can also see such a
concern among some American philosophers -- eg, Searle -- although his
argument for the importance of biology takes a slightly different tack.) For
those espousing this view, merely building in a "reinforcement module" won't
do. Hence, my argument.
46
I here and henceforth shall mean type III representation by
"representation". No difficulties in explaining type II representational
content in PDF states arise, as the content is assigned by the researcher in the
act of labelling a unit (for localized representation) or a pattern of activation
(for distributed representation). Clearly, though, the act of labelling does not
make a difference to the network -- it goes on processing quite oblivious to
what is assigned to its states: the labels play no role in the ensuing procession
of states.
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as describing such states is so freely used. (My personal theory as to
why this topic has not been addressed relates back to my conviction
that the writing in this field occurs independently of a developed
theory of causation -- and, without such a theory, it is not possible to
give a detailed account of representation.) So, let's start at the
beginning (again). We have a network with a fixed architecture (e.g.,
number of units, available communication lines), a hard-wired
learning rule, and weights initialized to small, random numbers.
Figure 10 gives an overview of the system and its relation to the
environment.
Figure 10 -- PDP network in system capable
of supporting representational states
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As the system is initialized (i.e., prior to training), the network states
do not have representational content. The audio-visual front-end
receives information from the environment, and transforms it into a
format suitable for use as input to the network. The introduction of
this input vector produces changes in the activation values of the
input level units, then subsequently the rest of the units in the
system. All current PDP systems presuppose temporal quantization:
the input signal does not change continuously, but rather changes at
discrete time steps. We can stipulate that the audio and video
devices likewise sample the information available from the
environment at discrete points in time; to simplify the description of
network behavior, we can assume that the time interval between
input vectors is large enough to allow use of the learning algorithm
described in Section 2 of this chapter. The network output is used to
drive effectors that (for example) manipulate objects in the
environment. A typical effector is a robot arm. Other types of
effectors are also possible, for example, a transportation sub-system
capable of changing the location of the system relative to the
environment. The effectors force changes in the environment,
which, in turn, may cause an increment or a decrement in the
pleasurableness value returned by one or several of the
pleasurableness detectors.
As with the effectors, there are many possible types of
pleasurableness detectors. What they all have in common is the
ability to produce a signal measuring some factor relating to the
hospitableness of the environmental conditions for the continued
functioning of the system (i.e., the network plus front-end plus
174
effectors). One type of pleasurableness detector often seen in mobile
robots is a simple volt-meter measuring the energy reserve
available in the robot's storage battery. The higher the energy
reserve, the greater the pleasure signal. This is loosely equivalent to
a hunger detector (which takes into account food in the digestive
system and energy reserve in the form of blood sugar and stored
fat) in natural creatures. One can imagine other types of detectors
based loosely on the sorts of detectors selected for by natural
evolution -- temperature detectors, strain gauges, etc. The overall
output of the pleasurableness detector box (i.e., the reinforcement
signal) is the difference between the overall pleasurableness at the
current time step minus that at the previous time step, where the
overall pleasurableness at a time step is some function of the
outputs from each of the individual pleasurableness detector
apparati. With this access to a reinforcement signal, the network can
use the learning procedure described in Section 2 to force a change
of weights in a manner so as to decrease the probability of doing the
"wrong" thing relative to the output of the pleasurableness detector
box. If, as supposed, the output of this detector box is correlated
with the continued-functioning-of-the-system expectancy, this
means that learning will result in a system whose output (and, via
the effectors, behavior) is decreasingly likely to be deleterious to the
continued functioning of the system.
While this sounds well and good, it is open to the opponent of
the possession by PDP systems of type III representational states to
argue as follows: although the researcher is in one sense out of the
learning loop, in that she need not even be present during the actual
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learning phase; still, various of her choices in the design of the
overall system have as a consequence that the system achieves only
type II representation. Such an opponent may point to any of
several design choices as critical in this regard - these include: (1)
front-end, (2) network architecture, (3) learning rule, (4) effectors,
and/or (5) pleasurableness detectors. Does the fact that these
choices were made by a cognitive agent (i.e., the researcher) and not
by evolution make a difference to the type of representational status
had by the network ' s representational states? In answering this, it is
important to keep in mind that the representational states in
question are not the states of the various devices forming the
interface between the network and the environment, but rather the
states internal to the network. The network achieves type III
representation if some of its individual states achieve type III
representation. A particular representational state is type III if its
causal role (i.e., its place in the chain of states during processing in
the network in regard to the other states within the chain) derives
from the history of the system -- in particular, from the way that
changes in its causal role aided in the increase of survival
expectancy (as measured by the pleasurableness detectors) during
the learning phase. That the choice with respect to design
parameters was explicitly made by a cognitive agent is therefore
irrelevant to the type III status of the network's representational
states. A simple thought experiment also produces the same
conclusion. Imagine a person born with a perfectly normal brain,
but lacking all of the five sense organs. Imagine further that this
person is supplied with an artificial eye much like the TV camera
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forming part of the front-end of the overall PDP system. The mere
facts that the eye is artificial and that a physician chose which
particular artificial eye to use do not prevent the person from
becoming a type III representational system after learning. I think
that similar thought experiments questioning the relevance of an
external cognitive decision-maker to type III representational status
can likewise be given for each of the other four design choices,
although, particularly for the case of the architectural design, the
scenario to be imagined would be very far-fetched. Just so, the fact
that various design decisions in the construction of the PDP system
were made by the researcher does not prevent the system from
becoming a type III representational system. Thus, we have
satisfied one of Dretske' s conditions for the presence of intentional
mental states.
Here, I would like to distinguish two types of states used to
describe the "current state" of a PDP network: (1) the current
weight state (i.e., the matrix of weight values connecting the units to
one another) and (2) the current activation value vector (i.e., the
vector whose elements are the activation values for each of the
units), or, alternatively, the current output vector (i.e., the vector
whose elements are the output values for each of the units). All
three are candidates for contentful states. In what follows, I use the
terms "weight state" and "activation value state" in such a way as to
avoid committing myself one way or another on the question of
whether such states are atomic or complex with respect to content.
As with the discussion in Chapter 3 dealing with the supposed
representational complexity of the monolithic computational states, I
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want to remain non-committal (at least, at this stage of the
discussion) with regard to whether it is only the network weight
state (or network activation value state) as a whole that can carry
content, or whether sub-states of the network weight state (or
network activation value state) can also be contentful. In general,
the writings of most PDP researchers indicate a willingness to allow
sub-states of network states to be contentful.
Now it is time to look inside the network as learning
progresses, in order to isolate exactly where the changes are being
made and how those changes bring about representationality. As
already stated, prior to training, none of the network's states are
representational
.
47 In what follows, I present a scenario showing
how a network could come to possess a representational state. The
network is presented with an input vector. Let us suppose that the
scene encoded by the input vector is of a fire. (Clearly, this level of
description is that of an outside observer -- the system does not yet
possess a representational vocabulary at all, much less one capable
of distinguishing a fire from other potential objects in the
environment.) As the network's weights at the beginning of the
learning phase are randomly assigned, the network's output, and,
hence, the system ' s behavior, will likewise be random. Suppose that
the behavior produced just so happens to move the system further
away from the fire (perhaps by a command to the transportation
sub-system to move in a particular direction which in this case
happens to be away from the fire). So we have an input/output pair
47Obviously, I am here speaking only of type III representation. It is possible
that the researcher, by a clever choice of weights, has produced a network
with type II representational states.
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(i.e., input vector encoding of the fire scene and "move away"
command), and a change in the environment relative to the robot.
The change in environment results from the relative movement of
the fire. Suppose that one of the pleasurableness detectors supplied
to the system is a thermometer measuring the temperature of the
air near the system surface, calibrated so as to return the values
shown below:
Value Temperature Range
3
2
1
0
60-75 F
40-59 F, 76-80 F
20-39 F, 81-95 F
5-19 F, 96-110 F
Figure 11 -- Hypothetical pleasurableness values
returned as a function of temperature
Suppose further that the only pleasurableness detector that changes
value in the time step after execution of the behavior is this
thermometer, which measures a temperature drop from 62 F to 58
F. 48 So, the reinforcement signal received for the I/O pair is
48Obviously, the example I am presenting, with its many suppositions and
happy coincidences, is not very realistic as an actual sequence of events. This
fact does not, however, detract from its usefulness as a summarization of the
(for present purposes) relevant changes leading to a representation of a fire.
A more likely sequence of events -- for example, one in which no change of
pleasurableness level is evoked from any of the detectors over many time
steps — would lead to the same representational state. Describing the process
would, however, necessarily include many irrelevant details.
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negative
,
thus forcing a change in weights to make this output less
likely in the presence of this and similar inputs. The next input
vector is again directed at the fire scene; although it will have
changed from the first vector in that the fire is further from the
front-end. Now suppose the output produced for this input is such
as to direct the transportation sub-system to drive the system as a
whole closer to the fire. The 60 F temperature threshold separating
the "ideal" and "suboptimaT ranges is crossed, and the reinforcement
signal becomes positive, which tends to increase the likelihood of
continuing to approach the fire. This is repeated. At some point, the
75 F threshold will be crossed, resulting in a negative reinforcement
signal, and a corresponding refinement of the "approach-fire"
behavior.
During this group of learning cycles, the input vector has been
changing, although, by supposition, it has at each stage been directed
at the fire scene. The first change (resulting from the initial
"retreat" behavior) had the fire taking up a smaller area of the
visual field, with decreased overall brightness, and a decrease in the
decibel-level of "fire-type" noise. The negative reinforcement signal
brought about a change in behavior from "retreat" to "approach",
which in turn produced changes in the environment relative to the
system. In particular, the portion of the visual field occupied by the
fire increased, as did the brightness level and "fire-type" noise.49
49
I would assume that the "crackliness" property of the sound of a fire is
isolatable in the frequency profile of an audio reproduction of a lire, and that
the rapidly fluctuating brightness and color characteristics of a fire are
likewise isolatable in the visual reproduction of a fire. In order to capture
these aspects of the continuously-changing environment, it may make most
sense to have each input vector be not an encoding of the input-at-a-moment
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The approach behavior led eventually to an increase of the
temperature to a value greater than the maximum ideal
temperature, thus producing a negative reinforcement signal and a
change from "approach" to "retreat" behavior. This in turn led to
further changes in the input vector (i.e., decreased fire area,
decreased brightness, decreased level of "fire-type" noise).
Obviously, other changes in the input vector not directly related to
the fire were simultaneously occurring. For example, the
background visual signal was changing as the system moved, as was
the background noise. Other additional changes were also taking
place. Perhaps other mobile creatures entered and/or exited the
perceived environment during this time period. Hence, viewing this
sample sequence of events in isolation, it is not immediately obvious
that it is the aspects of the input directly related to the fire that are
important in the changes in reinforcement signal. However, suppose
that the system has repeated encounters with fires. The non-fire-
related particulars will change with each encounter, while the fire-
related effects on the pleasurableness detector (and, in turn, on the
overall reinforcement signal) will remain constant. Thus, the change
in weights forced by these repeated fire-encounters will tend to
make the approach-retreat behavior depend only on the visual and
auditory properties of the fire, and not on the non-fire-related
circumstances.
Looking back to Dretske ' s explanation of the determination of
representational content, we see that all of the conditions for the
alone, but rather an encoding of the input-at-a-moment and an encoding of
the variability between time steps of the signal received by the front-end.
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acquisition of intentional mental statehood are satisfied in the
above-described depiction of learning in a PDP system. The internal
registration of the fire's presence, R, 5() has been (via the learning
rule) made into a cause of the approach-retreat behavior, M. This is
explained by the fact that the system had a need to coordinate its
behavior with the presence of fire -- fire can be, given certain
system behaviors, highly deleterious to the system. This
deleteriousness detection is mediated by the pleasurableness
detectors, which were chosen because of their ability to correlate the
presence of potentially harmful conditions (brought about by the
presence of potentially harmful objects) with a reinforcement signal.
R represents fire because R's causal role lies between "presence of
fire" and "fire-approaching-and-retreating behavior". This causal
role is the result of changes made in the weights of the network.
After learning, an input vector encoding a fire scene produces R,
which in turn produces a certain set of behaviors relative to the fire,
which tend to increase the probability of the continued functioning
of the system.
Let's look at the same process in light of my possible worlds
theory of causation. Suppose that R did not represent fire (either
because it represented something else, or because it represented
nothing at all). Thus, the production of R would not be correlated
with the presence of fire. In this case, R' s causal role would not lie
between "presence of fire" and "fire-approaching-and-retreating
behavior". (Assume that the general architecture of the system
50j have not yet discussed what this internal registration is. That will come
presently.
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remains unchanged in this counterfactual world.) If R did not
represent fire, then R would not govern the particular approach and
retreat behaviors that it in fact governs, for the learning of these
behaviors was mediated by the heat-producing characteristics of the
fire. Without a fire, there would be no heat production; hence, no
changes detected in temperature; hence, no positive and negative
reinforcement signal (or, at least, not this particular pattern of
reinforcement); hence, not this particular change in weights; hence,
no learned approaching and retreating behavior. If R were
instantiated in the network, the output of the network (and ensuing
behavior of the system) would be different. R s causal role is thus
dependent upon its meaning, as it must be if R is to participate in a
mental causal law. As I argued in Chapter 2, it is illegitimate to
construe the antecedent to the counterfactual conditional testing for
causal relevance (i.e., "if the system were not in that mental state")
as "stipulate that the system is in the same physical state as the one
implementing that mental state in the actual world, but assume that
the instantiation of that mental state means something else, and
leave everything else in the world (including the past) unchanged."
Thus, not only is R meaningful, but its participation in causal laws
adverts to its content. Recall Dretske ' s soprano example, in which
the meaning of the words sung by the soprano are causally
irrelevant to the shattering of the glass. This case is different,
because the meaning of R is causally relevant, for, if R had meant
something else, then its effects would have been different.
I mentioned previously that it is currently a debated topic
whether Dretske ' s account of the relevance of meaning is circular or
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not. With the general case, as well as with this particular use of
Dretske s account, I don't think the charge of circularity is correct.
Let s look in more detail at how "causal role" is to be understood in
the context of the two sentences:
(51) R represents fire because R' s causal role lies
between "presence of fire" and "fire-approaching-
and-retreating behavior"
.
(52) R s causal role is dependent on its meaning fire.
Prior to learning, R was an indicator of fire: a token of type R
became instantiated whenever a fire was observed (although, at this
early stage, R does not mean fire). S2 is describing how R came to
have its causal role after learning. During learning, the repeated co-
occurrence of the triple:
( 1 ) tokening of R,
(2) particular behavior,
(3) particular reinforcement signal
led to changes in the network such that tokenings of R came to have
control over certain behaviors. Had R been such that its meaning (if
it were to have one) came to be something other than fire, it would
have had a different causal role than it in fact came to have. This is
because the changes made in the system relevant to the tokening of
the R-behavior sequence during learning were guided by the
reinforcement signal received during learning. But the particular
reinforcement history would have been different had R (truly)
indicated, not fire, but (for example) human face. Thus, S2 is making
the counterfactual claim that had R indicated something other than
fire (and, hence, had the history of reinforcement vis-a-vis fire been
different), then the causal role that R eventually took on would be
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different. Thus, S2 is true by virtue of the past (actually occurring)
tokenings of R in the presence of fire. SI, on the other hand, is
explaining why this and all future tokenings (assuming learning had
ceased) of R represent fire as opposed to something else: they
represent fire because they lie between "presence of fire" and "fire-
approaching-and-retreating behavior". SI is wholly silent on how
this causal role for R has been arranged.
While the above fire example was chosen for its relative
simplicity, there is no principled reason preventing all
representational states in PDP networks from gaining their content
in a similar manner. A point that deserves to be emphasized is that
learning in PDP networks (and, correspondingly, content acquisition)
occurs piecemeal and achieves relative stability only after a long
training period. One would assume that the number of learning
cycles needed for the formation of a representation of (for example)
another cognitive agent would be very large and that a description
of its acquisition in terms of environmental feedback would be very
complex. Very large and very complex do not, however, imply
impossible. Judging PDP as a model of the mind based on this
criterion (i.e., amount of exposure to an object needed to acquire a
representation of it) does not automatically exclude it, for one-pass
learning is the rare exception. When considering representation
acquisition in humans, one must also include the learning cycles
needed to produce the base of representations from which complex
representations are formed -- a process lasting many years and
encompassing very, very many learning cycles. I can only think of
one case of genuinely one-pass learning among humans: namely, the
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learning of an aversion to a food type after only one exposure to it,
when that exposure is followed by severe nausea. However, I am
not at all ready to grant that the causal law governing this aversive
behavior is mental (i.e., that it adverts to contentful states of the
agent).
One advantage of the explanation of the acquisition of
intentional states within the PDP framework over that within the
traditionalist framework is that one can see in PDP how
representational states emerge from an initially unstructured
network. The regularities in the environment resulting from the
existence and persistence throughout time of objects guide not only
the learning of behavioral responses appropriate to the objects, but
also the learning of the representations of the objects. Thus, one can
see the Humean bent of PDP, which presents a contrast to the more
Cartesian bent of traditionalism. In the latter, concepts are innate to
the extent that traditionalism provides no explanation for the
acquisition of their manner of representation. In contrast, PDP
networks must also learn how to represent a concept: it must
answer for itself the following questions. Is a concept atomic or
complex? If the latter, are there any necessary and/or sufficient
conditions associated with it? If so, what are they? Learning within
PDP explains how these questions can be answered given merely the
system set-up and information from the environment, whereas the
process of concept formation within traditionalism either remains
unexplained or presupposes the innateness of concepts. This
Humean flavor of PDP has led some traditionalists to direct the same
arguments against PDP as were aimed against associationism (and, in
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particular, behaviorism). These come in two sorts: (1) complaints
that the emerging model cannot be of the mind because it does not
take into account the representational properties of causally
efficacious states, and (2) poverty of the stimulus arguments. I have
already given reasons for rejecting the first type of attack against
PDP: it is clearly concerned with representation, both in explaining
its acquisition and its causal relevance. I explicitly addressed this
complaint against PDP because it strikes at the root of my contention
that PDP can constitute a coherent model of the mind. Poverty of
the stimulus arguments, on the other hand, are directed at the
empirical adequacy of PDP as a model of the mind, and, as I am not
here concerned with arguing either for or against PDP or
traditionalism as providing the best model, I shall not pursue this
topic further.
I have yet to specify what sorts of states within PDP systems
are the bearers of causally-efficacious content. The reasons for my
reticence on this point are two-fold: a lack of consistency within the
PDP literature and the necessity to tackle only one issue at a time. I
hope that the above arguments suffice to convince the reader that
PDP networks are capable of possessing representational states.
Now all that is left is to pick out which among the candidate states
are representational, and participate in causal laws as a function of
their content. As to the first reason, I have now reached a point
where, if the analysis is to continue, I must disregard as inconsistent
many of the stated views on this topic made by PDP researchers.
I have already mentioned the two candidates most often
mentioned in the PDP literature for intentional mental statehood:
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the weight-state (or parts thereof) and the activation value state (or
parts thereof). 51 One condition set down in Chapter 2 for an
intentional mental state type is that its tokens must participate in
mental causal laws (or, at least, must potentially do so). A mental
causal law is one relating an intentional mental state either to
another mental state or to some external behavior. How can one
understand the causally interacting representational objects in a PDP
network? The only regularities of transition that are isolatable in a
PDP network are the unit-level rules governing unit output as a
function of activation value, and activation value as a function of the
connectivity pattern of the network (encoded in the weights) and
the state of the local units to which this unit is connected. Is the
unit-level the appropriate level to consider in looking for mental
states? Perhaps the activation value of a unit represents the
presence (or, for real-valued units, the degree of presence) of an
object. On first glance, this is the most intuitive interpretation
schema for a PDP network. The weights would then correspond to
the degree of association of the objects represented by the various
units. (This "degree of association" may even constitute a degree of
conditional support — thus, if unit-n is connected to unit-m via a
line with a large positive weight, then a large output on unit-n lends
a high degree of support that the object represented by unit-m is
also present.) This approach to interpretation (hereafter called the
51 The latter is often used interchangeably with the output of each unit state.
In networks with a one-to-one function relating activation value and output
of a unit, the two state-types collapse into one. As the network exemplar that 1
have in mind throughout this chapter is one using back-prop as it is
currently construed (ie, in conjunction with a squashing function a la Figure
5c), I confine myself to consideration of only activation value state and
weight state, but not output of each unit state.
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local interpretation schema"), while easy to understand, presents
some difficulties.
Experiments on PDP networks capable of learning often show
that, after training, there is no consistent assignment of individual
objects to units: the activation value of the units is not correlated
with the presence or absence of any particular object in the domain
of commonsense representable objects. Perhaps, even in this case,
the local interpretation schema can be salvaged, for, perhaps, the
units represent, not the objects picked out by words in our natural
language, but objects that are picked out by a very large disjunction.
Is there a reason to reject such "objects" as genuine, at least to the
extent that representations of them participate in mental causal
laws?
For those philosophers (e.g., Grice) who want to use
contentfulness of mental states to ground contentfulness of words
and expressions in our public language, such a large mismatch
between mental representational units and linguistic
representational units would be unacceptable. For such
philosophers, mental representation is basic, and language has
evolved as a means to encapsulate the possible mentally
represented items and allow its transmission among minds. But
then, our public language should have been capable of easily
capturing these mental representational units. This is clearly not the
case. (In general, it is only with considerable awkwardness that PDP
researchers can encapsulate the content of a unit-level
representational state into natural language.) The most obvious
response to the argument against viewing the unit activation values
189
as the bearers of causally efficacious mental content of someone
keen on defending this view is to point out that there are alternative
means to grounding the meaningfulness of words and expressions in
our public language. One such alternative (most often associated
with Wittgenstein) is to ground meaning in social practice. The
possibility of such alternative avenues for grounding meaning of
words and expressions takes the punch out of this sort of argument.
In order to shore it up, such an opponent to unit-level
representation must argue that the Gricean approach is the only
contender for grounding linguistic meaning. I, for one, cannot
imagine how such an argument would go.
Another line of attack against the unit-level representations as
quantified over in mental causal laws view of PDP focusses on the
mismatch between mental processing described in terms of unit-
level meaning units and mental processing described in "stream of
consciousness" reports during (for example) problem solving. An
assumption of this argument is that stream of consciousness reports
provide an accurate picture of the causal goings-on in the mind of
the reporter. There are two possible counters to this argument. The
first involves questioning the assumption that stream of
consciousness reports bear any relation to the actual mental
processing involved in problem solving (or, mentation in general).
One sees even within the traditionalist framework (e.g., in the work
of Freud) a questioning of the reliability of subjective reports. It is
merely one more step down this familiar road to question not only
the reliability of the reports, but also the reliability of the
vocabulary in which the reports are couched. A second approach to
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countering this argument against unit-level representation harks
back to the equation within PDP (and, within traditionalism as well)
of the mind with a certain type of processing. Consciousness in
general is left as, at best, a by-product of mental processing. Thus,
PDP needn' t take conscious reports as conclusive in this regard. It is
perhaps strange that there is such a mismatch between the two
vocabularies, but not decisive. (As I am not taking the view of PDP
as reconstructed by me to be that unit-level representations are
those quantified over in mental laws, both the Gricean complaint and
the disparity with stream of consciousness reports complaint
constitute mounting evidence in favor of the alternative
interpretation schema.)
Neither of the above arguments succeed in knocking out unit-
level representation as a contender for mentally causally efficacious
items. They at best tend to disconfirm this thesis by pointing out
aspects in which its implications are counterintuitive. As the history
of other scientific disciplines (particularly in the 20th century)
makes abundantly clear, mere counterintuitiveness is not by itself
reason to reject a theory. I shall return to a consideration of unit-
level representation later. Now, however, I would like to consider
another set of candidates for the bearers of causally efficacious
representation within PDP: namely, the pattern-level activities.
Under the rubric of multi-unit patterns, there are two commonly
mentioned possibilities for bearers of meaning: patterns over units'
activation values and patterns over weights. The patterns in
question may encompass one unit, multiple units, or all of the units
in the network. Recall in Chapter 3 that, strictly speaking, a
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computational state is the monolithic system state. It is only under
the assumption that parts of this monolithic state are causally
isolatable that it is legitimate to speak of the representations of
these parts as being causally efficacious. A similar issue crops up
with respect to the isolatability of parts of the monolithic network
state (whether of weights or of activation values) within PDP
systems. Under what assumptions is it legitimate to speak of a
pattern of activation or pattern of weights as a causally efficacious
representational item, when that pattern is only constituted by a
proper subset of all of the network's units? What does "causal
isolatability" mean in this context? A pattern consisting of a proper
subset of the network's units is causally isolatable when (1) its
representational content is adverted to in a mental causal law, and
(2) all other representational states adverted to in that mental
causal law interact with that subset of states such that the set of
units not a member of the subset are irrelevant to the proper
instantiation of the law: relative to all the mental causal laws in
which that subset partakes, the non-subset members are irrelevant.
Whether there are such causally isolatable subsets is an empirical
question which will not be pursued here. When I use the word
"pattern", I mean to include any such subsets. If there are none,
then "pattern" refers only to monolithic network states. A further
note on terminology. The attempt to assign causally relevant
meanings to patterns over many units (as opposed to the activation
value of a single unit) is referred to in the literature as the
"distributed interpretation schema", in that the contents borne by
PDP networks are distributed over multiple units.
192
Let's first examine patterns of weights as potential bearers of
content. Can a coherent picture of mental causation emerge from
such an assignment? Clearly not, for mental causal laws relate
mental states with one another. The format of mental causal laws is:
mental-state- 1 causes mental-state-2.52 But patterns of weights do
not cause one another. In particular, it is not the case that the
instantiation of one pattern of weights is immediately followed by
another. So, patterns of weights alone cannot be the sought-after
bearers of causally relevant content.
Perhaps, then, sense can be made of patterns of activation
values as causally efficacious representations. Here, at least, the
overall format of mental causal laws can be applied to transitions in
patterns of activation during processing: patterns of activation
follow upon one another from one time step to the next. Patterns of
activation as mental states also satisfy the format of the mental
causal laws relating mental states and behavior, for a particular
network output (driving system behavior) is immediately preceded
by a pattern of activation. So, at least on this superficial point,
patterns of activation are contenders for mental statehood. Closer
analysis shows, however, that patterns of activation alone cannot be
mental states, for the transitions between patterns of activation are
law-like only relative to the weight state of the network at the time
of the transition. On this point, the traditionalist mindset, with its
notion of mental causal laws encoded in a static algorithm governing
52 Mental causal laws can also relate mental states and behavior. 1 do not
bother considering these, as the patterns of weights can already be excluded
as potential causally relevant mental states, because they cannot lit into the
framework of mental causal laws relating one mental state with another.
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the manner of manipulation of stored representations, must be
jettisoned. In a PDP network, there are no explicitly encoded rules
governing manipulation of a distinct group of mental states; rather,
it is the total pattern of the network (i.e., activation values plus
weights) that forces transition to the next pattern. So, the bearers of
causally efficacious content within PDP networks are patterns over
activation values and weights. I shall look in more detail at the
implications of this view for PDP as a model of the mind in the next
section.
Before leaving the present section, however, I would like to
sum up the most central points of my examination of PDP as it is
currently practiced. A useful springboard for such a summarization
is a consideration of what the separate words within the name
"parallel distributed processing" entail, especially in light of PDP's
use as a model of the mind. The word "processing" distinguishes PDP
as a particular way of arranging state transitions -- namely, in a
manner that (1) has many sub-processes going on in parallel, and (2)
involves somehow the amalgation of each of the individual sub-
processes into a larger unit. In relation to PDP as mental model, the
thesis is that the mind is likewise a process with just these
characteristics. The "parallelism" refers to the fact that many simple
units are operating simultaneously, such that each of these simple
units has access only to locally available information (i.e.,
information on the state of those units to which it is connected). The
"distributed" nature of PDP networks describes the usual manner of
interpretation of representational atoms within the network. This
distribution of representation is not so much spatial as it is involving
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the contribution of many relatively-independent simple units. This
distinction is important, because, in one sense, representations in
traditionalist systems implemented on a physical computer are
distributed -- in space. For example, the medium in which a
representation is stored may, and usually does, involve multiple
individual locations (whether they be multiple physical locations on
a chip, or, in the extreme case, multiple storage devices). What
distinguishes the spatial sense of distribution from the one meant
within the context of the title PDP is that, in the former, the
representation is manipulated as a unit, despite its spread-outness.
4.4 PDP as a Model of the Mind
In this section, I examine some of the implications of PDP s
properties, when PDP is construed as a model of the mind. Some of
the particular topics I include on this score are: the ramifications of
the mental state as patterns over weights and activation values; the
(still unresolved) issue of local versus distributed interpretation
schemas; and generalization (semantically described) within PDP
networks. I end the section and chapter with a description of PDP as
an explanatory model of the mind. What ontological commitments
does it make? What level of reality is represented by its causally
efficacious intentional states? What form will its causal laws take?
I begin by taking a closer look at the ramification of PDP as a
model of the mind, under the assumption that the bearers of
causally efficacious content are patterns over weights and activation
values. Perhaps the simplest way to broach this subject is by a
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quick contrast of this view of mental activity with that implied by
traditionalism. Rumelhart and McClelland provide just such a
contrast:
In most [ie, traditionalist] models, knowledge [ie, a
representation] is stored as a static copy of a pattern.
Retrieval amounts to finding the pattern in long-term
memory and copying it into a buffer or working
memory. There is no real difference between the
stored representation in long-term memory and the
active representation in working memory. In PDP
models, though, this is not the case. In these models,
the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what
is stored is the connection strengths between units
that allow these patterns to be re-created
.
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While the above-depicted "database” characterization of
traditionalism is only one among many (one heavily influenced by
the current set of programming languages available to the computer
scientist), it points out by overstatement a basic difference between
the two modes of processing: in traditionalism, there is a clear
distinction between the rules governing manipulation of
representations (whether those rules are explicitly or implicitly
stored) and the representations thus manipulated. In PDP, on the
other hand, the two are not clearly distinguishable: one pattern of
activation follows upon another as a function of the weights, which
encode the potentiality of the production of patterns of activation.
Thus, the particular succession of patterns of activation is
determined by the network itself. One cannot therefore view the
53 Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol I, page 31.
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network merely as a storage medium for representations, which, as
passive storage medium, is operated upon by some external process.
A useful way of viewing the relative contribution of the
patterns of activation and the patterns of weights is in terms of
explicit versus implicit representations; although, as argued in
Section 3, this way of viewing it is only approximately correct, as
neither patterns of activation nor patterns of weights are in isolation
constitutive of representations. In describing the contents of the
mind, we often distinguish between those items that are explicitly
represented (usually understood as being available to introspection)
versus those that are implicitly represented (only potentially or
latently available to introspection). As I have already mentioned,
PDP as a model of the mind tends to discount the importance of
(conscious) introspection, yet the implicit/explicit distinction in
representation has survived within PDP in a slightly altered form.
Let s look again at what happens during network processing. The
network has a particular pattern of activation instantiated in the
activation values of its units. It also has a particular pattern of
weights. The weights determine the line of succession (relative to a
sequence of input vectors) of one pattern of activation upon another,
and the pattern of activation instantiated picks out where in that
line of succession the network is currently located. Thus, the current
pattern of activation is explicitly realized in the network, and the
pattern of weights encodes the information needed to produce the
future patterns of activation: the future patterns of activation are
implicit in the weights. It is only a short step to using the word
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implicit' to describe the representational status of the weights. One
sees this usage quite often in the PDP literature, as in:
... almost all knowledge [ie, representation] is implicit
in the structure of the device [ie, in the connections]
that carries out the task, rather than explicit in the
states of units themselves. Knowledge is not directly
accessible to interpretation by some separate
processor, but it is built into the processor itself and
directly determines the course of processing. It is
acquired through tuning of connections as these are
used in processing, rather than formulated and stored
as declarative facts . 54
This reworking of the implicit/explicit distinction offers the
possibility for a smooth union in the interpretation of the two
"directions" of processing with PDP networks: forward processing
(i.e., the succession of one pattern of activation upon another) and
backward processing (i.e., learning). Backward processing is the
tuning of the weights so as to fix the line of succession of patterns of
activation relative to a sequence of input vectors -- to bring about
the succession of the explicit states that instantiate mental causal
laws. Forward processing is then the unfolding of the causal
sequence. This way of putting it is still too simple, because the
processing involved in learning likewise involves mental causal laws.
The picture of mentation that emerges is, at least at this level of
description, very different from that of traditionalism. According to
PDP, there is less differentiation of the elements of the mental realm
into the static, discrete representations and the mental algorithm
54Rumelhart and McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. I, pp. 75-76.
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that operates upon them. Because of the time quantization needed
to accommodate the learning rules in current use, there is an
element of discreteness to PDP representations, but the distinction
between static representations and active algorithm has
disappeared. 55
One question that I left hanging in Section 3 concerned which
of the two interpretation schemas was the correct one - is the local
interpretation schema, which isolates the content at the unit level,
the correct one for identifying the representational states mentioned
in mental causal laws, or is the distributed interpretation schema
correct? I should note here that I am using the phrase "local
interpretation schema" in a slightly different way than is usually
encountered in the literature. (I do this, not for the mere sake of
perversity, but because "local" versus "distributed" are, I think,
intended as opposites — whether used by me or within the
literature. However, the standard meaning that has evolved for
"local" in this context is not precisely the opposite of "distributed". I
want to pair these two interpretation schemas off as exact opposites,
so I must jettison one of the two standard usages. I have chosen to
retain "distributed" in its standard sense and to change that of
"local".)
5 5While it certainly lies outside the scope of this work to address the issue of
the possibility of learning within continuously processing PDP networks, it is
interesting to consider its potential ramifications for PDP. In that case,
representational states would not follow upon one another in discrete time
steps (as, for example, the integers follow upon one another when counting),
but rather would flow continuously -- so that no particular representation
could be truly said to follow upon another. In light of PDP s modelling of the
mind, this would translate over into the thesis that for (human) minds,
representations are not discrete, isolatable entities.
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The most often encountered usage of the epithet "local
interpretation schema assumes that there is some non-disjunctive
unit level semantic content. Thus, the class of "acceptable" networks
are those for which the unit level content is restricted to
representations of objects, properties of objects, or microfeatures.
The first two types of content are self-explanatory. "Microfeatures",
on the other hand, is used to describe an object or property at a
level lower than that at which commonsense objects or properties
are described. Thus, if is-a-cup is a property, it may have
microfeatures has-a-handle, is-made-of-porcelain, etc.
M/crofeaturehood is thus relative to which level is identified as the
surface or ground level of description. The restricted class of PDP
networks for which a local interpretation schema can be given
encompasses the correct mental model, on this view.
As already mentioned in Section 3, most PDP networks whose
representational content is determined by training (as opposed to
being selected and hand-coded by the researcher) fall outside of this
class. The unit level represents a disjunctive object or property.
Non-disjunctive objects or properties only emerge in the
representational states implemented by multiple units. It is still
possible, however, to identify the unit-level representations as those
implementing mental causal laws. In this case, the form of mental
causal laws would be radically different from what is normally
assumed. I use the phrase "local interpretation schema" to
encompass both of the above possibilities. Thus, the local
interpretation schema is correct if the content adverted to in mental
causal laws can be borne only by single units, irrespective of
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whether that content is disjunctive or not. I also mentioned in
Section 3 that, under the rubric "pattern", I wanted to include
"patterns” encompassing only a single unit. I remarked that
whether such "patterns" are truly causally isolatable is an empirical
matter. Allowing the word "pattern" to range over all possible non-
empty subsets (both proper and not) of the units in a network is
fairly standard in the literature, and the singletons are just as much
subsets as are those with more members. The issue boils down to
whether multiple unit patterns are even potentially the bearers of
content adverted to in mental causal laws: proponents of the local
interpretation schema say "no", whereas proponents of the
distributed interpretation schema say "yes".
One point in favor of the local interpretation schema is its
intuitiveness: units are easily identifiable and labellable. Patterns
over many units, on the other hand, are harder to isolate for the
purpose of discovering their representational content. Is there
anything arguing in favor of the distributed interpretation schema?
Before tackling this question, I must make the notion of "distributed"
more precise. 56 The word is ambiguous. One of its senses is
"spatially extended". Thus, a content is distributed if the physical
stuff forming its representation occupies more than a point in space.
Clearly this sense is not very useful, for all physical stuff occupies
more than a point in space: all stuff has extension. Using this sense,
physically realized representations a la traditionalism are likewise
56My starting place for this discussion is van Gelder's paper "On Distributed
Representation" in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. While he makes
many good points on the way to distinguishing "local" and "distributed", 1
think his final choice of criteria for distributedness relative to FDP networks
misses the mark.
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distributed. A second sense of "distributed" (the one preferred by
van Gelder as the sense that best fits how the term is and should be
understood within PDP) is applicable to a representation if the
resources (in this case, units) used to realize it likewise participate in
the realization of distinct representations. Thus, a network supports
distributed representation if each unit participates in many patterns,
each of which is a representation. Alternatively expressed, there is
no mutually exclusive partitioning of the set of units separating the
overall set into subsets, each of which is responsible for representing
a content, such that all representable contents have their own
subset. Van Gelder calls this sense of "distributed" "the
superposition of representations".
While the distinction superposable/non-superposable is useful,
in that superposability of representations is a feature often realized
in PDP networks, I don't think it gets at the heart of the issue, in
light of the use of PDP as a model of the mind. Rather, I want to
distinguish distributed from non-distributed based upon whether
mental causal laws advert to contents borne (at least potentially) by
multi-unit patterns. Thus, the important sense in which
representations are distributed in PDP networks is that the network
models a mental process whose causally interacting items
correspond in the network to multi-unit patterns. The superposition
of representation may be an additional feature, but it is not the
crucial one in distinguishing the interpretation schema as local or
distributed.
So now, we can return to the question: is there any reason to
reject the local interpretation schema in favor of the distributed
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one? In Section 3, I mentioned two points of counterintuitiveness
associated with the local interpretation schema. There is, in
addition, slightly less anecdotal evidence that the (human) mind
implements its representations in a distributed fashion. This
evidence is not of a sort to yield an out-and-out disconfirmation of
local representation; rather, it points to four mental phenomena
which follow naturally, without the need for the introduction of
special procedures, from distributed representation. The first piece
of evidence is the ease with which humans generalize. 57 Stated
broadly, generalization is the application of principles learned from
experienced examples to novel examples. Usually, though, to say
that a system can generalize is to imply that the choice of
principle^ ) to be applied makes sense -- that the system takes into
account the similarities and differences between the previous
examples and this novel one, and either chooses the correct among
many principles, or adapts a learned principle in light of these
similarities and differences. When a representation is spread over
many units in a PDP network, there is a natural similarity metric
available to compare two representations — namely, the distance
between the two vectors forming the representation. This
"similarity check" occurs automatically — there is no need for an
outside agent to assign a similarity metric. To take a particular
example, suppose that a network has been trained so that on input
5
"Strictly speaking, it is not distribution per se, but superposition of
representations that explains ease of generalization. In rejecting van Gelder's
equation of "distributed" and "superposed", I was not rejecting the thesis that
superposition is a property had by most mental representations, but rather
the thesis that superposition is the defining feature of distributed
representation in general.
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II it produces output Ol, and on input 12 it produces output 02, on
input 13, 03, and on 14, 04. Now imagine that the network is
presented with a novel input, 15, which, from the perspective of an
outside observer, is similar to II and 12 in some respects, and
similar to 13 and 14 in other respects, but dissimilar to all of the
other inputs on which the network was trained. Again, from the
point of view of the external observer, the "reasonable" way of
handling this novel input is to produce an output, 05, that is similar
in some repects to Ol and 02 (to the extent that Ol and 02 are
similar) and similar in some respects to 03 and 04 (again, to the
extent that 03 and 04 are similar). This high-level description of a
"reasonable generalization" is just what a PDP network does. The
perceived similarity between two input vectors must somehow be
encoded in the actual vectors (else, why would they be called
similar?). This similarity is automatically taken advantage of as the
processing proceeds and the network output is computed. With a
localized interpretation schema, there is no automatic generalization.
Any generalization that may take place must be guided by a hand-
coded procedure and/or a hand-coded similarity metric relating
representations. If we take PDP seriously as a model of the mind,
generalization within a local interpretation schema requires a
homunculus who can look at and appraise the similarity between
inputs (and between internal representations). While the idea of
such a homunculus is not incoherent, I am working under the
assumption that, other things being equal, an interpretation schema
that does not require the existence of a homunculus to explain a fact
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about human mentation (namely, that we can generalize) is
preferable to one that does.
A second feature of a distributed interpretation schema that
provides evidence that human mental states are implemented in a
distributed fashion is a modified version of the "graceful
degradation" property of distributed networks. To say that a
network's performance degrades gracefully is to say that no
individual piece of the network is so crucial that its loss or damage
produces a marked decrease in the performance level of the
network as a whole. A further aspect of graceful degradation is the
gradual decline in performance with the loss or damage of parts of
the system. Clearly, a local interpretation schema does not display
graceful degradation: there may be a unit representing a key object
or property (i.e., key to the level of performance of the system) such
that its loss produces a drastic decline in performance. What about
the case for a distributed interpretation schema? Here it is
important to be clear on what graceful degradation means when
applied to PDP qua mental model. I pause to note one thing in
particular that it does not mean. (I make this explicit, because the
PDP literature is rife with this mistaken understanding of graceful
degradation.) It does not mean that units are like neurons, in that
(as we know from empirical investigation) neurons die off every day
without a noticeable decline in intellectual capacity of the individual.
This mixes two distinct understandings of what the PDP project is
about — namely, modelling the mind versus modelling the brain.
What I think the feature of graceful degradation within distributed
representations has as important implication is that representational
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content can change in a piecemeal fashion. I am reminded of Stich ' s
thought experiment involving the woman who, over the course of
time, gradually lost the ability to represent President McKinley
.
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Under a local interpretation schema, this is not a possibility:
representations are atomic and either all there or all absent, with no
inbetween states.
There are two further features of distributed interpretation
that provide evidence in favor of it as the schema present in
(human) minds. The first of these is the ease of implementing
content-addressable memory within a distributed framework.
Content-addressable memory is one in which items can be recalled
based upon some part of the item. So, for example, when I try to
recall a female acquaintance's name by the "generate-and-test"
procedure (i.e., think up a bunch of common female names and ask
myself for each one: "is this her name?"), I am taking advantage of
content-addressable memory. The "content" in this case is the
hypothesized name, which I use to recall each person with whom I
am acquainted who has that name, in order to see if the woman in
question is among them. Content-addressable memory is easily
implemented in a distributed network, but is implementable only
with great effort in a local schema. A fourth piece of evidence
pointing to a distributed interpretation schema as that used by
human minds is the ease with which both humans and distributed
networks can create new representations on the fly. I have given
less emphasis to these latter two features of distributed
representation because they present less conclusive evidence in
58See From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, pp. 54-56.
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favor of a distributed interpretation schema as the correct one. I
think, though, all in all, that the evidence points against a local
interpretation schema as the correct one in constructing a model of
the mind. Hence, I shall from here on assume a distributed
interpretation schema.
One potential objection to a distributed interpretation schema
that I would like to counter goes as follows: doesn ' t this schema fall
afoul of the locality constraint within PDP networks? In particular,
doesn't it implicitly posit an additional entity who is "looking over"
the network to gather together the non-local information regarding
which patterns are present? A simple reductio shows the hollowness
of this objection. Suppose that instantiation of a mental causal law
does require such an external observer to note that a particular
contentful state has been tokened. (Assume that this contentful
state forms the nomologically sufficient condition for some effect.)
There is in this regard no relevant difference between mental causal
laws and causal laws simpliciter, so there must likewise be an
external observer to note when the antecedent to a causal law is
satisfied, in order for that causal process to ensue. But this is clearly
false. Therefore, no external observer is required to gather together
the non-local information constituting the distributed
representation. Therefore, distributed representation per se does
not violate the locality constraint on PDP.
I end this section with an examination of several issues which
will surface again in Chapter 5 as points of comparison with
traditionalism. The first question asks: what ontological
commitments are inherent in PDP as a model of the mind? PDP
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presupposes a physicalist metaphysics, while also maintaining the
existence of causally efficacious mental states, identified in terms of
their semantic content. Mental causal laws advert to the content of
these states.
Looking closer at the form that these mental causal laws will
take, we see that the set of possible mental causal laws is
constrained by the nature of PDP processing. If we take PDP
seriously as offering a mental model, this translates into the
statement that the manner in which one representational state in a
PDP network can follow upon another reflects the manner in which
one mental state can cause another. (Recall that my analysis is not
at all concerned with what particular mental causal laws there are,
but rather with what form is assumed by, and what restrictions are
placed upon mental causal laws in accordance with the framework
provided by either traditionalism or PDP.) I will take up this topic in
more detail in Chapter 5, where I attempt a point-by-point
comparison of the constraints on mental causal laws offered by the
two paradigms.
Finally, what level of reality is represented by the causally
efficacious mental states according to PDP? As already argued, I
think that the most promising interpretation schema for use within
PDP is the distributed interpretation schema, according to which the
causally efficacious states have non-disjunctive content. While there
is no argument within PDP that plays the same role with respect to
implying exactly what level of reality is represented by these
causally efficacious states as we see in the LOT argument within
traditionalism, some general comments on this topic are possible. A
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review of the literature quickly confirms the view that PDP does not
differ much from traditionalism on this score. After training,
researchers analyze the network by trying to identify regularities in
the succession among internal patterns, and in the relationship
between inputs and internal patterns. The labels attached to
causally efficacious patterns correspond in most instances to
concepts easily expressed in natural language. (Either objects or
properties.) There are, however, many renegade trained networks
that have yet to succumb to this analysis . 59 For such networks,
researchers can identify no consistent mapping between causally
efficacious patterns and such easily expressible concepts -- yet, the
networks succeed in achieving a high level of performance at the
task at hand. I am not quite sure what to make of such networks.
One can assume that such a mapping exists, but, because it is so
complex, it has not yet been discovered. Contrarily, one can take
this as a sign that a full-blown model of the mind may likewise not
have mental states whose content is easily expressible in natural
language.
59The most famous example is the mine identifier system of Gorman and
Sejnowski.
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CHAPTER 5
ARE THE TRADITIONALIST AND PDP MODELS
QUALITATIVELY DISTINCT?
In this concluding chapter, I have set before myself several
tasks. First, I develop a general framework for comparing two
models of a domain. This framework is general in the sense that it
specifies criteria to be used in judging qualitative distinctness,
irrespective of the particular domain being modelled. This topic is
addressed in the first section.
One often hears PDP referred to as a "new paradigm" for
understanding mental phenomena, and the transition within
cognitive science (at least, with respect to emphasis in professional
meetings and journals) from the traditional to the PDP model of the
mind as a "paradigm switch" or "revolution" within the field. The
allusions to Kuhn's theory of scientific change have led me to
consider the questions: Can we understand traditionalism and PDP
as forming the kernel of disparate paradigms, and are they
incommensurable? I examine this issue in the second section. In
doing so, I highlight the differences between Kuhn's
"incommensurability" (a concept which is, I think, never fully
developed in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and my
"qualitative distinctness".
One famous exchange in the traditionalism versus PDP
literature (see Smolensky's "On the Proper Treatment of
Connectionism" and Fodor and Pylyshyn's "Connectionism and
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Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis") that addresses this topic
bears attention. I therefore devote Section 3 to a summarization of
the views of these two opposing camps. While they are suggestive, I
believe that the arguments put forward by both sets of authors
(indeed, by all of the authors who have written on this topic) fall
short of the mark. As I have already repeatedly mentioned, the
construal of one object (or object-type) as an explanatory model of
another is possible only in the context of a theory of causation.
When such an articulated theory is absent (whether because it is
tacitly assumed or because it is wholly lacking), the analysis of
something's modelhood as well as the comparison of models
becomes highly problematic. In each of the above cases, the authors
fail to provide the necessary causal theoretic background.
In Section 4 I consider issues relating to computability. This
discussion is included to thwart the superficially plausible argument
that traditionalism and PDP as models of the mind must be distinct,
because the two corresponding abstract machines (namely, the
computer and PDP networks) differ in their computational power.
Finally, in Section 5 I give my answer to the question: Are the
traditionalist and PDP models of the mind qualitatively distinct?
Briefly, my argument takes the following form. While both models
describe the mental level, and both make similar ontological
commitments, there is no possible isomorphism between the web of
causal laws permitted within the constraints of the respective
models. Hence, the two are qualitatively distinct.
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5.1 What is Qualitative Distinctness?
As remarked above, one often meets in the literature
surrounding the traditionalism versus PDP debate the assertion that
the two camps are proposing distinct theories of the mind.
Unfortunately, these assertions are usually left at the level of vague
generality, because they are made outside the context of any
worked-out explication of what it means for two theories to be
distinct. As we shall see in Section 2, even Kuhn fails to give more
than the briefest of sketches in describing what criteria distinguish
genuinely incommensurable theories from those that merely differ
with respect to adopted vocabulary. In this section, I propose my
own set of criteria for use in determining whether two theories are
qualitatively distinct.
Before beginning that task, I pause to give reasons for my
choice of the descriptor "qualitatively distinct". Scientific theories
can be distinct in many ways. For example, two theories are distinct
if they make differing predictions about future events given the
same initial conditions. This divergence in and of itself need not
reflect an underlying qualitative distinctness between the two
theories, for such divergence can result if the two theories merely
differ in respect of some value of a parameter. To be more specific,
the divergence in prediction that results when two otherwise
identical theories of relativistic mechanics differ with respect to
their values for the speed of light (say, 2.9x10*17* m/s versus
3.0x10*17* m/s) does not constitute a qualitative difference
between the two theories. Similarly, two theories that make
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identical predictions (about both observable and non-observable
states of the system), given the same initial conditions are not
qualitatively distinct, even though the vocabulary that each employs
to identify the objects and states quantified over by its causal laws
may differ radically
.
1 In the above two respects, my application of
qualitative distinctness does not differ much from Kuhn's
incommensurability. For him, two formulations do not constitute
incommensurable paradigms either when one is a mere quantitative
refinement of the other, or when the two formulations support a
ready translation between themselves. I do not, however, adopt his
"incommensurability" for several reasons. First, the notion is never
clearly defined in his work. If this were my only objection,
however, I could view my work as a natural extension and
specification of his own. A more important reason for rejecting his
"incommensurability" is my desire to distance myself from some of
the baggage that comes along with that term. In particular, I (unlike
Kuhn) do believe that there can be (rationally defensible) reasons
for preferring one paradigm over another. Note here my use of the
rather weak "can be" over the much stronger — and, I think,
unjustified -- "shall be". I think that for Kuhn, even the "can be" is
too strong. While he explicitly rejected the accusation that his view
Whis statement will get me into trouble with anyone who rejects the
possibility of a theory-neutral language of description. However, as will
become clear later in this section, I mean here to exclude from the extension
of the set of obviously qualitatively distinct pairs of theories only those pairs
permitting the most superficial mappings between their respective
terminologies.
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of science turns it into a "subjective" and "irrational"? enterprise^
still, a consequence of his view is that any attempt at arguing for one
against another of two incommensurable paradigms will be
necessarily circular
.
4
I shall have much more to say on Kuhn's
"incommensurability" in the next section.
On my use of the term, qualitative distinctness takes in two
aspects: respective ontological commitment and respective
decomposition of phenomena into causal sequences. In posing the
question "what ontological commitments are made by a particular
theory?", I am presupposing that that theory takes a realist stance
towards the objects and states quantified over in its causal laws. So,
this question is transformed into: "what things must exist on the
assumption that this theory correctly subdivides the world (or, at
least a level of causal interaction within the world -- more on this
later) into its causally efficacious parts?" Answering this question is
in general a very difficult task, for several different reasons. The
most obvious is that theories do not wear their ontological
commitments on their shirt-sleeves: rarely does a researcher or
theoretician give explicit declarations regarding what assumptions
are and are not being made within a scientific theory. As Newton-
Smith remarks, this tendency toward silence on the part of scientists
is not a new phenomenon:
In examining scientific theories for ontological
commitment, it will not usually be such a trivial matter.
2
1 think he meant "arational".
^See especially his Postscript to the second edition of /Tie Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, pp. 191-198.
4 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 94.
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For instance, it remains as controversial today as it was
at the time for Leibniz and Newton whether theories of
time carry a commitment to the existence of moments of
time over and above collections of events
.
5
In performing an analysis of the ontological commitments made by a
particular theory, therefore, one must do some interpolation.
A second source of difficulty in teasing out ontological
commitments (particularly relevant when the aim of this analysis is
an inter-theory comparison) is that objects and/or their states that
are hypothesized within one theory to be causally efficacious entities
qua singletons may appear in the other theory only as one part of a
unit. In the latter case, only the unit (i.e., that singleton entity plus
the other singleton entities with which it is conjoined) is causally
efficacious. In this case, would one say that both theories are
committed to the existence of that entity? I think not. My reason for
denying this is that the latter theory does not recognize the singleton
as alone causally efficacious, even though the terminology
standardly used by practitioners of that theory have a word that
picks out that singleton. (This is particularly prevalent when the
theory that has the singleton being causally efficacious in isolation of
other facts about the world temporally precedes the theory that has
the singleton being one part of the true causally efficacious entity7 .)
The classic example of the difficulty is provided by a consideration
of whether Newtonian (classical) and Einsteinian (relativistic)
mechanics are both committed to mass as a causally efficacious
5 Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, page 38.
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property.^ A problem arises because the most intuitive construal of
"mass" as used by Newtonians equates to "rest mass" in the
terminology of Einsteinians, but rest mass is not alone the causally
efficacious property within that latter theory. Rather, it is the
conjunction of the rest mass of an object and a measure of the
velocity of that object relative to the speed of light that is causally
efficacious. Setting aside for the moment the fact that the phrase
"rest mass" was never used within Newtonian mechanics, would we
still want to say that both theories are committed to the reality of
rest mass as a causally efficacious property? As noted above, my
answer is "no": Newtonian mechanics is committed to the reality of
rest mass, but Einsteinian mechanics is not.
A third source of difficulty in comparing the ontological
commitments of two theories is that, while the same word is
employed within both theories to pick out an object, many of the
causal interactions in which the object can participate according to
one theory are not recognized by the other, and vice versa. A case
in point is determining the import of the sentence: "this theory is
committed to the existence of light" when made with reference to a
corpuscular versus a wave theory of light. Clearly, many of the
properties possessible by light in the one theory are not recognized
by the other. Does this mean that the two theories are ontologically
committed to different things -- namely, light-qua-particle for the
corpuscular theory and light-qua-wave for the wave theory? I think
so, for the causal efficacy of the two "types" of light differ. For the
6 Put in terms of the causal efficacy of objects and states, this is the same as
asking whether both theories recognize "having-mass-x" as a causally
relevant state of an object.
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wave theory (but not for the corpuscular theory), light must exist as
something having a particular wavelength: the state of having-
wavelength-x is a state of a beam of light that must exist if the wave
theory correctly describes the world. In a sense, the above example
shows the difficulty of teasing apart the ontological commitment
aspect of a theory from the set of causal laws propounded by a
theory: the wave theory is committed to light-qua-wave because its
causal laws mention possible states of light (e.g., its wavelength) that
presuppose that it is a wave.
Choosing an example closer to the theme of this work, consider
whether the ontological commitments made by Freud ' s psychological
theory and by folk psychology prior to Freud are the same. What
must exist if the former is a true depiction of the world? Clearly,
mental agents with various attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) towards
representations must exist. The causally efficacious items are the
conjunction of representational content plus attitude. (Thus, the
belief that I will receive a raise has a distinct causal efficacy from
the desire that I will receive a raise, which in turn has a distinct
causal efficacy from the desire that I eat French fries.) This much is
uncontroversially shared with folk psychology. A possible point of
divergence crops up in considering whether the fact that some of
these causally efficacious states are unconscious for the Freudian
theorist adds something new to the ontology of Freudian theory not
found in folk psychology. (Note: Although I am certainly no expert
on Freudian theory, I am assuming that the unconscious itself is only
metaphorically causally efficacious within that theory: what are
causally efficacious are beliefs, desires, etc., some of which are
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unconscious. For a fuller discussion, see the section "Freud and the
Unconscious", in The Construction of Reality by Arbib and Hesse, pp.
114-117.) This boils down to the question: does Freudian theory
recognize unconscious-beliefs, unconscious-desires, etc., as distinct
entities (vis-a-vis causal relevance) from conscious-beliefs,
conscious-desires, etc.? I don't think a definitive answer can be
given, because Freudian theory is not a monolithic theory, but rather
a group of schools of thought. The version of Freudian theory
presented by the school most at home with cognitive psychologists
does not give unconscious mental states a distinct status. The case is
perhaps otherwise for other schools within the broad Freudian
tradition -- I just don' t know. The question concerning distinctness
of ontological commitment is much more clear-cut when the two
rival theories are folk psychology and behaviorism. The latter
makes no place for the causal relevance of beliefs, desires, or any
other representational states; hence, the two theories make differing
ontological commitments.
A second aspect of qualitative distinctness involves sameness
of causal interaction across the two theories. This aspect is in a
sense secondary to that of ontological commitment, for it
presupposes sameness of ontological commitment. Where two
theories have well worked-out sets of causal laws, this comparison is
(conceptually, at least) straightforward. First, pair off the objects
and states referred to in one theory with the corresponding objects
and states in the other. (Again, I reemphasize that this step is
predicated on the existence of a correlation between the causally
efficacious objects and states posited by the two theories.) One can
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think of causation as a relation over sets of states. So, for example,
the causal law that says a&b&c causes d&e relates the set containing
a, 5, and c to the set containing d and e. Now, the two theories are
distinct with respect to causal interaction when the relation thus
defined by the one listing of causal laws is not isomorphic to the
other listing under the mapping equating the causally efficacious
objects and states in the one theory with the corresponding objects
and states in the other.
This version of distinctness is, however, not exactly what we
are looking for, as it is too quick to label two theories as distinct. For
example, it labels as distinct two versions of relativistic mechanics
that differ only in their respective approximations of the speed of
light. This, I think, slices the world of scientific theories too finely.
A coarser slicing (one more befitting the epithet "qualitative")
requires some additional distinctions within each respective theory.
In particular, each theory would group its causally efficacious states
into relatively quantitatively similar sets. The two theories are
qualitatively distinct with respect to causal interaction when the
relation defined by the listing of causal laws is not isomorphic to the
other listing under the mapping using the coarser grained sets of
quantitatively similar objects and states. There are two points to
note on this refined version of distinctness. First, it fails to
distinguish between two theories that differ only in non-qualitative
ways. This is more than an empty truism, for the ultimate
determiner of what differences are quantitative and what
differences are qualitative is relative to the two theories being
compared. By specifying the quantitatively similar groupings, each
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theory implicitly says: "any theory that keeps within these
parameters will be viewed by me as the qualitatively same theory."
Secondly, this understanding of qualitative distinctness can
distinguish theories that differ in quantitative ways, where those
quantitative differences constitute qualitative differences. For
example, a relativistic theory of mechanics that allows particles
(whether massive or not) to travel above its approximation of the
speed of light may be judged as qualitatively distinct with respect to
causal interaction from one that disallows such fast moving particles
relative to its approximation of the speed of light. Thus, the "mere
quantitative" difference of 1 m/ s, when that difference occurs at the
cusp separating sub-light from supra-light speeds, may constitute a
qualitative difference.
The above characterization of my method for determining
qualitative distinctness with respect to causal interaction requires a
general remark. For those theories wherein the cardinality of the
set of causally efficacious objects and states is equal to that of the
set of real numbers, the problem of the inability to enumerate all of
the causal laws crops up: if you can ' t enumerate all of the causal
laws, how can you possibly compare the one listing with the other?
My response is to shrug my shoulders and note that my method,
while conceptually straightforward, presents some difficulties in
implementation.
Considering my method in light of the task at hand (namely,
comparing the theories presented by traditionalism and PDP, to be
discussed in Section 5) points to another potential problem: both
theories are too young to have a well worked-out set of causal laws.
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In particular, the model driving the theory in each case is merely
such as to place constraints on the possible causal laws, it does not
dictate particular causal laws. Thus, in applying my method, I will
have to examine, not whether the two causal relations permit an
isomorphism, but whether the constraints placed on the possible
causal relations leave open the possibility of an isomorphism. If not,
the two theories are qualitatively distinct. This lack of
conclusiveness (in that the failure to discover the impossibility of a
possible isomorphism does not entail that the two theories are not
qualitatively distinct — failure to prove that p does not imply that
not-p ) is tolerable, for my over-arching goal - the question that has
spurred my interest in this subject - involves whether the
accusation that PDP is just the same old thing (i.e., traditionalism)
with some updated vocabulary is true. At a minimum, the analysis
to be performed in Section 5 should settle that question.
Before leaving this section, I pause to give a high-level
summary of my method for determining qualitative distinctness,
and to characterize the two (grossly described) "flavors" in which
qualitative distinctness comes. The first stage of testing for
qualitative distinctness involves asking the question: "do the two
theories make the same ontological commitments?" If the answer is
"no", then the matter is settled: the two theories are qualitatively
distinct. If, however, the answer is "yes", then one must continue
the analysis to include a consideration of the causal interactions
posited by the respective theories. When the two are qualitatively
distinct with respect to causal interaction, then they are
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qualitatively distinct, simpliciter. Otherwise, they are qualitatively
indistinct.
Described at a high level of abstraction, qualitative distinctness
comes in two "flavors": (1) same level but no or little overlap, and
(2) different levels. The qualitative distinctness of two theories in
the latter flavor is perhaps easiest to see, for the level of reality
(viewing the world as a quasi-hierarchy of causally interacting
objects and states) encompassed by each differs. Consider current
quantum mechanics (or, more precisely, consider one version of
current quantum mechanics) and modern cellular biology. These
two scientific theories are clearly qualitatively distinct, because the
ontological commitments are so radically different in the two
respective theories. Modern cellular biological laws quantify over
cells, membranes, and their states. Thus, modem cellular biology is
committed to the existence of these objects and states. However,
there is no mention whatsoever of these objects and states within
modern quantum mechanics. In general, disparate scientific
disciplines have qualitatively distinct theories; this distinctness is
reflective of differences with respect to ontological commitment
within the two theories.
What, though, of the case in which it is not obvious that the
two theories are describing different levels of reality, either because
the two do indeed describe the same level, or because there is
disagreement among the proponents of one or both theories with
respect to the level of reality being described? (This latter
possibility is particularly relevant to the issue at hand in light of the
lack of consensus within PDP regarding what their model is a model
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of.) Returning to the previous example of the corpuscular versus
wave theory of light, we see a case in which the two theories do
describe the same level of reality (namely, the behavior of light), yet
they share little in common in terms of either ontological
commitments or causal interactions. The classic example of the
overthrow of one theory by another within a scientific discipline fits
this mold. Those proponents of PDP who are fond of describing their
model of the mind as a new paradigm usually have such an
understanding of the relationship between traditionalism and PDP.
5.2 Kuhn's Theory and the Relationship between
Traditionalism and PDP
Such references to the terminology in Thomas Kuhn's The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions leads me naturally to ask several
questions. Is the usage appropriate: is psychology in the midst of a
revolution pitting traditionalism against PDP? Also, is my
"qualitative distinctness" just his "incommensurability"? If not, what
are the points of divergence between the two?
Kuhn lays out the typical development of a scientific
revolution as seen in historical case studies of transitions that, in
retrospect, are clear instances of paradigm changes. First, a
particular discipline is united around a single paradigm in the
process of doing normal science. Practitioners in the field are
occupied with fleshing out some aspects of the paradigm not yet
fully concrete and solving puzzles (i.e., results not predicted by the
paradigm as it currently stands) within the context of the paradigm.
If a sufficient number of puzzles prove to be recalcitrant with
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respect to being explained with the (perhaps slightly modified
version of the) paradigm, a crisis situation develops. (Puzzles not
thus explainable are called "anomalies ".) There is growing discontent
among some of the members of that discipline, particularly the
younger ones, who have less stake in the maintenance of the old
paradigm, leading eventually to the feeling among some members
that the "existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had
previously led the way ." 7 Eventually the discontented group congeal
around a rival paradigm, and the battle for allegiance within the
previously unified group commences. The allegiance centers around
three sorts of commitments that a scientist derives from her
paradigm:
Less local and temporary, though still not unchanging
characteristics of science, are the higher level, quasi-
metaphysical commitments [which follow from the
acceptance of a paradigm] that historical study so
regularly displays. ... That nest of commitments
proved to be both metaphysical and methodological.
As metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of
entities the universe did and did not contain. ... As
methodological, it told them what ultimate laws and
fundamental explanations must be like. ... More
importantly still [a paradigm] told scientists what
many of their research problems should be . 8
The two rival paradigms are not only incompatible (they must differ
on some of their predictions, in that the new paradigm is put
forward in response to and as supplying an explanation of the
7 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 92.
8 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 41.
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results that were anomalous within the context of the old paradigm),
but may also be incommensurable. Kuhn breaks
incommensurability into its three aspects:
(i) "[T]he proponents of competing paradigms will
often disagree about the list of problems that any
candidate for paradigm must resolve. Their
standards or their definitions of science are not the
same." 9
(ii) "Since new paradigms are bom from old ones,
they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary
and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative,
that the traditional paradigm had previously
employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed
elements in quite the traditional way. Within the
new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments
fall into new relationships one with the other. The
inevitable result is what we must call ... a
misunderstanding between the two competing
schools ." 10
(iii) "[Most fundamental:] the proponents of
competing paradigms practice their trades in
different worlds ." 11
This incommensurability between paradigms makes rational
discourse concerning the relative merits of the two paradigms
impossible. Members of the opposing camps often find themselves
"talking past" one another, because the meanings of the terms that
they use are paradigm-relative, and because "they cannot ... resort
to a neutral language which both use in the same way." 1 - Arguments
for or against a particular paradigm must be persuasive (rather than
9 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 148.
10 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 149.
11 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 150.
12 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 201.
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rational) in nature. As enough of the members of the field come to
adopt the challenger paradigm (either because people are actually
persuaded, or because the scientists who remain committed to the
older paradigm die off), the challenger attains the role of accepted
paradigm and normal science commences within that field again,
albeit around a new paradigm.
Kuhn describes the process by which an individual scientist
becomes committed to the new paradigm as akin to the gestalt
switch that occurs in the oft-cited duck/rabbit picture: it is a
quantum experience not further decomposable into substages. Kuhn
describes the transition from a field in crisis to the field again
unified around a new paradigm as:
a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals,
a reconstruction that changes some of the field ' s most
elementary theoretical generalizations as well as
many of its paradigm methods and applications. ...
When the transition is complete, the profession will
have changed its view of the field, its methods, and
its goals. One perceptive historian, viewing a classic
case of a science ' s reorientation by paradigm change,
recently described it as "picking up the other end of
the stick," a process that involves "handling the same
bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new
system of relations with one another by giving them
a different frame ." 13
With this description of the Kuhnian view of scientific
revolution in hand, we can consider the question: is the current
state within cognitive science one of crisis/revolution, with
13 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 84-85. Quote from H.
Butterfield's The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800, pp. 1-/.
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traditionalism as the old paradigm and PDP as the challenger? My
approach in the next several pages will be to give a depiction of the
emergence and development of PDP within cognitive science that is
as sympathetic as possible to the view that takes PDP as a new
paradigm within that field. (As already hinted at previously, this
view predominates among PDP researchers themselves, whereas the
prevailing view among adherers to traditionalism is that cognitive
science is not in a crisis situation, and the puzzles that are not yet
explainable within the framework of traditionalism will, with
further research, eventually succumb.)
Traditionalism came to dominate psychology after the
overthrow of behaviorism. It was the accepted paradigm, and the
normal scientific phase of research within psychology during the last
30 years or so assumed it, as can be seen in researchers' acceptance
of its (1) ontological commitments, (2) methodological
presuppositions (in the form that causal laws and causal
explanations within psychology would take) and (3) depiction of the
sorts of phenomena that a theory within psychology should be able
to explain. Thus, the work of psychologists during this time period
consisted in fleshing out the particulars within the traditionalist
framework (e.g., performing experiments to determine what the
individual mental causal laws are) and making minor adjustments
within the framework in order to solve the outstanding
psychological puzzles.
Many puzzles did indeed prove to be explainable within
traditionalism; however, many remained (and continue to remain)
recalcitrant. Some of the anomalous mental phenomena have
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already been described in Chapter 4. One such example is the
inability of traditionalism to explain how content-addressable
memory is achieved in the mind, given empirical data on access time
required to recover a particular item. Some researchers within
psychology (particularly the newer ones to the field, who either had
just completed their professional training or had just gained an
interest in psychology after work in some other field - most often,
neuroscience or computer science) began placing more emphasis on
the failures of traditionalism (i.e., the anomalies) than on its
successes. The "youth factor" among converts to PDP is quite
apparent, and is explained by the fact that part of the reluctance of
the older members of the psychological community to give up on
traditionalism relates to their professional commitment to that
paradigm. They continue to see only puzzles to be solved within the
framework of traditionalism, whereas the younger generation is
much more willing to brand the "as yet not explained" mental
phenomena as "anomalies" and to reject traditionalism as itself
inadequate. These discontents have by and large congealed around
PDP as a rival for the allegiance of psychologists. At a minimum,
they contend, PDP can explain what has heretofore remained
unexplained within traditionalism:
[PDP holds] out the hope of offering computationally
sufficient and psychologically accurate mechanistic
accounts of the phenomena of human cognition which
have eluded successful explication in conventional
computational formalisms [ie, traditionalism]. 14
14Rumelhart and McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing, page 11.
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One can see in some of the debates that have occurred
between adherents of traditionalism and adherents of PDP the tell-
tale signs of incommensurability between the two theories. The
clearest example of this is the denial that the sorts of problems that
PDP systems are particularly good at solving are even within the
purview of psychology. Thus, we see Fodor and Pylyshyn (the truest
of believers in traditionalism) unintentionally illustrating this very
aspect of the crisis situation within psychology today in their denial
of the successes of PDP qua model of the mind:
We have, in short, no objection at all to [PDP]
networks as potential implementation models, nor do
we suppose that any of the arguments we've given
are incompatible with this proposal. The trouble is,
however, that if connectionists do want their models
to be construed this way, then they will have to
radically alter their practice. For, it seems utterly
clear that most of the connectionist models that have
been proposed must be construed as theories of
cognition, not as theories of implementation. This
follows from the fact that it is intrinsic to these
theories to ascribe representational content to the
units (and/or aggregates) that they postulate. And,
as we remarked at the beginning, a theory of the
relations among representational states is ipso facto a
theory at the level of cognition, not at the level of
implementation. It has been the burden of our
argument that when construed as a cognitive theory,
rather than as an implementation theory,
connectionism appears to have fatal limitations. The
problem with connectionist models is that all the
reasons for thinking that they might be true are
reasons for thinking that they couldn t be
psychology. 15
15
"Connectionism and Cognitive Archtitecture: A Critical Analysis", page 66,
italics added.
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Similarly, some of the terminology often seen within
traditionalism has been retained within PDP, but with a different
meaning. A case in point is the word "representation". The reader
likely noted this in Chapter 4. While the broad definition of
"representation" as "one thing that stands in for another" is retained,
many of the particular defining features of representations change
from traditionalism to PDP. This, in turn, produces radical changes
in the very notion of what processing representations means. For
example, RumelharT and McClelland note that for traditionalism:
[t]here is no real difference between the stored
representation in long-term memory and the active
representation in working memory. In PDP models,
though, this is not the case. In these models, the
patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what is
stored is the connection strengths between units that
allow these patterns to be re-created. 16
The implication of this view of representation for cognitive
processing is that:
[u]sing knowledge in processing is no longer a matter
of finding the relevant information in memory and
bringing it to bear; it is part and parcel of the
processing itself. 17
16 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 31.
17 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 32.
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Also, the relevance of some previous experiments within psychology
has been reevaluated within PDP. Again, Rumelhart and McClelland
make this point explicitly.
[TJhese same mechanisms [associated with PDP]
exhibit emergent properties which lead to novel
interpretations of phenomena which have
traditionally been interpretted in other ways . 18
One way of describing the advent of PDP is as provider of a whole
new way of picking out and slicing up (into its causally efficacious
parts) the mental world, such that the very notion of "mental" has
been transformed. Two quotes, again from Rumelhart and
McClelland, bear proof of this transformation.
[PDP has] radically altered the way we think about
the time-course of processing, the nature of
representation, and the mechanisms of learning
.
19
And
This is a profound difference between our approach
and other more conventional approaches, for it
means that almost all knowledge is implicit in the
structure of the device that carries out the task
rather than explicit in the states of units themselves.
Knowledge is not directly accessible to interpretation
by some separate processor, but it is built into the
processor itself and directly determines the course of
processing. It is acquired through tuning of
18 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 13.
19Parallel Distributed Processing, page 13.
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connections as these are used in processing, rather
than formulated and stored as declarative facts
.
20
One interesting aspect of the traditionalism versus PDP debate
is that, while some participants in the debate (most noteably,
proponents of PDP) relish seeing their theory as a challenger in a
scientific revolution sweeping over psychology, and often use Kuhn'
s
terminology in describing their theory as a new paradigm
,
they just
as often fail to take note of some of Kuhn ' s other remarks concerning
the evolution of science. In particular, they fail to notice several key
aspects of his view of scientific revolution with respect to the nature
of discourse between the proponents of the two clashing theories.
Thus, one often finds in the PDP literature an attempt at arguing that
PDP is (objectively considered) the better of the two theories at
explaining psychological phenomena. This flies in the face of Kuhn s
assertion that rational discourse on the relative merits of two
incommensurable paradigms is impossible: to the extent that
argumentation for or against a paradigm is possible, it will be
persuasive (rather than rational) in nature. Thus, the adoption of a
Kuhnian construal of their situation undercuts a second important
working premise of the most vocal PDP enthusiasts: namely, that
their theory is the best.
This sketch of the history of the rise of PDP-as-challenger-
paradigm leaves us still in the midst of a crisis within psychology.
Certainly it is premature to say either that PDP has become the new
paradigm around which future normal science within psychology
20 Parallel Distributed Processing, pp. 75-76.
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will work or that a crisis-like mentality within psychology has been
eased by the solution of some potentially anomalous
counterexamples to traditionalism. Thus, it is still too early to say
whether the final stage of the revolution (i.e., the congregation of the
members of the psychological community around PDP, as a result of
either persuasion or a dying-off of the traditionalist generation) will
be reached. Clearly, it is the view of some PDP adherents that this
paradigm change will eventually occur (or, at least, that it is a goal of
the movement), as is illustrated by the following:
We wish to replace the "computer metaphor" as a
model of the mind with the "brain metaphor" as
model of mind .21
With respect to the "gestalt switch" between paradigms
predicted by Kuhn, not all first-hand accounts lend support to this
aspect of Kuhn ' s theory. For example, Rumelhart and McClelland
describe their piecemeal acceptance of PDP as a model of the mind.
The idea began to seem more and more attractive to
us as the contrast between our convictions about
basic characteristics of human perception, memory,
language, and thought and the accepted formal tools
for capturing mental processes became more
apparent .22
Interestingly, the gestalt switch aspect of a paradigm change at the
level of the individual researcher is highly contested within the
21 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 75.
22 Parallel Distributed Processing, page ix.
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literature that has grown out of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Some authors maintain that, as historical fact, it is
mistaken. For example:
The shift in world view associated with paradigm
changes are likened to the sort of gestalt switch one
may have when, having first seen the notorious
duck-rabbit as a duck, one suddenly sees it as a
rabbit. By and large this analogy is absurdly far-
fetched. For few of us had anything like this
dramatic shift of attitude when, having learned
Newtonian mechanics in school, we came slowly and
perhaps painfully to appreciate the greater virtues of
Einsteinian mechanics
.
23
Newton-Smith continues on to argue that such a gestalt switch
phenomenon, if true, would undercut some of Kuhn's own theses.
Even Kuhn, in some of his examples
,
24 contradicts his prediction of a
gestalt type phenomenon on the part of scientists. Thus, the lack of
concurrence within the PDP literature on this point is not surprising.
Hopefully, the above description of Kuhn's
"incommensurability", both in general and as potentially applicable
to the situation relating traditionalism and PDP as competing
theories, has given the reader a better understanding of how a
Kuhnian may try to interpret the import of "qualitative distinctness",
particularly as applied to traditionalism and PDP. I would like to
contrast that with my own interpretation of "qualitative
distinctness", both as an aid to seeing the differences between my
23W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, page 118.
24See especially his description of the Priestley/Lavoisier debate. /Tie
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pages 54-56.
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view and Kuhn's, and, more importantly, as an aid to gaining a
better understanding of my "qualitative distinctness", simpliciter. I
begin by noting that Kuhn never gives any hard criteria (or even
hints) for deciding when two theories are incommensurable. All of
his case studies describing incommensurability have been historical
ones in which, in retrospect, it is clear that a major shift within a
scientific discipline has occurred. It is not sufficient to leave the
matter at the level of generality at which he speaks. While his
characterization of incommensurability is certainly fruitful, for the
purpose at hand I need concrete criteria for comparison of two
competing theories. Lacking such criteria, it is not even an option on
my part to compare traditionalism and PDP for possible
incommensurability.
It may even be argued that my setting up of criteria for cross-
theoretic comparison refutes the claim that they are indeed
incommensurable
.
25 However this may be, it is clear that my views
2:>
I do not want to turn this section into a commentary on The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, but a few words on one of the more contentious aspects
of that work are in order. The most straightforward reading of the first
edition would have Kuhn disallowing the very possibility of cross-theoretic
comparisons, when those two theories are incommensurable. (1 henceforth
call this the "strong incommensurability thesis".) According to this view,
there can never be any such comparison, because there is no neutral
language within which to perform the comparison. Thus, my posing of the
question: "does traditionalism make the same ontological commitments as
PDP?" in the process of deciding qualitative distinctness is illegitimate, for it
assumes the existence of something (namely, a neutral language) which does
not exist. In his Postscript (added to the second edition as a response to many
criticisms of the first edition), however, he seems to take back this strong
incommensurability thesis and replace it with something else. What that
something else is is not quite clear, but his statements regarding the
possibility of inter-theoretic translation (see page 202.) show that it cannot be
the strong incommensurability thesis. I think the most generous reading is
that incommensurability a la the second edition is merely the claim that
arguments in favor of one theory against another will inevitably be merely
persuasive in nature, as they will use as premises comparison measures based
on aesthetic considerations (eg, simplicity).
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(both those stated in this chapter and in the remainder of this work)
are at odds with those of Kuhn. In particular, I interpret simplicity
and strength criteria as not merely aesthetic", but as providing the
basis for the truth or falsity of causal laws. My combination of a
Lewisian version of lawhood with a realist construal of causation
(admittedly unorthodox, but not, I think, inconsistent) is at odds
with Kuhn s relativism, which explains our differing views on the
possibility of rational arguments for one theory against another. As
I have already often mentioned, I am not in the least here concerned
with a comparison of the relative merits of traditionalism and PDP,
so I shall not develop this point of divergence further.
5.3 Some Answers Given by Others
Most often, the subject under discussion in the traditionalism
versus PDP debate is not whether the two are qualitatively distinct,
but rather which of the two provides the best explanation for mental
phenomena. Such arguments obviously presuppose some sort of
distinctness between the two theories; else, how could one be better
than the other? Whether the distinctness presupposed is my
qualitative distinctness is another matter. In this section, I shall
examine what is perhaps the most famous (or, at least, the most
often cited) exchange in the debate between Fodor and Pylyshyn
(representing traditionalism) and Smolensky (representing PDP) as
to the relative merits of the two theories. My focus will not be so
much empirical evidence cited for or against either theory, but
rather the assumptions (both implicit and explicit) in the
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argumentation of each set of authors with respect to the qualitative
distinctness of traditionalism and PDP. I shall also mention some of
the other positions vis-a-vis qualitative distinctness found in the
literature.
I begin with Smolensky's treatment of the relationship
between traditionalism and PDP. Smolensky states right from the
start that the two theories are distinct:
A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist
approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses
are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses
underlying traditional cognitive models.26
And:
...the level of cognitive analysis adopted by the
subsymbolic paradigm [ie, PDP] for formulating
connectionist models is lower than the level
traditionally adopted by the symbolic paradigm.27
What remains to be done is to understand the specific points of
departure between the two theories, and to examine whether his
notion of distinctness is the same as or entails qualitative
distinctness.
The remark in the second quote concerning a difference in
levels is telling, for, as noted in Section 1, a difference in levels is
evidence for a difference in ontological commitment with respect to
the causally relevant entities. The issue is not so clear, however, for
26
"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page 1.
27
"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism”, page 3.
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Smolensky is not always so consistent in identifying the PDP model
of the mind with the unit-level (as opposed to the pattern-level) of
analysis of PDP systems. I think, though, that on either of the two
identifications, his view results in a qualitative distinctness between
traditionalism and PDP. If we take the second quotation as
representative, and consider PDP systems at the unit-level of
analysis as the model of the mind to be associated with the PDP
paradigm, then the two paradigms are qualitatively distinct, for they
postulate distinct causally efficacious entities. This follows from
three premises that he makes, either explicitly of implicitly:
(1) In PDP systems, the only exceptionless laws are
to be found at the level of changes of states in
individual units.
(2) The representational content of individual units is
not that of concepts.
(3) Traditionalism is committed to the causal
efficaciousness of entities that bear content at the
conceptual level.
He sums up the conclusion of this line of reasoning:
Does the complete formal account of cognition lie at
the conceptual level? The position taken by the
subsymbolic paradigm is: No -- it lies at the
subconceptual level.28
There are, however, passages in which he implies that it is on
the level of analysis of patterns of activation within PDP networks
that the official PDP model of the mind is to be found. This "tension"
28"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page 7.
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is his thinking has a clear source; namely, the fear that the unit-level
of analysis of PDP networks is not a model of the mind
,
for the laws
governing transitions among unit states do not advert to meaning.
He states this himself:
subsymbols [the units of representation of individual
units] are not operated upon by symbol
manipulation: they participate in numerical - not
symbolic — computation
.
29
If one takes this quotation in its strongest interpretation (i.e., that
unit level laws are only syntactic - they do not admit of a construal
as adverting to the meaning of unit states) then this fear is justified.
Thus, he is on occasion driven to considering the level of analysis of
patterns of activation (which he allows represent concepts) as the
model of the mind supplied by PDP. Even on this interpretation, PDP
is qualitatively distinct from traditionalism. Even though the two
make the same ontological commitments vis-a-vis what the mentally
causally efficacious objects and states are (namely, symbols with
conceptual level content), the laws describing state transitions will
be different. According to traditionalism, the mental causal laws are
precisely formalizable and computable; whereas, according to
Smolensky:
[Typically, interactions at the level of patterns of
activity, which, under this intrepretation, would be
the mental causally relevant entities,] can be
computed only approximately. In other words, there
will generally be no precisely valid, complete,
29
"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page 3.
239
computable formal principles at the conceptual level;
such principles exist only at the level of individual
units -- the subconceptual level.30
There is a third construal of PDP that Smolensky never
considers. He never examines whether sense can be made of the
unit-level interaction as adverting to content; rather, as stated
above, he assumes that unit-level laws governing transitions
between activation values are only syntactic (i.e., they admit of no
semantic counterpart). I think, though, that his limiting of content to
the pattern level is unnecessarily restrictive, and shows a common
misunderstanding in the role played by meaning in structuring
causal laws.
Smolensky, along with many others, makes the assumption
that, if causal laws adverting only to syntactic features of a system
are available to explain all syntactic transitions within the system,
then semantic considerations (for example, the semantic properties
possessed by that same system) must be causally inert. Thus,
according to this way of thinking, because a complete description of
unit-level activity can be given in syntactic terms alone, no semantic
laws at the unit-level exist. My view, as made clear in Chapter 2, is
that his assumption results from an incorrect construal of the
counterfactual testing for causal relevance of semantic properties.
Smolensky (and others) who right from the start deny causal
relevance to semantic properties at the unit-level, misinterpret the
antecedent to the counterfactual;
30
"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page 6.
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If the system were not in a state with this particular
(unit-level) meaning, then this other state would not
follow.
as:
Hold everything else constant (e.g., the system
architecture, the items presented to the system
during the learning phase, and the weights learned
during the previous cycles of the system), but
stipulate that the unit state has a different meaning
rather than (my preferred interpretation of it):
Hold the system architecture constant, but allow the
past to vary so that the system is not in a state with
this (unit-level) meaning
...
The weights acquired during the learning cycle govern transitions
between activation values, but the learning cycle (in particular, the
inputs received from the environment and the changes in weights
that result from application of the learning rules as a function of the
reinforcement signal), and, hence, the weights, would have been
different had the environment been different. I am taking seriously
the theory of representation presented in Chapter 4, whereby the
(Type III) representational content of a state is determined by the
causal role that it acquires in mediating the causal sequence
between the presence of an object and the production of behavior
appropriate to that object. Had the object during the learning phase
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been something other than it was, the causal sequence connecting
registration of the presence of that object and object-appropriate
behavior would have been different; hence, the system that resulted
would be syntactically different (because the weights would be
different). So, we would not expect the behavior in this
counterfactual world to remain as it was in the actual world.
Smolensky ' s quick dismissal of a unit-level construal of PDP as
provider of a model of the mind is thus seen to be premature. There
are, as stated in Chapter 4, other reasons for rejecting the unit-level
analysis of PDP as a model of the mind; although, these reasons are
based more on empirical considerations than on an analysis of what
content-adverting causation could possible mean.
The local interpretation schema view of PDP is clearly
qualitatively distinct from traditionalism, as the presumed causally
relevant entity on this view of the mind is a singleton (subconcept)
that is not recognized as alone causally relevant within
traditionalism. Rather, traditionalism recognizes only conceptual-
level states as efficacious.
The most consistent position that Smolensky could take
(although he nowhere does so explicitly) is that PDP as model of the
mind presupposes a distributed interpretation schema - thus, the
ontological commitments of PDP are the same as those of
traditionalism. However, PDP is not in general a mere
implementation of traditionalism (a charge that we shall see made
by Fodor and Pylyshyn), for it is the rare case in which PDP systems
admit of exceptionless transitions between patterns of activation
(and, on a semantic level, between traditionalism-like
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representational states). The second half of this position reinforces
the relevance of the unit-level analysis to PDP as a model of the
mind, in that, qua explanatory model, the actual causal laws
governing mental state transitions must be not merely simulated but
implemented, along with their concommitant ceteris paribus clauses.
This genuine implementation is possible only if the model includes
the unit-level - not as itself providing the mentally causally
relevant representations (a la the local interpretation schema), but
as implementing the true mental causal laws .31
The second of the two works that have set the tone in the
traditionalism versus PDP debate is Fodor and Pylyshyn's
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis". As
already mentioned, these authors are also of the opinion that
traditionalism and PDP are distinct, as is demonstrated by the
following quote from the introductory section of that paper.
When taken as a way of modeling cognitive
architecture, Connectionism really does represent an
approach that is quite different from that of the
Classical cognitive science [traditionalism] that it
seeks to replace .32
The major burden that Fodor and Pylyshyn assume in this paper is
to show that, if PDP is a (true) model of anything, it is something
other than the mind. One can see this in a previously-quoted
passage. Their reasons for arguing in favor of this PDP-as-
31 For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see my unpublished draft On
the Necessity of Including the Implementation Level in a Model of the Mind".
32
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 4.
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implementation view are that mental activity displays certain
regularities (summarized in that paper, but more fully developed in
Fodor s The Language of Thought) which PDP, when interpreted as a
model of the mind, cannot explain. In Section 4 of this chapter, I
shall look at parts of the LOT argument in some detail, in considering
whether it is laying down principles of mental processing (i.e.,
necessary conditions), or merely citing empirical evidence (i.e., the
instances of mental processing that we have heretofore encountered
possess these properties, but there might be, in theory, a being
lacking one or several of these properties who nevertheless has a
mind).33
The LOT argument describes certain conditions had by mental
causal sequences. So, for example, the systematicity of thought
condition stipulates that the possession of certain mental states
implies the ability to possess certain other mental states. The causal
structure of the mind ensures this systematicity. In particular, the
components of certain mentally causally efficacious representations
are themselves causally efficacious, and the causal role of the
complex representations are somehow a function of the causal role
of the constituents. The effect of this combinatorial structure of
certain representations is the above-mentioned systematicity. Fodor
and Pylyshyn then ask the question: "are the causally efficacious
states postulated by PDP similarly structured, so as to ensure
systematicity (and the other conditions of the LOT argument)?" They
33
I think it is safe to assume that all readers of this work are already
sufficiently familiar with the oft-reproduced LOT' argument that 1 can omit a
full summarization of it here. In the process of arguing that it is citing
empirical evidence relevant to, but not laying down necessary conditions for,
mental processing in Section 4, I shall be summarizing parts of it.
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answer: "no": such regularities within PDP systems, on those
occasions when they do obtain, would be merely accidental, not the
result of an underlying combinatorially-structured syntax and
semantics. Does this mean that traditionalism (which does possess
this combinatorial structure) and PDP are qualitatively distinct? The
answer is, I think, not so clear. Fodor and Pylyshyn s preferred
view would answer "yes", for the two models imply divergent
mental causal laws (and, hence, divergent causal sequences ).34
There is also a way of interpreting the LOT argument that
yields a less unequivocal answer. If it really is a principle of mental
phenomena that the LOT conditions hold, then perhaps a PDP system
34Fodor and Pylyshyn give a somewhat confused account on this matter, for
they want to distinguish the merely causal relations among representations
from their structural relations, as in:
"Connectionist theories acknowledge only causal connectedness as a primitive
relation among nodes; when you know how activation and inhibition flow
among them, you know every thing there is to know' about how the nodes in a
network are related. By contrast, Classical theories acknowledge not only
causal relations among the semantically evaluable objects that they posit, but
also a range of structural relations, of which constituency is paradigmatic."
("Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 12.)
How'ever, it is not clear how such structural relations can make a difference if
they are not in some way realized in the causal relations among
representations. The whole point of the LOT argument is that certain
observable mental phenomena are explained by these structural relations;
but, in order to be observ able mental phenomena, these relations must make a
difference in the causal relations among the representations. It is not clear,
therefore, what the structural relations are above and beyond restrictions on
the mental causal laws. Indeed, in many of their examples illustrating the
difference between traditionalist and connectionist models, they describe the
ramifications of combinatorial structure solely in terms of restrictions on the
set of mental causal laws, as in:
"Now consider a Classical machine. This machine has a tape on which it writes
expressions. Among the expressions that can appear on this tape are: "A", "B",
"A&B", "C", "D", "C&D", "A&C&D" ... etc. The machine' s causal constitution is as
follows: whenever a token of the form P&Q. appears on the tape, the machine
writes a token of the form P. An inference from A&B to A thus corresponds to
a tokening of type "A&B" on the tape causing a tokening of type "A"."
("Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", pp. 15-16.)
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will be forced to develop a structure consistent with these conditions
during the learning process. Fodor and Pylyshyn have no argument
(indeed, none is possible) that PDP systems are disbarred from
evolving during learning into systems displaying all of the LOT
conditions. Furthermore, if these conditions constitute a part of the
set of conditions operative in the development of a Type III
(learned) representational system, then the fact that the PDP system
displays these regularities would not be mere coincidence. Fodor
and Pylyshyn never consider this possibility: they assume that such
conditions, in order to be non-contingent, must be "built-into” the
structure of the model, rather than resulting from the learning
process. And, they argue, any PDP system with such a "built-in"
combinatorial structure is nothing above and beyond an
implementation of a traditionalist model. I shall return to this topic
in Section 4, when I examine the nature of the LOT conditions in
more detail.
A second burden of Fodor and Pylyshyn s paper is to argue
that PDP is best understood as a (non-mental) model of the
implementation of the mind: to the extent that PDP has been
successful in explaining certain phenomena, its success can only be
granted on the assumption that it is not a model of the mind, but
rather a model of the subprocesses (none of which involve mental
causal laws) that implement the mind. As I have argued previously,
when two models explain distinct levels of reality (in this case, the
traditionalist model explains the mental level and the PDP model the
implementing level, according to Fodor and Pylyshyn), they are
qualitatively distinct. The ontological commitments of traditionalism
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include states picked out by their representational content, whereas
(on this view) the ontological commitments of PDP include no such
things.
There is a third alternative position on the relationship
between traditionalism and PDP. It states that the mind cannot be
wholly explained by either of the two models; rather, PDP explains
one subset of mental phenomena, traditionalism explains a distinct
subset, and there is no reduction between the two subsets. Both
Smolensky and Fodor and Pylyshyn suggest this as a possibility, but,
in each case, the subset of mental phenomena that "the other" model
explains is vanishingly small. For example, Fodor and Pylyshyn say:
It could still be that [PDP] networks sustain some
cognitive processes. A good bet might be that they
sustain such processes as can be analyzed as the
drawing of statistical inferences. ... Since we doubt
that much of cognitive processing does consist of
analyzing statistical relations, this would be quite a
modest estimate of the prospects for network theory
compared to what the Connectionists themselves
have been offering .35
Smolensky is perhaps a bit more generous in allowing that the
traditionalist model explains mental phenomena dealing with novice
problem solving (i.e., that characterized as the conscious following of
explicit rules). However, neither set of authors wants to grant much.
More ecumenically-minded authors are Robert van Gulick 3() and
3
5
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis , page G8.
3
^See, for example, his commentary on Smolensky s article "On the Proper
Treatment of Connectionism", pp. 57-58.
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Woodfield and MortorD 7
,
who suggest the possibility that fairly large
expanses of mental phenomena are explained by traditionalism and
PDP, respectively. (Smolensky refers to this version of
ecumenicalism as "cohabitation".)
The question then follows, are the two models qualitatively
distinct on this view? Note that this is similar to a comparison of
theories that we have already met in this chapter: namely, that
between the corpuscular and wave theories of light .* 8 There was a
time earlier in this century when physicists interpretted the two
theories not as competing, but as cohabitating. The corpuscular
theory s purview included optical phenomena in which the energy
packet nature of light and the states mentioned in quantifying this
nature were causally efficacious, whereas the wave theory's
purview included those phenomena in which the wave properties
were causally efficacious. Thus, while both theories attempted to
explain the same level of reality, they were not competing to explain
the same phenomena. This is just the view (albeit, with respect to a
different domain) held by the cohabitation proponents in the
traditionalism versus PDP debate. As already argued, the
corpuscular and wave theories are qualitatively distinct. An
analogous argument can be given for the qualitative distinctness of
* 7Also part of commentary on Smolensky's article, page 58.
3
^Usually, when one speaks of the corpuscular versus wave theories, one
means the two competing paradigms in optics in the early 19th century: the
Newtonian theory and the (newer) wave theory (not clearly identifiable with
a single name). In the above passage, however, I mean the cohabitating
theories within optics just before the development of the photon-as-quantum-
mechanical-entity theory of light. During this period, it was common to
consider neither corpuscular nor wave theory as alone encompassing all
optical phenomena; rather, some phenomena were explainable by means of
the corpuscular theory, and other phenomena by the wave theory.
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traditionalism and PDP on the cohabitation view: by the very
supposition that the two theories cover distinct ranges of
phenomena, there must be some causally relevant property or
properties that split the overall set of cognitive phenomena into two
subsets, such that those phenomena explainable by traditionalism
have that property or properties and those explainable by PDP do
not, and vice versa. Thus, the ontological commitments of the two
theories differ. The end effect of the differences are clearly
identifiable when considering whether there is a possible
isomorphism between causal laws.39 If the strict exclusivity of
theory range is maintained (as, in a consistent cohabitation view, it
must be), there can be no isomorphism; for, by the very supposition
of distinct ranges, no isomorphism of causal sequences is possible.
The effects mentioned in the one theory would never be mentioned
in the other. To cite a concrete example, it is common among
proponents of the cohabitation view to put memory storage and
access phenomena within the range of PDP, and outside the range of
traditionalism. Thus, while traditionalist mental causal laws may
make use of remembered items, the actual retrieval of those items
in the mind is not within traditionalism's purview. So,
traditionalism would postulate no causal law, the "effect-side" of
which is the recalling-of-x. This could, however, appear on the
"effect side" of a PDP causal law. Where a correlate of an effect
39As noted, sameness of ontological commitment is conceptually prior to
isomorphism of causal laws; however, as the ontological commitment of a
theory becomes clear only on an analysis of the objects and states quantified
over in its causal laws, the two characteristics are not independent.
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postulated by one theory is wholly absent from the other, there can
be no isomorphism.
This concludes this discussion of the views concerning the
qualitative distinctness between traditionalism and PDP found in the
literature. We have seen the two flavors of qualitative distinctness
exemplified. Both Smolensky and Fodor and Pylyshyn admit
readings in which they are describing different levels of reality (for
Smolensky, this is the less preferred interpretation of his view,
whereas for Fodor and Pylyshyn, it is the more preferred). The
other readings of Smolensky, Fodor and Pylyshyn, as well as the
cohabitationists represent the other flavor of qualitative
distinctness, for which the two theories describe the same level, but
have little or no overlap. In Section 5, I will put my neck on the line
and give my answer to this question.
5.4 Issues Concerning Computability and Computation
(Plus, the LOT Argument)
Before tackling this issue, though, I feel obliged to discuss a
topic that has been oft discussed in the literature, the treatment of
which I believe shows a widespread misunderstanding of the nature
of computation — and, in particular, what distinguishes
computational processes from non-computational processes. The
form in which one most often meets this topic in the traditionalism
versus PDP debate is:
My preferred model [proponents on both sides of
this debate make use of the argument form] is
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superior as a model of the mind, because it can
compute function-x; whereas, your model cannot.40
Thus, a traditionalist might mention some Turing-computable
function and hint that no PDP network could realize it. As follows
from what I said in Chapter 4, Section 1, such an argument is
guaranteed to be unsound, for it has been known since the 1940s
that a PDP network can (in theory) be constructed to instantiate any
Turing-computable function. One also sees the reverse: PDP
proponents saying that their model is superior because it can
compute functions that no traditionalist-type machine could
compute. This error is particularly glaring, as the set of computable
functions is determined by the set of Turing-computable functions.
(This assumes a construal of Church's Thesis as a quasi-analytic
statement -- to be computable is to be Turing-computable. The
reader is free to disagree with this construal. This does not,
however, ameliorate the errorfulness of referring to the processes
within PDP systems as computational.)
Both of these lines of argument show the same
misunderstanding, in that both presuppose that what PDP systems
do is to compute. This is, however, not the case; rather, PDP systems
instantiate functions. The misunderstanding arises because, given
the current state of technology, PDP systems must be simulated on
digital computers; so, it is perhaps natural to assume that PDP
systems compute their functions. (Interestingly, though, no one
40Obviouslv, this is premised on function-x' s being a cognitively relevant
function -- ie, a function realized in cognitive agents. Arguments for this
suppressed premise are, however, usually lacking.
251
would make the analogous mistake of saying that a real spring/mass
system whose state transitions are being simulated on a digital
computer therefore computes its state transitions.) Looking back to
Chapter 3 and the definition of a computational process (i.e., a
computational process is one in which (1) the representational states
being manipulated are explicitly stored, and (2) the program that
refers to and transforms these states corresponds to formal rules
governing the manner of manipulation), one sees that the second
condition is not satisfied. In PDP systems, there is no distinct
program governing the manipulation of representational states;
rather, the representational states (i.e., activation values + weights)
"include" the "program".
One very interesting thesis mentioned by proponents of PDP is
that their systems can instantiate functions that are not computable.
Whether any particular one of these non-computable functions is of
significance to PDP as a model of the mind is still an open question.
The only attempt I've seen in the literature to isolate a particular,
clearly cognitive phenomenon41 that does not correspond to a
41 The emphasis is meant to make clear that I wish to exclude Rumelhart and
McClelland s "On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs", which is
sometimes cited as a provider of an argument that there is a cognitive
function that is not computable. But, as the authors themselves state: " ... we
suggest that the mechanisms that process language and make judgments of
grammaticality are constructed in such a way that their performance is
characterizable by rules, but that the rules themselves are not written in
explicit form anywhere in the mechanism." (Page 217, italics added.) I also
wish to exclude the various writings of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, for they
nowhere cite particular psychological evidence that some cognitive
phenomenon does not correspond to a computable function. In any event,
they are not proponents of PDP as I have laid it out in Chapter 4, for they
explicitly deny causal relevance to meaning. Also excluded are the recent
writings of Roger Penrose, whose arguments, I admit, 1 apparently do not
understand. And, like Dreyfus and Dreyfus, he is in any case no supporter of
PDP as a model of the mind.
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computable function is due to Cummins and Schwarz
.
42 However,
their example of such a cognitive phenomenon (behavior relating to
clothing) remains purely anecdotal.
Perhaps, even under the assumption that no individual non-
Turing computable function is cognitively necessary, the mere fact
that PDP does not engage in computation is sufficient to pronounce
the two theories qualitatively distinct. This is, I think, the most
ambitious interpretation of Fodor and Pylyshyn s intent in their
charge against PDP, that it is not getting it (i.e., modelling the mind)
right because it does not presuppose that mental processes are
computational in nature. Their LOT argument can be summarized as
follows: Human mental phenomena display certain pervasive
properties (i.e., productivity, systematicity of representation,
compositionality of representation, and systematicity of inference).
These properties are explainable only on the assumption that mental
processing consists of rule-governed manipulation on
representations in a combinatorially structured language of thought
-- ie, that mental processing consists of computation. They couch
this argument in several different forms. One version is:
But we are not claiming that you can't reconcile a
Connectionist architecture with an adequate theory
of mental representation (specifically with a
combinatorial syntax and semantics for mental
representations). On the contrary, of course you can:
All that's required is that you use your network to
implement a Turing machine, and specify a
combinatorial structure for its computational
language. What it appears that you can't do,
42See "Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition", in Connectionism and the
Philosophy of Mind, edited by Horgan and Tienson.
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however, is have both a combinatorial
representational system and a Connectionist
architecture at the cognitive level
.
43
Thus, they attempt a transcendental proof (in the Kantian sense) of
the computational nature of the mind. If their proof goes through,
then the non-computationality of PDP processes would make it
qualitatively distinct from traditionalism. In this case, it would be a
condition on any explanatory model of the mind that it instantiate
all mental functions computationally: mental causal laws would
quantify necessarily only over computational states.
While the thought of proving such a strong result might bring
glee to Fodor and Pylyshyn, their actual supporting argument for the
LOT falls very far short of establishing any such thing. As I read it,
all that they have done is to have listed several properties possessed
by mental phenomena (although, as even they would admit, not
universally so). One way of explaining these properties is by
positing a certain type of mental architecture (namely,
traditionalism). Thus, the whole LOT argument argument is a sort of
"inference to the best explanation". They tend to waffle on this
point. There are passages, such as: "The traditional argument has
been that these features of cognition [systematicity, etc.] are, on the
one hand, pervasive and, on the other hand, explicable only on the
assumption that mental representations have internal structure ," 44
as well as passages suggesting a more modest proposal, such as: "But
43
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis , page 28.
44
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis , page 33,
italics added.
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if this explanation [linking systematicity with the existence of
combinatorial structure] is right (and there don't seem to be any
others on offer), then mental representations have internal structure
and there is a language of thought."^ On this more reasonable
interpretation of the LOT argument, the computational nature of
mental states is not causally relevant, so no qualitative distinctness
based on differences in ontological commitment can be traced back
to the non-computational nature of the causally efficacious states in
PDP systems.
Perhaps, though, one could argue that there could be no
possible isomorphism between the causal laws in the two theories
because, whereas the traditionalist laws would satisfy those
properties (systematicity, etc.) identified in the LOT argument, the
PDP laws would not. This seems to be, however, a bit premature
without an accompanying argument that the PDP laws as resulting
from the learning process would not possess just these properties .46
Fodor and Pylyshyn consider this possibility as a way of reconciling
PDP to traditionalism, but then reject it:
It s possible to imagine a Connectionist being
prepared to admit that while systematicity doesn t
follow from — and hence is not explained by -
Connectionist architecture, it is nonetheless
compatible with that architecture. It is, after all,
perfectly possible to follow a policy of building
45"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", pages 39-
40. Note in particular the weakness of claim implicit in this passage.
46Yet another topic for future research is the ability of multi-layered PDP
networks to develop a connectivity pattern (perhaps generalizing from
presented examples in which both P&Q. and P are true, to the universally
quantified x&y->x) that produces a system meeting the conditions identified in
the LOT argument.
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networks that have aR b nodes only if they have bRa
nodes ... etc. There is therefore nothing to stop a
Connectionist from stipulating — as an independent
postulate of his theory of mind -- that all biologically
instantiated networks, are, de facto, systematic.
...
[However], it s not enough for a Connectionist to
agree that all minds are systematic; he must also
explain how nature contrives to produce only
systematic minds. Presumably there would have to
be some sort of mechanism, over and above the ones
that Connectionism per se posits, the functioning of
which insures the systematicity of biologically
instantiated networks. ... There are, however, no
proposals for such a mechanism. Or, rather, there is
just one: ... Classical architecture
.
47
This is the closest that Fodor and Pylyshyn ever come to arguing
that PDP will certainly produce a set of causal laws non-isomorphic
to those of traditionalism because its laws will not necessarily reflect
the above-mentioned conditions. However, recall that, for the case
at hand, one cannot speak of the specific mental laws associated with
either traditionalism or PDP because they have yet to be formulated.
Hence, the test for isomorphism, simpliciter, must be weakened to a
test for possible isomorphism: are the two sets of laws possibly
isomorphic? Lacking a proof that the mental causal laws that will
result in PDP systems necessarily display non-systematicity, Fodor
and Pylyshyn s LOT argument does not supply evidence that
traditionalism and PDP are qualitatively distinct.
47
"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 50.
Italics as in original.
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5.5 Are Traditionalism and PDP Qualitatively Distinct?
I have repeatedly stated and reiterate here (more for my own
benefit than for that of the reader — I must constantly remind
myself of my goal so as not to wander too far afield) that I am
performing a conceptual analysis and comparison, not a comparison
of the empirical adequacy of either traditionalism or PDP as a model
of the mind. My job is done as soon as the issue of qualitative
distinctness is settled; the relative merits of the two theories is a
topic for another day. So, finally, we reach the point where I give
my answer to this question.
My starting assumption is that PDP is put forward as a model
of the mind. While many researchers (predominantly
neurobiologists) use PDP-type networks to model neural processes,
to assume this view decides the issue of qualitative distinctness
leaving little room for a philosophically-interesting discussion. Even
on the other view, though, there are several ways of interpreting the
relationship between the processes modelled by traditionalism and
those modelled by PDP. The outline of this section is as follows. I
describe each of these (three) alternatives, and consider the
question: are the two models qualitatively distinct under this
interpretation? As the first alternative has already been discussed in
Section 3, and the second alternative is, in a sense, a special case of
the first and third alternative, I shall give a rather abbreviated
treatment to these. I concentrate on the third alternative, which is, I
think, the alternative that correctly depicts the relationship between
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traditionalism and PDP. I argue that, under this interpretation, the
two models are qualitatively distinct.
We have already met the first interpretation of the
relationship between traditionalism and PDP in Section 3 of this
chapter on the possible readings of Smolensky. According to this
view, PDP is an implementation of traditionalism (so, some reductive
or at least supervenient relation is assumed to hold), yet both are
models of the mind, because both posit mental causal laws (i.e.,
causal laws that pick out states based upon their representational
content). This corresponds to the reading of Smolensky that
identifies the mental causal laws with unit level state transitions. At
first, the very idea of two models explaining the same causal realm
(namely, that realm whose laws advert to content), one of which is
an implementation of the other, may seem ludicrous -- after all,
there can be at most one level describing mental phenomena. Hence,
two models assumed to describe distinct levels cannot both be
models of the mind. The summary dismissal of this view is,
however, premature (at least, it is premature to dismiss it as being
incoherent). Perhaps the mental realm is causally "fat", in that
mental causal phenomena are distributed over two distinct levels. If
the reader is having difficulty making sense of this as a genuine
possibility, consider an analogous relationship -- that between
Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics restricted to the
domain of (relatively) slow-moving, large objects. It is not
incoherent to maintain that both describe physical causal
phenomena, yet that quantum mechanics implements Newtonian
mechanics. By restricting consideration to large objects — for which
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quantum effects are not discernible — the domain of mismatch, and,
hence, of non-reducibility, is excluded. Perhaps, then, the mental
realm is like the domain of classical physical objects - explainable
by two distinct theories, one of which implements the other. (This
obviously skirts the issue of whether both theories do in fact
correctly describe this domain.) In any event, this demonstrates that
this possible relationship between traditionalism and PDP is not
incoherent.
As already argued, the two models would be qualitatively
distinct on this view. Also as mentioned previously, I do not find
this alternative to be the one that best depicts the relationship
between traditionalism and PDP, for it identifies the model of the
mind offered by PDP as the unit level of description of PDP systems.
A second possible relationship allows only partial reduction or
supervenience between the two models. Thus, for a restricted
domain within the overall mental realm, PDP implements
traditionalism; but, for another domain, no reduction or
supervenience of mental states posited by traditionalism to states
posited by PDP is possible. For this alternative, the qualitative
distinctness of the two models with respect to the domain of
reducibility or supervenience decides the issue of qualitative
distinctness simpliciter: they are qualitatively distinct. I do not
reject this possibility outright, but I note that the most
philosophically interesting question relates to the qualitative
distinctness of the two models when restricted to the domain for
which traditionalism is not implemented by PDP. This is an issue
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that I consider with the third alternative interpretation of the
relationship between traditionalism and PDP.
According to this third alternative, there is no possible
reduction or supervenience relations linking traditionalism and PDP:
there is no sense in which the mental realm is causally fat, and the
two models explain distinct levels of phenomena within that realm.
Looking back to Chapter 2 and my preferred view of causation
presented there, the mental facts are predicted by the traditionalist
mental causal laws plus initial conditions, and the mental facts are
predicted by the PDP mental causal laws plus initial conditions, and
there are no bridge statements (either universally quantified or
particular) linking the states quantified over within the two models.
Thus, traditionalism and PDP are models competing to explain the
same level. As mentioned in Section 1 of this chapter, competing
models are distinct, but not necessarily qualitatively distinct. To
settle that question we must examine the two aspects of qualitative
distinctness as applied to this interpretation of their relationship.
The first question to ask is: do they make the same ontological
commitments? In the final sections of Chapters 3 and 4, I laid out
the ontological commitments associated with traditionalism and PDP,
respectively. First, the very broad considerations. Both theories are
based on a physicalist metaphysics, and both assume that there are
causally efficacious mental states picked out by their content. These
mental states are explicitly instantiated in physical states,
presumably in the physical states of the brain.
Since mental causal laws advert to content, one aspect of the
ontological commitment of a theory of the mind is the level of reality
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represented by these causally efficacious mental states. I think that
a good case can be made that the LOT argument imposes on
traditionalism constraints that imply that the level of realitv
represented by mental states corresponds to word-concepts and
propositions easily expressible by words and sentences in our public
language. Similarly, the general considerations favoring a
distributed interpretation schema impose on PDP constraints that
likewise imply this level of reality as that represented by the
causally efficacious mental states. Thus, the ontological
commitments of the two theories are the same.
The question of ontological commitment is, however, only one
of two questions to be addressed in deciding the issue of qualitative
distinctness. The more complex of the two questions is: Are the two
causal relations on the set of efficacious states associated with
traditionalism and PDP respectively possibly isomorphic? Here it is
important to recall what it means when a proponent of one or the
other of the two models pronounces: "this is an explanatory model
of the mind." Mental state transitions are regulated by the mental
causal laws. In particular, the transitions of the states of a
traditionalist (or PDP) system identified as the mentally causally
efficacious states are regulated by the mental causal laws. These
state transitions (picked out by content in a semantic description of
system behavior) are also describable in syntactic terms .48 Indeed, it
48
I feel obliged to reiterate a point made repeatedly in this work, and justified
in Chapter 2 -- my account of mental causation does not leave content causally
impotent, even though the behavior of a system (whether artificial or
biological in origin) that admits of a semantic description also admits of a
syntactic description.
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is the syntactic description of state transitions that defines the
corresponding abstract machine.
According to traditionalism, it is the computational states that
are the causally efficacious mental states. According to (my
reworking of) PDP, it is the activation value plus weight vector
states. So, traditionalism and PDP are qualitatively distinct only if
there is no possible mapping between computational states and
activation value plus weight vector states, such that the state
transitions within the respective systems are the same. Is there
possibly such a mapping? Given what I have said in Chapters 3 and
4, there cannot be such a mapping. Consider the evolution of the
representational states within a PDP system. When a state changes,
it must be either that one (or more) unit activation values changed,
or that one (or more) weights changed, or that one (or more) of each
changed. Let's consider the first of the three cases separately.
When only a unit activation value (or multiple unit activation
values) has changed, there is no change in the line of succession of
activation values — all that has happened is that the next overall
activation value has replaced the current one. A line of succession
(determined by a fixed pattern of weights) defines a system
dynamics not necessarily dissimilar from the succession of
computational states within a traditionalist system. (Keep in mind
that my task is to identify a dissimilarity between the state
transitions of traditionalist and PDP representation states that is
guaranteed to occur.)
The situation is otherwise when the change of state within a
PDP system is owing to a change in weight (or weights). In this case,
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the line of succession of future states is altered. Recall from Chapter
4 the role that weights play within PDP systems: they implicitly
encode the sequence of patterns of activation that will be produced
on a particular input. Whereas a change in activation value merely
changes the position of the system within a sequence of activation
values, a change in weight changes the whole sequence. There is no
comparable feature within a traditionalist system.
Weight change within PDP systems using the back-prop
technique is the result of back-propagation of an error signal during
learning. Perhaps, an opponent of the qualitative distinctness of
traditionalism and PDP may argue, a similar effect can be found
during the execution of a learning cycle within a traditionalist
system. Certainly traditionalist systems can learn (an active area of
research within traditionalist-based AI is the development of
learning algorithms); however, the computational assumption at the
heart of traditionalism limits learning within traditionalism to
changes in the manipulated data structures. Changes in the
algorithm (or program) take one outside the scope of computational
processing. Again, this imagined opponent may wish to divorce
traditionalism from computationalism. This move, however, would
prove the undoing of traditionalism as a model of the mind, for the
representational content of traditionalist states depends crucially on
those states being computational states. Expressed compactly: No
computationalist assumption, no representational content. No
representational content, no subsumption under mental causal laws.
No subsumption under mental causal laws, no model of the mind.
263
Traditionalism without the computational assumption is not a
possible contender for a model of the mind.
Again, this imagined opponent may try another tack. Perhaps,
the mode of learning within PDP is a detail not relevant to PDP's
being a model of the mind -- we should consider PDP sans learning
when asking the question: are traditionalism and PDP qualitatively
distinct? This tack is, like the previous one, doomed to failure, for
PDP sans learning is not a possible candidate for a model of the
mind. In accordance with Chapter 4, the representational content of
PDP states is determined by the causal role of those states; but, the
causal role for Type III representational systems (with "genuine
intentional mental states") is determined via learning. Unlike
traditionalism, PDP has no alternative means (i.e., computational
statehood) for fixing meaning, so learning is an integral part of its
being a possible model of the mind.
Looking at the foregoing argument in overview, we see that
there is no possible isomorphism associating the transitions between
mentally causally efficacious states within traditionalism and PDP.
Various attempts at modifying the features of either theory so as to
allow a possible isomorphism result in a product that is not a
possible model of the mind. Therefore, taking the two theories
seriously as models of the mind implies their qualitative
distinctness.
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